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Foreword
For nearly 50 years the unemployment insurance program
has functioned as a unique and largely successful in
tergovernmental effort. From its inception, federal and state
governments have each had principal jurisdiction over par
ticular aspects of the program and both have shared respon
sibilities for others. The distribution of authority and
responsibilities has provided a balance of power which, in
the author©s view, accounts for the vitality of the program
and its responsiveness to new problems over the years.
Rubin©s concern is that recent economic developments and
political shifts are producing an increasing federal
dominance and a departure from long-standing program
goals. From his analysis of the qualities and dynamics which
have contributed to the UI program©s past success, he con
cludes that the future of the program requires a return to the
traditional federal-state balance of power.
Facts and observations presented in this study are the sole
responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not necessari
ly represent the positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
Jack R. Woods
Acting Director
July 1983
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The author, Murray A. Rubin, obtained B.A. and M.A.
degrees at Rutgers University and later pursued graduate
studies in political science at Ohio State University. In 1960
he joined the staff of the Unemployment Insurance Service
of the Labor Department©s former Bureau of Employment
Security, where he specialized in state and federal UI legisla
tion. As chief of the Division of Program Policy and Legisla
tion, he was responsible for review of state UI legislation for
conformity with federal law, preparation of draft legislation
to assist states, negotiation with state officials on issues of
nonconformity, and development of federal UI legislative
programs. He retired from the Department after 29 years of
government service. In 1979 he was appointed Consultant
for Legislative Studies for the National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation, where he prepared reports
on a number of major UI issues. Since then he has con
tracted with both governmental and private organizations as
a consultant on unemployment insurance.
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Preface
This monograph reflects my association for almost 20
years with thousands of individuals in the state and federal
employment security field. The accomplishments of
unemployment insurance, this unique experiment in in
tergovernmental relations, are due in large measure to the
skills and personal commitment of many of these public ser
vants.
This monograph is dedicated to the memory of my first
supervisor in the Unemployment Insurance Service, Philip
Booth, who died in 1981. He is most representative, in my
mind, of the "old guard," a diminishing group of outstand
ing federal and state civil servants who established the
guiding principles of this program, and whose dedication
served it so well for 50 years.
I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Saul Blaustein
of the Upjohn Institute for his early support and continuing
encouragement. This monograph has been much improved
because of his many suggestions and careful editing. I am in
debted also to my wife, whose patience, personal experience
with the program, and typing skills helped see us through
several drafts of this monograph. Errors and other limita
tions are solely my responsibility.
Murray Rubin
April 1983
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Introduction

The unemployment insurance program has been successful
by any reasonable measure throughout its nearly 50 years of
existence. It has provided hope and help to millions of
workers at critical times in their lives. Money for necessary
expenses has been paid to qualified unemployed workers
quickly, in an impartial manner, without a means or needs
test and with relatively little fraud or scandal. Unlike
welfare, which is based on a demonstration of need,
unemployment insurance has not cost workers their selfrespect. Its cost to employers, who finance the program, has
not been negligible, but neither has it been excessive, given
the value provided. The dollars pumped by the program into
failing economies have helped workers and employers by
forestalling potential economic disasters at both local and
national levels.
These accomplishments have been made despite two ap
parent obstacles that seem serious enough to defeat any
public program. While it is now accepted that insurance
against unemployment is a legitimate governmental respon
sibility, the degree of protection to be provided is the subject
of unremitting controversy, primarily between those anxious
to ensure a high level of adequacy of protection and those
for whom program costs, employer tax rates, and potential
work disincentives are important concerns. This debate sur
faces at least once every two years in the legislatures of all 50
States, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
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Islands, and not infrequently at the federal legislative level.
Since each element of unemployment insurance qualifying
requirements, benefit amounts, benefit duration, eligibility
and disqualification provisions, tax rates and financing pro
visions has cost implications, proposed amendments to any
and all such elements may provoke controversy. Over 2,000
unemployment insurance-related proposals are introduced
each year in the states© legislatures. Not all are contentious,
and not all controversy involves program adequacy versus
program costs. However, those considerations underlie
debate on most of the significant amendments.
But rather than being an obstacle, the cost-adequacy con
troversy has made unemployment insurance (UI) a dynamic
program, responsive to economic and social change. When
opposing views have been reasonably balanced, controversy
and ensuing debate have usually resulted either in enactment
of carefully considered legislation, or at least defeat of pro
posals that would weaken the program©s effectiveness. When
debate has been absent because of the dominance of either
labor or management, the program has suffered distortions.
The second apparent obstacle also involves controversy. It
arises from the fact that responsibilities for unemployment
insurance are shared between two levels of government with
different perspectives.
Each of the states and three other jurisdictions (called
"states" for UI purposes) provides for its own complete,
self-contained unemployment insurance program, ad
ministered by state employees. The states are responsible for
all substantive matters: qualifying requirements; benefit
levels; disqualification provisions; eligibility conditions; and
tax structure. The federal government©s responsibilities in
clude maintaining nationwide standards which often include
program matters. Friction results from state resentment of
federal encroachments into state jurisdiction. It results also
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when state enactments or practices appear to federal officials
to violate national standards. These issues of conformity
with federal requirements are usually settled through
peaceful negotiation, but occasionally they provoke heated
confrontations. What makes conformity with federal stan
dards compelling is the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,
which provides for a payroll tax on virtually all employers. It
allows employers to credit against most of the federal tax the
taxes they pay under a state unemployment insurance pro
gram if that program conforms with federal standards. If a
state UI law does not conform, employers receive no credit
and are liable for the full federal tax, which may be con
siderably more than the taxes many employers pay under the
state law. None of federal taxes thus payable would be used
for unemployment benefits. Payment of both the full federal
tax and state unemployment taxes could be prohibitive. Ac
cordingly, the state would probably be forced either to aban
don its nonconforming unemployment insurance program or
find alternative financing. In most cases, denial of tax credit
would be tantamount to elimination of the state©s program.
Similarly, although the states are responsible for the ad
ministration of their programs, the responsibility for the
design and nature of that administration is shared, since
financing of UI administrative costs comes from federal
funds. (A portion of the federal unemployment tax, which
cannot be offset by state UI taxes paid, provides the source
of funds for program administration.) Thus, state laws and
practice also conform with additional federal controls (ad
ministrative standards and directives), if the state is to
qualify for the funds necessary to run its program.
As indicated above, the result of this division of respon
sibilities is continual discord. The states seek independence
from federal supervision over administrative matters and
from federal intrusion into program matters. Federal ad
ministrations seek greater authority to establish priorities,
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ensure economical operations and exert more influence over
program matters.
The intergovernmental conflicts, like the program
adequacy-program costs controversy, have provided a "bet
ter product" but only as long as the powers on each side
have been reasonably balanced. Until recent years, statutory
and practical restraints on the authority of both levels of
government have helped preserve the balance by keeping
each from usurping the powers of the other. These restraints
and the resulting balance of state and federal authority have
produced conflict, but more important, they have generated
the high degree of intergovernmental cooperation that is
necessary in order for either partner to operate effectively.
This cooperation has been the key to the program©s success.
For example, neither the federal nor any state govern
ment, given the awesome sanctions available, has any in
terest in provoking a conformity confrontation that could
jeopardize the continued existence of a state©s program. The
result has been the resolution, through negotiation, of all but
a handful of issues. Thus, despite an average of about 20
potential conformity issues being raised each year since the
program began, there have been fewer than 30 formal con
formity hearings actually undertaken over the first 45 years.
Another practical limitation on federal officials that en
courages cooperation is their accountability to Congress.
Amendments restricting the authority of the Secretary of
Labor have followed past federal administrative actions con
sidered arbitrary by a state-oriented Congress. That ex
perience has been an inhibiting factor even during periods
when administrations have been popular with Congress.
The states also face practical limitations on their authority
that encourage cooperation and restraint. For example, cer
tain past state enactments have been considered so arbitrary
or discriminatory as to provoke congressional adoption of
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new federal standards. Each standard diminishes all states©
authority.
The restraints on federal authority have allowed the wide
discretion states have to tailor their programs to local condi
tions and preferences. This freedom has made possible the
conflict and debate within state legislatures that have made
state programs dynamic and responsive. The restraints on
state authority have helped control state excesses and unwise
legislation. The division of responsibilities and the restraints
on both levels of government have necessitated the coopera
tion that has produced sound programs and effective ad
ministration.
It may be that other structural arrangements would have
been as successful. A wholly state UI system would produce
even greater diversity. However, without at least minimum
federal responsibility, it seems likely that pressures of in
terstate competition ultimately would lead to serious inade
quacies and inequities. A wholly federal system would have
the advantage of greater efficiency that uniformity offers,
but also the potential of sterility. Indeed, most of the innova
tions that have kept the unemployment insurance program
current and dynamic have originated in the states, not from
Washington, because of the opportunity for experimentation
that the federal-state system encourages.
The balance of power produced by the division of respon
sibilities and the system of checks has always been fragile,
dependent as it is on voluntary as well as statutory restraints.
It has been seriously threatened in recent years. Increasingly,
the federal government has tightened control over ad
ministration of the states© programs. More federal standards
concerning substantive program matters, originally the
states© jurisdiction, have been enacted since 1970 than during
the first 35 years of the system©s existence. Recent federal re
quirements concerning extended benefit duration have
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dominated that aspect of unemployment insurance and in
fluenced regular program changes. Federal loans to
bankrupt state UI funds and federally imposed conditions
for repayment since 1974 have produced new federal in
fluence over state UI tax matters.
There are as many reasons for the new federal dominance
over the unemployment insurance system as there are
manifestations of federal control. Preservation of the
balance of power has been dependent on the states meeting
their obligations and the federal government exercising
restraint. Failures of the states to keep their programs cur
rent, adequate and solvent have contributed much to the re
cent federal invasion into matters ordinarily outside its
jurisdiction. Currently (early 1983), insolvency is the most
serious problem, with about half the states© UI funds in debt
because of severe recessions, and more borrowers on the
horizon. Federal restraint has been undermined not only by
state failures, but also by inclusion in the federal unified
budget of the Unemployment Trust Fund, through which all
UI moneys flow, and the system©s consequent vulnerability
to national cost-cutting pressures.
The upset of the federal-state balance of power that has
lasted nearly 50 years threatens the breakup of an in
tergovernmental relationship that has been both unique and
highly successful. The full consequences of this trend are not
yet clear.
The following chapters discuss first the original reasoning
for the federal-state distribution of responsibilities and the
provisions originally adopted to implement the system. They
next describe later federal standards and their impact on the
balance of power. The administration of the federal laws is
explored, as well as the process of resolving conflicts. Final
ly, an assessment is attempted on the value of the balance to
the system and the prospects for its preservation.
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The intent of these chapters is to describe the federal-state
division of responsibilities; to identify how the restraints on
each partner©s authority actually operated; to determine how
and why they have been weakened; and finally, to evaluate
the implications of increasing federal dominance. This effort
seeks to examine the extent to which the federal-state balance
of power has been important to the success of the American
system of unemployment insurance.
Any light shed on this question should not only add to the
understanding of the UI system, but also may have implica
tions for other federal-state programs. In a period when new
approaches to federalism are being explored, an understand
ing of the reasons for at least one federal-state program©s
success should be useful.

Chapter 1
Conceptual Framework
for a Cooperative System

Aside from those directly employed in it, few people are
aware that unemployment insurance is a federal-state pro
gram. Even fewer have a clear idea of how responsibilities
are actually shared. Nor is there much overt evidence
anywhere of the division of authority. For example, when a
laid off worker files a claim for unemployment insurance at
the local claims office in Elizabeth, New Jersey (or any of the
other approximately 2,000 local offices in this country) his
interest is likely to focus only on whether he qualifies, how
soon he can collect, the size of his check, and for how long
he can draw. The worker may know that those objects of his
concern have been subjects of debate in the New Jersey
legislature. It©s unlikely that he would know that these ques
tions are also the subjects of an on-going federal-state tug of
war that began in 1935.
From all he can observe, the Elizabeth claimant will
assume that unemployment insurance is solely a matter be
tween him and the State of New Jersey. The local office is a
state-owned building. The claimstaker and all other UI and
employment service personnel the claimant sees are state
employees. The requirements the worker must satisfy are all
spelled out in the New Jersey Unemployment Compensation
Law. So too are the formulas from which the amount of his
benefits is computed, the work-search and other tests of
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availability he must pass, and the disqualifications that may
be imposed on him. The unemployment check is signed by
state officials and drawn from the New Jersey unemploy
ment insurance fund, which is financed by UI taxes paid by
New Jersey employers and workers. Not a whisper of federal
influence appears to exist.
A federal worker employed by the U.S. Department of
Labor©s (DOL) Unemployment Insurance Service to review
state UI laws for their conformity with federal requirements
would see the program from a different perspective. She will
know that New Jersey would probably not have enacted an
unemployment insurance law as early as 1936, if at all, if the
Social Security Act had not been adopted a year earlier. She
will also know that the source of most major provisions of
the New Jersey law, as well as the other states© laws, is
legislative language suggested by the Social Security Board
and later by the DOL. The local office operation in Elizabeth
is paid for entirely with federal funds, including the salary of
the claimstaker; federal funds finance, as well, the salaries of
all other UI personnel in New Jersey and elsewhere.
Registration, reporting and claim filing requirements the
claimant in Elizabeth must meet are governed by federal
standards. A federal standard also applies to the time it takes
the state to send the claimant his first check. If benefits are
denied for any reason, the claimant is entitled to an appeal,
as required by federal law, and the time within which a deci
sion on the appeal can reasonably be expected is governed by
a federal standard. If unemployment conditions are bad in
New Jersey, the claimant may be entitled to as much as a
13-week extension of benefits, again because of federal law.
From the federal employee©s perspective, virtually every
significant aspect of unemployment insurance is directly or
indirectly controlled by federal law.
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This example shows how thoroughly responsibilities are
divided. It is hard to find another public program with
authority so intertwined between two separate governments.
The general lack of awareness of the existence of the partner
ship is perhaps a reflection of how smoothly it has operated.

Origins and Rationale
This chapter describes some of the thinking that led to the
allocation of the basic responsibilities for the UI program
between the federal government and the states. The division
of responsibilities was incorporated into the original UI pro
visions of the Social Security Act which continue to dictate
the structural framework of the American system of
unemployment insurance. The most authoritative discussion
of the reasoning for the federal-state division of respon
sibilities is contained in the 1935 Report to the President of
President Roosevelt©s Committee on Economic Security. 1
The Committee recommended federal legislation to
establish a federal-state system of unemployment insurance.
Evidently, it did not consider seriously two other possible
options. The first was retention of the status quo, which
meant leaving total responsibility for unemployment in
surance to state initiative. The failure of this approach was a
principal reason the President believed federal action was
needed in the UI area. As late as 1934, only Wisconsin had
enacted a UI law. Even less realistic was another op
tion leaving unemployment insurance to individual
employer initiative. Private unemployment benefit plans had
developed very slowly, were quite limited, and many did not
survive the early 1930s. 2
The Committee considered a wholly federal UI program
but rejected it in favor of a federal-state system for a number
of reasons, not the least compelling of which was the fact
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that President Roosevelt favored such a hybrid approach.
The Unemployment Insurance Subcommittee of the
Technical Board (created to advise the Committee on
Economic Security) decided at one of its first meetings to
recommend a federal system. Its members, however, could
not agree on specific provisions. The Subcommittee (and the
Committee on Economic Security) ended by unanimously
recommending a federal-state system. 3 In addition to the
President©s known preference for a hybrid system, the case
for a wholly federal approach was weakened also because the
constitutionality of any federal invasion into social and
economic matters was still questionable, given the composi
tion and tenor of the Supreme Court. It was reasoned that if
unemployment insurance was structured as a federal-state
program, the chances would be greater of its surviving the
constitutional challenge. Finally, a wholly federal approach
to cope directly with a problem such as unemployment was
simply not consonant with American political tradition at
that point and it would not be easy to break tradition. Not
only was a state-oriented Congress unlikely to relinquish all
state authority over the issue, but also the founders and sup
porters of the Wisconsin unemployment insurance program
had both considerable influence and interest in continuing
what they had begun in 1932.
Although rejecting the wholly federal approach, the Com
mittee still felt compelled to acknowledge the possibility that
a future Congress may well find it desirable to abandon the
dual government system entirely, "should those fears ex
pressed by the champions of a federally administered system
prove true. . . ." 4 Indeed, to remove possible roadblocks to
future federalization should Congress follow that path, it
recommended that the federal act require all states to pro
hibit provisions that would create vested interests in the cur
rent system and thereby tend to hinder modification or
repeal of state UI laws if a wholly federal system was later
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enacted. Accordingly, as a condition for approval of tax
credits, each state law must provide:
... all the rights, privileges, or immunities confer
red by such law or by acts done pursuant thereto
shall exist subject to the power of the legislature to
amend or repeal such law at any time. 5
According to the Committee, with such a provision in place,
... the Congress can at any time increase the re
quirements which State laws must fulfill and may,
if it sees fit, at some future time, substitute a
federally administered system for the cooperative
Federal-State system we recommend. 6
The Committee recognized that responsibility for the na
tion©s system of unemployment insurance would remain
shared only as long as Congress continued to be convinced
that the advantages of a federal-state balance of authority
outweigh its drawbacks. An important advantage of a dual
system was that it permitted wide latitude for experimenta
tion by the states, needed because of the nation©s lack of ex
perience with unemployment insurance at that time. In the
process, mistakes made by individual states could be confin
ed within the boundaries of those states, while successful
measures could be adopted and shared elsewhere.
The most serious disadvantage was that workers exposed
to the same risk of unemployment would be treated dif
ferently from state to state, and the level of protection was
likely to be wholly inadequate in some.
As noted elsewhere, recognition by both levels of govern
ment that Congress could alter the entire structure of the
system at any time has been an important deterrent to abuse
of authority, adoption of extreme provisions, and in
temperate actions. Neither federal nor state officials have
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been anxious to jeopardize a partnership that has been suc
cessful by any reasonable measure.
As to the actual division of responsibilities, neither the
Committee Report nor the Social Security Act systematically
spells out federal and state duties in any detail. Instead, the
Report contains general recommendations for five categories
of responsibilities: providing an incentive for states to enact
UI laws; adopting minimum standards for state programs;
controlling reserve funds; establishing substantive program
provisions; providing effective administration. In most
cases, although certain functions were assigned either to the
states or the federal government, the actual carrying out of
the responsibilities proved to be a shared, not an exclusive,
responsibility. Indeed, the single most pervasive theme of the
Committee©s Report is the expectation that the states and the
federal government will find ways of accomplishing most
unemployment insurance responsibilities through
cooperative effort.

Providing an Incentive
The compelling need in 1935 was to provide an effective
stimulus for state action:
So long as there is danger that business in some
States will gain a competitive advantage through
failure of the State to enact an unemployment com
pensation law, few such laws will be enacted. This
obstacle to State action can be removed only
through the imposition by the Federal Government
of a uniform tax (rate of contribution) on all
employers throughout the country, so that no State
will have an unfair advantage. 7
The tax offset approach, by which credit for state UI taxes
paid is allowable against the federal tax for employers in
states with approved UI laws, proved to be an effective in-
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ducement. Prior to 1935, only Wisconsin had adopted a UI
law. By the close of 1936, all but Illinois and Missouri had
passed such laws and those two did so within the following
six months. No state has ever voluntarily dropped out of the
system by reason of not having an unemployment insurance
law.
Tax offset is quite different from the more common grantin-aid approaches that characterize many federal programs.
The latter provide localities with an incentive to build airport
facilities, for example, by providing funds either on a match
ing or other basis if the locality agrees and itself makes some
effort. The tax offset approach acts less as a carrot than a
stick since the main incentive it provides a state is an oppor
tunity to avoid having the state©s employers lose credit
against the federal tax without any gain to the state.
According to the Committee, there was another reason
why the tax credit approach was preferred over an approach
under which the tax was wholly collected by the federal
government and then remitted as grants-in-aid to the states.
Under the latter system, the states would not have selfsupporting laws of their own, "and as with all compensation
having its source in federal grants, there would be great and
constant pressure for larger grants exceeding the money rais
ed by the tax, with a consequent confusion of compensation
and relief." 8
The federal law allows employers credit of up to 2.7 per
cent (90 percent of the original 3.0 percent federal payroll
tax) for UI taxes they paid under a state law, provided that
the state law satisfies certain federal requirements. The
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax rate, as of
1983, is 3.5 percent of the first $7,000 in wages paid by an
employer to an employee in a calendar year. Employers sub
ject to an approved state law continue to receive a maximum
credit of 2.7 percent of the same wage base for state taxes
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paid. The maximum credit involves both normal and addi
tional credit. Normal tax credit is credit employers receive
against the federal tax for taxes they actually pay under a
state law. An employer whose state tax was 1.0 percent of
taxable wages would, therefore, receive normal credit of 1.0
percent. Additional tax credit (allowable only if the state law
meets federal experience-rating requirements) is credit for
the difference between what the employer actually paid and
2.7 percent. In the example above, additional credit would
be 1.7 percent. Denial of both normal and additional credit
means, of course, payment of 2.7 percent to the federal
government in addition to the 0.8 percent balance already re
quired. 9 The 0.8 percent balance collected by the federal
government finances federal and state administrative costs,
the 50 percent federal share of the cost of extended benefits,
and a loan fund available to individual states with depleted
unemployment funds. 10
The tax offset approach provides a persuasive incentive
not only for states to adopt UI laws that conform with
federal requirements but also to cover every employer sub
ject to the FUTA, and to establish their taxable wage base at
least as high as the federal base. The reason for this is not
because either is required for conformity. They are not.
Aside from nonprofit organizations and state and local
governments, which are not subject to the federal tax but
which state laws must cover to be approved for tax credit, no
issue of nonconformity with federal provisions is raised or
sanction threatened if a state wishes to exclude certain
employers in the private sector, or to exempt certain
remuneration from its definition of taxable wages. But a
state does neither employers nor workers any favor by ex
cluding them from state law coverage or by reducing its tax
base below that of the federal base. Since the employers are
liable under the federal law for the FUTA tax, their exclu
sion under state law would result in denying them credit
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against the tax. In other words, the excluded employer would
pay no state UI tax, but would become liable for the full
federal tax (instead of the net 0.8 percent tax); the state fund
would receive no revenue from the exempt employer; his
workers would receive no benefits if they become
unemployed.
For these reasons, there exists almost a complete overlap
between federal and state coverage, and no state has a tax
able wage base lower than the federal base. 11 Indeed, to
avoid any inadvertent gap in coverage or tax base, DOL has
recommended (and most states have adopted) provisions
automatically requiring liability under the state law for any
employer, employment or wages also liable under the FUTA
or that the FUTA requires to be covered by the state as a
condition for tax credit (as in the case of nonprofit organiza
tions and state and local governments). Also for these
reasons, coverage expansion and taxable wage base increases
have occurred nationwide by reason of amendments first to
federal law. Some states have always had broader coverage
than the federal law and some have had higher tax bases. But
most states usually have not acted independently in these
areas. Without the powerful federal incentive, it is not likely
that coverage would have extended to virtually all employees
as it does today.
Shortly after enactment of the Social Security Act, the
question was raised in the courts as to whether so persuasive
an incentive as the tax offset credit approach constituted
federal coercion. This challenge as well as other constitu
tional questions were resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1937. Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, rejected the
allegation of coercion. A state has a choice:
The State does not bind itself to keep the law in
force. It does not even bind itself that the moneys
paid into the federal fund will be kept there in-
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definitely or for any stated time. On the contrary,
the Secretary of the Treasury will honor a requisi
tion for the whole or any part of the deposit in the
fund whenever one is made by the appropriate of
ficials. The only consequence of the repeal or ex
cessive amendment of the statute, or the expen
diture of the money, when requisitioned, for other
than compensation uses or administrative expenses,
is that approval of the law will end, and with it the
allowances of a credit, upon notice to the state
agency and an opportunity for hearing. 12
In reality, when a state either enacts an amendment that
puts it out of conformity with federal law or fails to enact a
provision necessary for conformity, it jeopardizes the con
tinued existence of its unemployment insurance program. If
grants or tax credits were withheld, the results would be
calamitous for the state©s employers, workers, and probably
the political leaders responsible. Thus, whether a state, as a
practical matter, can choose to accept or reject the federal
conditions for administrative grants or tax credits is certainly
arguable. Yet legally, the states have a choice. State confor
mity is voluntary. Failure to meet a federal standard incurs
no administrative or criminal penalty. The standards are not
legally binding, and neither DOL, the courts, nor any other
authority can coerce a state to comply. The distinction be
tween practical and legal existence of a choice is important.
As indicated above, the federal and state unemployment in
surance laws survived their major constitutional challenges
in 1937 on the grounds that the federal conditions were not
mandatory. Over 40 years later, the constitutionality of the
1976 amendments to the federal law was sustained on the
same basis. 13
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Adopting Minimum Program Standards:
Federal Role, State Influence
If the first federal responsibility, according to the Com
mittee on Economic Security, was to provide an incentive for
all states to adopt unemployment insurance laws, the second
was to provide certain minimum requirements where
"uniformity is absolutely essential." The same tax offset
credit approach that persuaded all states to adopt unemploy
ment insurance laws also compels them to conform to the
many federal requirements enacted and developed over the
years. Thus for any employer to receive credit against the
federal tax, his state unemployment insurance law must be
certified each year as conforming to over 25 standards in the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) which is part of the
Internal Revenue Code. As explained below, for the state to
receive funds necessary to administer the state program, the
state law and its administration must also meet about a
dozen additional federal standards in the Social Security
Act.
All standards, many of which are cast in general terms,
have been subject to interpretation. As a result, federal re
quirements including interpretative directives actually
number many times the number of statutory standards. Any
conformity with the standards must be absolute. A state may
not, for example, meet the standard requiring coverage of
state and local government workers by excluding temporary
or part-time employees. It must cover all. 14 Failure, for ex
ample, of the Idaho legislature to cover members of the
public Boise Symphony Orchestra created a conformity
issue, not resolved until the state was persuaded to close the
coverage gap.
Failure to conform with Federal Unemployment Tax Act
standards means denial of tax credit. Failure to meet Social
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Security Act standards means denial of administrative
grants.
The federal government has authority, of course, not only
to enforce existing standards, but also to adopt new stan
dards as needed. The Committee on Economic Security
recommended that federal standards cover only matters on
which uniformity is absolutely essential. Congress has not
followed that recommendation. The current variety of
federal program standards, discussed in chapter 3, suggests
the lack of any consistent guiding principle.
The Committee had recommended that the establishment
of standards be a shared responsibility: "Some standardiza
tion is desirable, but we believe that this should not be a mat
ter of Federal control, but of cooperative action." The
statutory authority of the federal government to establish
standards either by legislation or interpretation is un
qualified, but in practice the states play an active role in in
fluencing the fate of proposals that may affect them. Most
standards have originated as federal administration pro
posals, and for most past administrations, no proposed stan
dard was introduced without prior consultation with state
officials and other interest groups that may be affected.
Allowing states the opportunity to be heard did not always
mean dropping proposals for standards to which they ob
jected, but it did often result in improvements in the pro
posals, and this was a major reason why it was done.
In addition, state agencies are not without influence in
Congress. The Interstate Conference of Employment Securi
ty Administrators follows closely all federal legislative pro
posals affecting the employment service and unemployment
insurance programs. Administrators are polled on pending
bills and their views are presented to Congress in testimony
delivered during hearings on the bills by the Conference
leadership. Individual state administrators have been known
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to lobby with their Congressmen on behalf of or in opposi
tion to proposed legislation. In one way or another, Con
gressional delegations of states that would be either helped
or disadvantaged are invariably prepared to react to propos
ed new federal unemployment insurance standards.

Controlling Reserve Funds:
Federal Role
The President©s Committee on Economic Security placed
great importance in the "intelligent and unified handling of
reserve funds":
Intelligently handled, unemployment reserve funds
can be made an important factor in preventing a
depression; but utilization for this purpose is possi
ble only if their investment and liquidation is within
control of the United States Treasury. We deem
this an absolute essential if unemployment compen
sation is to accomplish the purposes for which it is
designed. 15
The Social Security Act provides for the establishment of
an Unemployment Trust Fund in the U.S. Treasury; authori
ty of the Secretary of the Treasury to invest amounts
deposited in the fund in interest bearing obligations of the
United States or obligations guaranteed by the United States;
the maintaining of a separate bookkeeping account for each
state agency; and authorization to pay out of the fund to any
state agency such amount as it shall requisition. The provi
sion is supplemented by sections of the Social Security Act
and FUTA requiring deposit of all money received in the
state©s unemployment fund (except for certain refunds) im
mediately to the Secretary of the Treasury to the credit of the
Unemployment Trust Fund. The establishment of the cen
tralized fund and the requirement for immediate depositing
into that fund by the states of all contributions would still
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not accomplish the Committee©s objective if the moneys
could be withdrawn by the states for any purpose. Accord
ingly, both the Social Security Act and FUTA prohibit ex
penditure of any money withdrawn from the fund for any
purpose other than unemployment compensation (with cer
tain minor exceptions).
The intent of these provisions was to avoid the funds being
so invested or otherwise expended by the states as to jeopar
dize their availability for benefits when needed, or diminish
their effectiveness as counter-cyclical measures. They con
stitute basic elements of the current federal-state system.
Federal safeguarding of the funds has not been seriously
challenged in principle, but it has been a source of federalstate conflict, as described in chapter 2.

Establishing Sound Program Provisions:
State Role, Federal Influence
According to the Committee on Economic Security:
The plan for unemployment compensation that we
suggest contemplates that the States shall have
broad freedom to set up the type of unemployment
compensation they wish. We believe that all mat
ters in which uniformity is not absolutely essential
should be left to the States. 16
This suggests that the Committee envisioned the states as
having very broad authority over program matters. The prin
cipal federal objective was to
. . . stimulate the passage of complete and selfsustaining unemployment compensation laws in the
States, by allowing a credit against the Federal tax
for contributions paid under State laws. 17
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State independence was to be limited only in the few areas
where "uniformity is absolutely essential."
The states never enjoyed quite the autonomy suggested by
the Committee. Their "broad freedom to set up the type of
unemployment compensation they wish" was circumscribed
at the outset by federal law indirectly governing state
minimum coverage and taxable wage base provisions and
directly governing deposit and expenditure of reserves.
Moreover, as indicated above, Congress never confined the
adoption of federal standards over the program area to mat
ters in which "uniformity is absolutely essential."
Still, the states had wide discretion over most substantive
program matters: qualifying requirements; benefit and dura
tion levels; eligibility and disqualification provisions; and tax
schedules and rates. However, this discretion was of no im
mediate advantage. In 1935 there was an almost universal
lack of knowledge about unemployment insurance. Very lit
tle was known at the state level about what was required to
meet conditions for credit against the federal tax and what
requirements must be satisfied to qualify for administrative
grants. Under these circumstances, although a few states
took independent action, most relied upon guidance from
the federal government.
The Report of the Committee on Economic Security con
tained several suggestions for state legislation, later
translated into a complete "draft bill." The Social Security
Board prepared Draft Bills for State Unemployment Com
pensation of Pooled Fund and Employer Reserve Account
Types which "meets the minimum standards set forth in the
Social Security Act for State unemployment compensation
laws." The Board emphasized, however,
This draft is merely suggestive and is intended to
present some of the various alternatives that may

24

Conceptual Framework

be considered in the drafting of State unemploy
ment compensation acts. Therefore, it cannot
properly be termed a ©model© bill or even a ©recom
mended© bill. This is in keeping with the policy of
the Social Security Board of recognizing that it is
the final responsibility and the right of each State
to determine for itself just what type of legislation
it desires and how it shall be drafted. 18
Despite the disclaimer, most states had no realistic choice but
to adopt large parts of the draft bills verbatim, with one state
actually adopting all the alternative as well as the regular
provisions offered. As a result, the original state unemploy
ment insurance laws were quite similar. As Congress enacted
amendments to the federal laws, the Social Security Board
and later the Department of Labor issued new draft bills,
now called Manual of State Employment Security Legisla
tion, containing suggested draft language implementing the
new requirements, as well as running commentary explaining
the background and implications of alternative provisions.
The draft bills and Manual are not confined to conformity
matters. Neither the Social Security Board nor DOL has
been inhibited in making recommendations to the state for
adopting what they consider sound program provisions.
What differences existed among the early state laws were
due largely to changes in successive versions of the Manual
and in states selecting somewhat different nonrequired op
tions offered in those documents. 19 A revised Manual was
prepared usually every two years, with the last complete
document issued in 1950. Since 1950, DOL has not issued a
comprehensive Manual covering all aspects of a state law,
but only suggested draft language designed to conform state
laws to specific changes in or additions to the federal re
quirements.
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Many years later, state UI laws are still more alike than
different in basic structure and required provisions. Most
contain identical language for provisions necessary for con
formity, and there are now more required provisions than
ever. But in nonrequired areas, there are now significant dif
ferences. These include provisions for qualifying re
quirements, weeky benefit amounts, benefit duration,
eligibility and disqualifications. A review of several selected
1978 provisions of 13 representative states shows some of the
more extreme differences. 20 A few examples of such dif
ferences, based on more recent data, include:
A claimant with only about 5 weeks of work could
qualify for 28 weeks of benefits in West Virginia in
1982, if his average weekly wage was as high as the
average wage for all workers in the state for 1981 (about
$277). In contrast, a claimant with only five weeks of
work would not qualify for any benefits in most states.
In Florida, at the other extreme, no claimant can qualify
for as many as 26 weeks (the maximum) no matter how
high his former wages unless he had 52 weeks of work in
his base period.
Two claimants with identical work experience can
qualify for substantially different benefits. A claimant
with six months© work at the 1981 U.S. average wage of
$255 for production workers in private nonagricultural
employment would qualify in 1982 for total benefits of
$1,365 in Florida ($105 per week for 13 weeks) and
almost three times that amount, or $4,050, in Penn
sylvania ($135 per week for 30 weeks).
Disqualification provisions also vary widely among the
states. For example, in Kansas as of 1982, benefits were
postponed a maximum of seven weeks for claimants
who quit work without good cause. At the other ex
treme, the penalty for voluntarily quitting work could
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be as high as 25 weeks of benefit postponement in Col
orado, with weeks of benefits reduced by the number of
weeks of disqualification.
These wide differences suggest that the federal partner has
been increasingly less persuasive in areas where it has no
authority to insist. This is not entirely true. The DOL has
been successful when it has been able to show the ad
ministrative or cost advantages of certain provisions over
others (e.g., simplified benefit formulas), or when it has
demonstrated clearly that some provisions are either
substantially more equitable than others or more adequate in
light of program objectives (e.g., indexing benefit ceilings to
average wage levels; individual rather than uniform base
periods and benefit years; reduction of waiting periods to no
more than one week; increase of regular duration ceilings to
26 weeks). This is not to say that federal influence alone is
responsible for the widespread adoption of these provisions.
Certainly, the action and experience of other, particularly
neighboring, states generally are more persuasive. It suggests
only that positive and soundly presented federal advocacy at
least provokes thinking about certain provisions and
sometimes enhances their acceptability.

Achieving Sound Administration:
Shared Responsibilities
The Committee on Economic Security intended for the
states to have "primary responsibility for administration."
However,
To encourage efficient administration, without
which unemployment insurance will fail to ac
complish its purpose, we believe that the Federal
Government should aid the States by granting them
sufficient money for proper administration, under
conditions designed to insure competence and pro
bity. 21
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The states indeed have primary responsibility for ad
ministration. The program is administered at the state level,
wholly through state employees, and with state facilities. The
states even share in the development of federal ad
ministrative standards. In the past, DOL has actively sought
advice and recommendations from state agency officials on
proposed operations or performance standards. Many of
these standards are the products of task forces and special
work groups composed primarily of state officials. In
developing these standards, usually DOL started with a com
mitment to the need for a standard and some idea of an ac
ceptable level of state performance. Subject to DOL ap
proval, the work groups developed such details as measure
ment periods, timetables, exceptions and penalties for failure
to meet the performance goals.
Although the states may have primary responsibility for
administration, and although states may sometimes be in
vited to share in the development of administrative stan
dards, the federal partner has authority to control state ad
ministrative practices. The source of this authority is the
federal control over the distribution of administrative grants
and the power to establish standards "designed to insure
competence and probity."
Under the Social Security Act, administrative grants are
permitted only if the state law provides "such methods of
administration as are found by the Secretary (of Labor) to be
reasonably calculated to insure full payment of compensa
tion when due." A second provision permits expenditure of
administrative grants by a state only in the amounts and for
the purposes found necessary by the Secretary for proper
and efficient administration.
The virtually unqualified authority of DOL to allocate ad
ministrative grants22 regularly collides with the states©
responsibilities to administer their own laws. Control over
allocation has translated into federal dictation of priorities,
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limitations on state flexibility, friction, and cooperation.
The conflicts have produced state recommendations either
for some share of the authority over allocations or for in
dependent sources of administrative funds, without federal
control.
There is some appeal to the states© claim for some control
of that portion of the money from the net federal tax that
has been earmarked since 1960 for administrative costs. This
portion of the tax is collected from the employers in the
state, transferred to Washington and then allocated back
among the states. The result is less money for several states
than would have been available if they had collected and re
tained the tax as state money, an approach advocated by
several such states. But the money is difficult to justify legal
ly as state money. It is derived from a federal tax for a
statutorily prescribed purpose. Moreover, while many states
would have more funds to use for administration if they col
lected and retained the earmarked tax on their employers, a
substantial minority of usually smaller states would collect
less from that tax than they now receive.
Many recognize also that state rather than federal collec
tion of a tax earmarked for administration would not
necessarily be an improvement. The state-collected tax
would not necessarily flow automatically to the state agen
cies without state legislative appropriation and the oversight
of state budget directors. State legislatures and executives
could prove even more parsimonious than their Washington
counterparts, particularly where controlled by individuals
antagonistic to the state©s unemployment insurance pro
gram.
Nor, in an era when money for benefit payments has
become scarce, does it appear that relief from federal control
over administration funds will come fron finding some in
dependent source of such funds, as some states have urged,
or from further distribution to the states of any excess of net
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federal unemployment taxes collected over administrative
expenses. The so-called Reed Act adopted in 1954 provided
that the excess of federal unemployment tax collections over
administrative expenditures would be appropriated to the
federal unemployment account until a loan fund of $200
million was accumulated. It also provided for the return to
the states of any excess above the $200 million reserve, the
excess to be used either for benefit purposes or ad
ministrative expenses including buildings (if appropriated by
the state legislature for specific projects). 23 Excess moneys
were actually returned to the states in 1956, 1957 and 1958.
These Reed Act moneys became revolving funds in many
cases. States that used them to buy buildings, for example,
and were later reimbursed for those costs from ad
ministrative grants, thereby recouped their Reed Act credits
and used them again and again. However, many states© Reed
Act moneys were considered depleted when they were forced
to borrow from the federal loan fund as a result of the
1975-78 recession. In order to borrow, all money available in
the state fund for benefits, including Reed Act money, must
first be expended. In 1982 Congress extended for 10 years the
period within which any Reed Act moneys may be used for
administrative purposes, 24 and also provided that states
forced, in the past or in the future, to borrow money from
the loan fund may, upon request of their Governor, have
their Reed Act moneys that were considered expended for
benefits restored and again available for administrative pur
poses. In any event, although the turnover of original Reed
Act moneys seems perpetual, there is little likelihood that
any further distributions will be made to the states from this
source in the foreseeable future.

Practical Checks to Federal and State Authority
The foregoing discussion suggests that despite the many
responsibilities allocated to the states, the statutory division
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of authority is overwhelmingly weighted in the federal
government©s favor. It is. In practice, however, federal and
state powers have been roughly balanced. The reason is that
the federal partner has neither the inclination until recent
years, nor the resources to exercise even a small fraction of
its potential authority. The inclination was weakened by in
hibitions on federal initiatives represented by a state-oriented
Congress. On three separate occasions, decisions holding
state law out of conformity with federal requirements
resulted in amendments to federal law either making the
state practice acceptable or limiting federal authority over
the issue. Federal officials are no more anxious to be in a
position of imposing sanctions on states in cases of noncon
formity than the states are to have them applied. This is true
not only because success may be short lived, but also because
the conformity process is a time and staff-consuming, fre
quently acrimonious process.
Nor are the resources available. Federal staff in
Washington (UIS) now responsible for administering more
standards than ever before has, ironically, steadily declined
in recent years. In the early 1970s, UIS staff in Washington
reached a peak of about 225, a figure then considered barely
adequate even before federal standards multiplied by reason
of 1976, 1980, 1981 and 1982 federal law amendments. As of
January 1,1983, authorized ceiling for the UIS was 113, with
105 actually on board of which a substantial portion are
clerical workers. State UI staff at the beginning of 1983 in
cluded a base staff of about 40,000, a figure that has remain
ed fairly constant during the last few years. 25 As the National
Commission on Unemployment Compensation observed in
1980, the federal staff is too small to perform even essential
responsibilities competently, let alone monitor state ad
ministration to the extent necessary to ensure compliance
with federal administrative and program standards. 26 No
thorough review can realistically be made of each state©s
budget requests. Evaluation of a state©s regulations and pro-
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cedures is impossible given current staff limitations. There is
not now adequate review even of the states© laws for confor
mity; nor is the rapidly diminishing pool of experienced
workers being replaced by adequately trained individuals.
Budgetary restrictions on travel by UIS officials imposed
in 1982, combined with a 400-1 state-federal staff ratio, vir
tually preclude the federal partner from providing even a
semblance of the technical assistance to the states "in setting
up their administrations and in the solution of the problems
they will encounter," as recommended by the Committee on
Economic Security. 27
Another restraining factor is the presence of internal
discord among the federal staff. The Unemployment In
surance Service is the DOL entity responsible for unemploy
ment insurance. The UIS staff is divided among three groups
of individuals with widely divergent views of the appropriate
federal role. Dominant at one time, but now diminished in
numbers and eclipsed in authority is a group of "old timers"
who view the federal role as involving active leadership in in
troducing and promoting program improvements, and
vigorous enforcement of federal standards. A second group,
made up in large part of former state employment security
agency employees, has substantially less interest in these ac
tivities than in assisting the states with technical problems
and serving as a clearinghouse of information, particularly
on administrative matters. The third group, now in the
ascendancy, is composed of management-oriented in
dividuals, with little background in UI, who are concerned
less with preserving basic principles and concepts than with
the cost effectiveness of the state agencies© operations.
Although this analysis is an oversimplification, it serves to
identify the major attitudes that compete for priority within
a relatively small organization.
In addition, the UIS is frequently in conflict with at least
three other DOL components. The Office of the Assistant
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Secretary for Program Evaluation and Review (ASPER)
with responsibilities for long-range planning has had recom
mendations on UI adopted by the Secretary (without UIS in
put) which were wholly inconsistent with long-standing
Departmental policy. 28 The Office of Policy, Evaluation and
Research (OPER), in the Department©s Employment and
Training Administration, with responsibility for coor
dinating the DOL employment and training legislative pro
gram, has occasionally conflicted with the UIS over ap
propriate strategy or Departmental testimony on behalf of
federal UI law changes. The Office of the Solicitor (SOL)
has frequently frustrated UIS efforts, as much by inter
minable delays in responding to requests for legal opinions
as by opinions that counter UIS positions. These are not
simply reflections of changes in political control of the ex
ecutive branch, appearing first at higher levels and slowly
working their way through the Department. The UIS has
been responsive to political shifts, as any responsible
bureaucracy must be. Rather, the conflicts reflect an un
professional lack of coordination with UIS by separate
organizational entities taking initiative in the UI area.
There are probably counterparts to these internal conflicts
in most organizations. There is no reliable measure of their
impact on the operations of an agency, and for that reason
there is a tendency to disregard their influence. The fact is,
however, that the existence of conflicting factions within an
organization can sometimes be a determining factor in terms
of particular actions taken or responsibilities abdicated.
All these factors have contributed to federal restraint.
There are corresponding restraints on the exercise of state
authority. It is generally recognized, for example, that when
a state enacts a highly inequitable provision, or when it fails
to update its law, or to improve its performance to reflect
common expectations, it invites new federal standards. Some
relatively recent federal restrictions barring denial of
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benefits to interstate claimants, prohibiting cancellation or
total reduction of benefit rights, and preventing denial of
benefits to claimants in vocational training courses reflect
Congressional responses to demonstrably inequitable state
law provisions. The adoption of a standard requiring all
states to participate in a plan to give claimants who work in
more than one state full credit for all their employment, and
a federal standard, requiring minimum levels of state perfor
mance in issuing first checks and appeals decisions promptly,
represent reactions to state inaction in areas demanding
reform.
As important as both statutory checks and practical
limitations have been in restraining federal and state authori
ty, they have been less significant than another factor. This
has been the realization on the part of state and, until recent
ly, federal officials, that the most effective means of resolv
ing problems connected with the program is through
cooperative effort.
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Chapter 2
Basic Statutory Provisions:
Conflict and Cooperation

Each of the unemployment insurance responsibilities
described by the Committee on Economic Security was
assigned either to federal to state authority by the original
Social Security Act of 1935. This chapter describes how the
Committee©s ideas were implemented, what issues arose
from the provisions of that Act, and how they were resolved.
Later amendments affecting program standards are the sub
ject of chapter 3. In implementing virtually all that the Com
mittee had contemplated, the 1935 Act provided for every
aspect of the system either through explicit statutory direc
tion, or language sufficiently broad to allow a necessary flex
ibility. Above all, the 1935 Act established the division of
responsibilities and, consequently, the balance of power
characteristic of the system until recent developments upset
the balance in favor of the federal partner.

Tax Credit Incentive
The first responsibility of the federal government to pro
vide an incentive for states to enact unemployment insurance
laws was effectively accomplished by the establishment in
the 1935 Act of a 3.0 percent payroll tax and a provision
allowing credit against that tax to employers for taxes they
pay under an approved state unemployment insurance law.
Originally, the tax applied to total wages. In 1939 its applica37
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tion was limited to the first $3,000 paid a worker by an
employer in a calendar year. Only employers of eight or
more workers in private industry and commerce were subject
to the tax. In successive years, coverage was extended and
both the tax rate and tax base were increased. The basic tax
credit device itself has never been altered, and it remains a
keystone of the system.

Control of Reserves
Another category of responsibilities assigned to the federal
government, the safeguarding of reserves, was accomplished
by two basic provisions that have not changed since 1935.
They concern the deposit and withdrawal of state UI funds.
The first requires states to pay all unemployment taxes they
collect under the program "immediately" into the Federal
Unemployment Trust Fund of the U.S. Treasury. This pro
vides the federal government, as trustee of the funds, the
means for preserving and protecting resources, one of the
objectives of the Committee on Economic Security. Aside
from an occasional dispute as to whether collected taxes are
deposited quickly enough to satisfy the meaning of "im
mediate," this requirement has not generated serious issues.
The second provision adopted to ensure the safeguarding
of reserves was the requirement that money withdrawn from
the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund by a state may be us
ed (with certain minor exceptions) only "in the payment of
unemployment compensation. . . .© M "Compensation" is
defined as "cash benefits payable to individuals with respect
to their unemployment." 2 This restriction on what the states
may spend their tax receipts for has produced considerable
federal-state friction.
For example, state proposals to have claimants engage in
community work projects and receive their unemployment
benefits as "wages" were rejected by DOL as violative of the
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withdrawal requirement. 3 State officials argued for accep
tance, claiming that both the community and the
unemployed would benefit from the proposal the former
by getting important projects completed, and the latter by
performing useful services and perhaps learning new skills.
DOL reasoning was that if benefits were conditioned upon
claimants working for the community, they would not then
be payable solely with respect to unemployment, but rather
with respect to whether or not they performed such work.
Even if the work was voluntary, as some states proposed, the
requirement would not be met. Claimants performing com
munity services would not have the opportunity to seek
remunerative work. Thus, benefits would not be paid for
unemployment due to lack of remunerative work, but rather
to individuals whose unemployment was due, at least in part,
to the fact that their engagement in community services
prevented their search or availability for paying jobs.
DOL applied similar reasoning to state proposals to pay
benefits to claimants out of work because of illness or
disability. Claimants not able to work are not unemployed
because of lack of work, but rather because of their physical
condition. This interpretation of the withdrawal requirement
was later modified somewhat to permit payment to in
dividuals who become ill only after they file a claim. Benefits
can be payable to them consistently with the withdrawal
standard, provided they are not offered or do not reject a
suitable job. The reasoning is that unless a claimant who
becomes ill after filing a claim is offered a job, the
unemployment can reasonably be considered due to the
original cause of separation and continuing lack of work,
not to the illness. 4
Another modification of the strict application of the fund
withdrawal requirement applies to claimants undertaking
training. Even though a claimant in training may not have
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the opportunity to seek work, and may even refuse a job of
fer, DOL held that payment of benefits would not violate the
withdrawal requirement. The reasoning was that by under
taking training, the claimant was demonstrating his
availability for work. The training may be the most realistic
approach the claimant can take toward obtaining perma
nent, meaningful employment. Some states continued to
deny benefits on the grounds (used by DOL in other con
texts) that a claimant who refuses an offer of suitable work
or does not actively seek work because he is in training does
not meet the availability-for-work requirement of the state
law. The DOL approach prevailed by reason of a 1970
amendment to the federal law expressly prohibiting all states
from denying benefits to claimants in training with the ap
proval of the state agency on the grounds that they violate
the state©s availability, active search for work, or refusal of
work requirements. 5
The withdrawal requirement, that involuntary unemploy
ment must be the sole determinant of benefit eligibility, has
proved to be the major statutory bulwark in preserving the
principle that unemployment insurance is distinguishable
from relief,
in that payments are made as a matter of right, not
on a needs basis, but only while the worker is in
voluntarily unemployed. 6
The requirement provided the basis for rejecting proposed
state law amendments which would pay or increase benefits
because of need, as well as others which would deny payment
because of lack of need. A Wisconsin proposal was rejected,
for example, which would have provided state extended
benefits to individuals who exhausted regular benefits, pro
vided they were in need, as defined in the state law on public
assistance. Similarly, a New Jersey bill was considered
violative of the withdrawal requirement because it provided
a less severe penalty for voluntarily leaving work without
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good cause for individuals who could prove they were in
need than applied to other claimants.
An Alaska bill, which provided that an individual with
$7,000 in base-period wages would be required to serve an
additional waiting week for each $1,000 in wages (up to a
maximum of six weeks), was rejected as introducing a needs
test rather than unemployment as the basis for paying
benefits. The same reasoning was applied to an Oregon pro
posal to disqualify all workers who received wages and
benefits during a calendar year totaling more than $6,000.
The withdrawal requirement was the basis also for reject
ing a Washington proposal for a higher qualifying wage re
quirement for claimants who have a working spouse; a Min
nesota proposal to put a lower ceiling on the maximum
benefit payable to any secondary wage earner in a household
with an employed head of the family; and a California pro
posal for limiting the maximum benefits paid to a husband
and wife to one and one-half times the maximum payable to
an individual.
The most persistent challenge to the withdrawal require
ment is represented by a 1963 amendment to the South
Dakota law, similar in nature to the Alaska and Oregon pro
posals noted above, requiring claimants whose base-period
wages were higher than others to serve proportionately
longer waiting weeks. The ensuing conformity confrontation
is discussed in chapter 4.

Administration
In no aspect of the program, including the area of federal
program standards, has federal control been more pro
nounced or provoked more friction than in the area of ad
ministration. As indicated in chapter 1, although the states
have the responsibility to administer their laws, the federal
government has authority over the administrative grants
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allocated to each state to assure that such funds will be spent
"solely for the purposes and in the amounts found necessary
by the Secretary of Labor for the proper and efficient ad
ministration of such State law." 7
As if this authority was not enough, the Social Security
Act also requires each state to provide:
Such methods of administration ... as are found
by the Secretary of Labor to be reasonably
calculated to insure full payment of unemployment
compensation when due. 8
This requirement is sufficiently broad to permit virtually any
federal control over administration the DOL sees fit to im
pose. Control is not exercised through actual direct federal
supervision of state operations or personnel. Federal in
fluence is applied instead through development and enforce
ment of detailed operating and performance standards.
The claim filing standard, for example, describes in detail
the circumstances under which claims must be filed, whether
in person or by mail; the time the state must give a partially
employed worker to file a claim; the kinds of job finding
assistance, placement and other employment services that
must be provided different categories of claimants, and
defining such categories as ranging from workers on short
term layoffs to persons permanently separated from their
jobs. 9
Operation standards similar to the claims filing standard
and the claims determination standard, which concern ac
tivities connected with eligibility determinations, 10 cover the
most significant facets of state administration of claims and
many less important activities as well. Failure of a state to
adhere completely to these detailed standards does not
automatically mean that it violates the "methods of ad
ministration" requirement. If the state applies alternative
provisions, DOL must determine if, in effect, they satisfy the
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federal requirement. If not, the state faces a conformity con
frontation.
Distinguishable from operation standards, which dictate
the procedural duties of the administrator, are two relatively
recent performance standards requiring minimum levels of
efficiency, as specified in terms of results. The appeals
promptness standard, first issued in 1972 and later modified,
prescribes as a minimum level of satisfactory state perfor
mance the issuance of at least 60 percent of all first level ap
peal decisions within 30 days of the date the appeal of an
eligibility determination was filed and at least 80 percent
within 45 days.©© A state that meets these minimum criteria is
considered to be meeting the standard.
If DOL finds that the failure of a state to meet the criteria
is attributable to factors reasonably beyond the state©s con
trol and the state has done as much as is administratively
feasible to overcome, the standard is considered satisfied. If
the reasons were not beyond the state©s control, recommen
dations are made for remedial action. Notice of an oppor
tunity for a conformity hearing goes to the state in the event
it fails or refuses to take necessary corrective actions.
The benefit payment promptness standard, issued in 1976
and revised in 1977, follows a similar pattern. 12 The criteria
for minimum satisfactory levels of performance are issuance
of 90 percent of first payments within 14 days following the
end of the claimant©s first compensable week claimed in the
case of states requiring a noncompensable waiting week, 90
percent within 21 days for nonwaiting week states, and 95
percent within 35 days for all states. This applies only to intrastate claims (claims filed within a state by individuals
whose benefits are based on wages earned in the same state).
Separate criteria for interstate claims (filed by individuals
with wages earned in a state other than the one in which they
are filing) are 75 percent within 14 and 21 days with respect

44

Basic Statutory Provisions

to waiting week and nonwaiting week states, respectively,
and 80 percent within 35 days for all states.
The standard on payment promptness prescribes seven
specific remedial steps to be taken by DOL if a state agency
fails, "for an extended period," to meet the criteria or fails
to show satisfactory improvement after having submitted a
plan of corrective action. The first step is informal discus
sion with state agency officials. The ultimate step is notice to
the state of an opportunity for a hearing on the question of
whether the state is in nonconformity and, accordingly,
whether administrative grants should be withheld.
The "methods of administration" requirement would
seem broad enough to permit the federal government to dic
tate to the states any requirement having an administrative
impact. Perhaps not anticipating the full interpretative
potential of this provision, Congress explicitly included four
specific administrative requirements in the Social Security
Act. These concern the use of employment offices to pay
benefits, selection of staff, information reports, and provi
sion for fair hearing.

Payment Through Employment Offices
Federal law requires that the states pay unemployment
benefits only through public employment offices. 13 This ap
proach had been a recommendation of the Committee on
Economic Security, but that Committee©s Report contains
no explanation of why this was considered necessary for effi
cient administration. It may have been intended to help en
sure close cooperation with the employment service which
has job referral functions and plays an important role in
identifying work refusal and unavailability-for-work issues.
In any event, this requirement was the basis for one of the
rare occasions in which a state was temporarily denied ad
ministrative grants. In 1939, grants to South Dakota were
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withheld when the state proposed to pay unemployment
compensation through the state public welfare offices in
stead of through public employment offices. The proposal
was advanced because no state appropriations had been
made for the state©s employment offices, to match federal
grants for these offices, as was then required under the
Wagner-Peyser Act. 14 The federal grants were restored after
two months, when the state finally made money available to
reopen the state employment offices.

Merit System Requirement
The Committee on Economic Security indicated that
among federal conditions necessary to ensure competent ad
ministration, "... we deem selection of personnel on a
merit basis vital to success." 15 The "methods of administra
tion" standard in the Social Security Act was amended in
1939 to add the merit system requirement, though with a
restriction on federal enforcement of the requirement, as
follows:
(including after January 1, 1940, methods relating
to the establishment and maintenance of personnel
standards on a merit basis, except that the
Secretary of Labor shall exercise no authority with
respect to the selection, tenure of office, and com
pensation of any individual employed in accor
dance with such methods). 16
According to Frances Perkins© biographer, the language
explicitly denying the Secretary authority over selection,
tenure or compensation of any individual employed under a
merit system was the result of Congressman (later Chief
Justice) Fred M. Vinson©s determination that "no damned
social workers are going to come into my State and tell our
people whom they shall hire." 17 The Executive Director of
the Committee on Economic Security later gave credit to the
Social Security Board©s interpretation and implementation
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of the provision for giving great impetus to sound state ad
ministration by its insistence upon basing the selection and
tenure of all employees in state employment security ad
ministrations on a merit basis. At the time, the great majori
ty of states had no merit-based Civil Service systems. The
Board required those states to establish special merit systems
for employees concerned with employment security opera
tions. This resulted in relatively competent staffing of
unemployment insurance and employment service agencies
and stimulated the passage of general state Civil Service laws
in a number of states, based on a merit system. Eventually,
there developed a large number of experienced employment
security administrators and a strong tradition of nonpolitical
administration. 18
In 1970, responsibility for administering the merit system
requirement was shifted from DOL to the U.S. Civil Service
Commission. Established regulations governing state merit
system requirements were substantially relaxed in 1979, par
ticularly those identifying the UI positions that states were
permitted to exempt from the merit system. The revised
regulations provide that,
To assure proper organizational responsiveness,
appropriate numbers of top level positions may be
exempted if they determine or publicly advocate
substantial program policy, provide legal counsel,
or are required to maintain a direct confidential
working relationship with a key exempt official. 19
The relaxation of merit system requirements is the result
primarily of pressure from governors for more state flexibili
ty; of the 1978 Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA),
which requires that federal standards "shall be prescribed in
such a manner to minimize federal intervention in state and
local personnel administration"; of the declared position of
the Carter Administration that governors shall be given max-
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imum leeway in running grant-in-aid programs; and of the
relaxation of regulations governing the federal Civil Service.
The result has been a substantial increase in recent years in
the number of state agency positions exempt from merit
system requirements. Another result, of course, is the
absence of a single issue being raised in recent years of non
conformity or noncompliance with this requirement, in con
trast with earlier experience of several of these issues being
presented each year.

Required Reports and Disclosures
of Information
The Social Security Act and the FUTA provide a number
of information requirements of the states to facilitate ad
ministration and to authorize information exchange with
other agencies:
(6) The making of such reports in such form and
containing such information, as the Secretary of
Labor may from time to time require, and com
pliance with such provisions as the Secretary of
Labor may from time to time find necessary to
assure the correctness and verification of such
reports; and
(7) Making available upon request to any agency of
the United States charged with the administration
of public works or assistance through public
employment, the name, address, ordinary occupa
tion and employment status of each recipient of
unemployment compensation, and a statement of
such recipient©s rights to further compensation
under such law. 20
The requirement of paragraph (6) is the basis for both
regular statistical and special research reports from states.
Under an established routine reporting system, state agencies
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collect and organize data from their UI operations for
transmittal to DOL which summarizes and publishes the
statistics for various purposes. Aside from the significance
of the information for the purposes of managing and
evaluating the program, much of the data, particularly
regarding UI claims activity, are important factors useful in
general economic analysis. In addition, weekly insured
unemployment data are used to trigger on and off the pay
ment of extended benefits. 21
The reporting requirement of paragraph (6) has generated
some minor issues. On occasion, states have resisted requests
for special reports, usually on the grounds of insufficient
staff. Some state agencies are habitually late in providing re
quired reports. One state agency regularly does not respond
or responds late and inadequately to requests for informa
tion concerning pending legislation. None of these issues,
however, has been considered serious enough to warrant a
conformity hearing. Paragraph (7) similarly has not produc
ed serious issues, probably because the public works and
work relief programs that now exist are administered at state
or local levels; at the time this provision was adopted (1935),
such programs were federally administered.
Another provision includes the following requirements for
state agency cooperation with other federal agencies. Cer
tification of granted funds is denied if the Secretary finds:
(1) That such State does not make its records
available to the Railroad Retirement Board and
furnish to the Railroad Retirement Board at the ex
pense of the Railroad Retirement Board such
copies thereof as the Railroad Retirement Board
deems necessary for its purposes; or
(2) That such State is failing to afford reasonable
cooperation with every agency of the United States
charged with the administration of any unemploy
ment insurance law. 22
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The foregoing requirements were either part of the original
Social Security Act or were added during the very early years
of the program.
Several additional disclosure requirements were added
more recently. One requires disclosure, to a state or political
subdivision, of wage information necessary for determining
an individual©s eligibility for (and the amount of) aid or ser
vices to needy families with children. 23 Another requires
disclosure, to officers of any state or local child support en
forcement agency, of wage information for the purposes of
establishing child support obligations and locating and col
lecting such obligations. 24 A third requires disclosure, to of
ficers and employees of the Department of Agriculture and
of any state food stamp agency, of information concerning
an individual©s wages, application and eligibility for UI,
name, address, any refusal of an offer of work, and if so, a
description of the work offered. 25
All the disclosure provisions require that the state agency
adopt safeguards ensuring the information is used only for
purposes of the programs for which it is requested. Authori
ty to develop such safeguards for state adoption is granted to
the Secretary of Labor in the case of the last two of the above
disclosure standards and to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in the case of the first standard.
Provisions requiring disclosure of information to the iden
tified agencies have not generated issues. The relatively new
requirements should not create problems, provided the
volume of requests from welfare, child support and food
stamp agencies does not become excessive and the informa
tion requested is easily obtainable from existing records.
The absence of conformity issues under the foregoing pro
visions requiring disclosure does not mean that states are free
of problems in this area. Many issues arise, not from these
provisions, but rather from requirements prohibiting
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disclosure under certain circumstances. Both the WagnerPeyser Act and the Social Security Act©s "methods of ad
ministration" requirement have been interpreted as pro
hibiting disclosure of information obtained in the ad
ministration of the program from claimants and employers,
if such disclosure would tend to deter individuals from filing
claims, or employers from cooperating fully with employ
ment security agencies. A state agency may not post the
names of UI claimants on a courthouse wall, for example, or
publish information about an employer that would help his
competitors.
On the other hand, the federal interpretations permit
disclosure (if consistent with state disclosure provisions) in a
broad range of circumstances, including "disclosure to a
public official in the performance of his public duties." Per
mitted disclosure is always conditioned upon it not disrupt
ing agency operations, and upon the agency being reimburs
ed by the requesting authority if obtaining the information
involves more than incidental expenses or staff time. Many
states have had problems with excessive requests for the
names and addresses of claimants, particularly from law en
forcement officials. As a result, most states have more
restrictions on information disclosure than set by federal in
terpretations, and all provide penalties for unauthorized
disclosure.

Fair Hearing
One of the single most important of the administrative
provisions included in the Social Security Act is the require
ment that a state law provide:
Opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial
tribunal for all individuals whose claims for
unemployment compensation are denied. 26
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This provision is categorized here as an administrative rather
than a benefit standard. Its principal purpose is to require of
each state the organizational machinery, trained staff in
cluding enough qualified and impartial referees, and all
other features necessary to implement fully the right of each
claimant who is denied benefits to a fair hearing. This right
has been extended to employers who experience an adverse
determination, on the grounds that this is necessary if the
system is to ensure not only that benefits are paid to eligible
individuals but also that they are denied to other individuals
who do not meet the eligibility conditions.
The "fair hearing" provision has been interpreted by
DOL over the years to require that any claimant or employer
wishing to appeal an adverse determination shall be provided
a hearing at a reasonably convenient location, at no expense,
and with neither any obligation nor any need to obtain legal
counsel. The hearing process must provide all parties at least
the following due process safeguards. 27
Right to a hearing tailored to the capabilities and cir
cumstances of those who are to be heard;
Right to be represented by a person of the party©s own
choosing;
Opportunity to present argument, to produce evidence
and witnesses, and to offer evidence in explanation or
rebuttal;
Right to a compulsory process for obtaining necessary
witnesses and records;
Right to confront and be confronted by opposing par
ties and their witnesses;
Right to cross-examine the other parties and their
witnesses;
Right to a prompt and comprehensive written decision
giving the referee©s findings, reasons, and conclusions,
with substantial evidence obtained at the hearing to sup
port them.
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Each referee (the most common term used for state hear
ing officers) must understand and apply these due process
rights, insure that the hearing and decision are completely in
telligible to the parties, and obtain at the hearing all the facts
necessary to reach a decision. Obviously, proper administra
tion of this requirement is one of the most demanding
responsibilities of a state agency. The key is a highly trained
staff and effective management.
Under its "Appeals Performance Appraisal Project,"
DOL evaluates the quality of hearings and decisions by
reviewing a sample of the written decisions and tapes of
recorded hearings of one-third of the states each year.
Failure, without good cause, of a state to attain minimum
adequate levels of quality (established by uniform test
criteria) constitutes violation of the requirement. Hearings
and decisions are evaluated by applying several criteria and
assigning specific points for "good," "acceptable," and
"unsatisfactory" performance. The criteria include, for ex
ample, questions similar to the following:
Was there opportunity for confrontation of all oppos
ing witnesses?
Was the language used in questions to witnesses geared
to the comprehension of those present?
Was the testimony taken in appropriate order and se
quence?
Did the decision contain the ultimate findings of fact re
quired to resolve the issues in the case, and were they
supported by the evidentiary findings of fact?
Was the final decision of the referee clearly stated?
"Fair hearing" also means a reasonably prompt hearing
and decision. As noted above, since 1972 performance stan
dards have prescribed for the states minimum satisfactory
levels of promptness. From the fair hearing and performance
standards has evolved a system of informal administrative
hearings unmatched by any other social program in pro-
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viding fair, inexpensive, and quick determinations of issues
for over a million appellants annually.
"Fair hearing" is not a static concept. For example, the
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation
(NCUC) has recommended deletion of two provisions, long
standing in some state laws, which it considers violative of a
fair hearing. The first denies a party to a hearing the right to
be represented by anyone other than an attorney. The second
prohibits any consideration of an appeal filed beyond the
statutory time limit, regardless of the reason for the late fil
ing. In addition, a minority of the Commission has argued
that fairness requires the availability in each state of free and
independent assistance and representation for claimants. 28
The "fair hearing" requirement has been the basis of a
large number and variety of conformity issues arising not on
ly from violations of due process rights by state officials in
conducting hearings, but also from state statutory provisions
and proposed amendments. For example, a New Jersey in
terpretation permitting appeals tribunals to decide appeals
solely on the basis of a review of the record was considered
by DOL to be in violation of the fair hearing requirement
because it gave claimants no opportunity to present
testimony or arguments. An interpretation of a Wyoming
provision, that a claimant must be conclusively presumed
unavailable for work during any week in which he received a
pension from his most recent employer, was considered by
DOL a violation of the federal fair hearing standard; as have
been other states© amendments establishing conclusive
presumptions of ineligibility that offer no opportunity for
the claimant to challenge. 29
A claimant who fails, with good cause, to appear at the
original hearing on his claim must have his hearing reopen
ed, according to a DOL interpretation issued to all states. 30
And the fair hearing standard has been interpreted to require
that benefit and eligibility hearings be public, subject to the
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limitation that the hearing tribunal must have authority to
close a hearing involving matters of an intimate, or a per
sonal nature. 31 DOL has consistently insisted that
"sunshine" laws permit this exception to otherwise required
open hearings. These examples represent only a small sample
of the variety of fair hearing issues that arise each year.

Federal Program Standards
The Committee on Economic Security emphasized in its
Report that unemployment insurance provisions in state law
should be left entirely to the state legislatures in "all matters
in which uniformity is not absolutely essential. ..." This
applied only to substantive program matters. Administrative
matters required a cooperative effort; requirements aimed at
safeguarding the fund, such as the immediate deposit and
withdrawal standards, were federal responsibilities.
The Committee did not indicate any provision which it
considered absolutely essential, but it was not reluctant at
least to make recommendations as to what a state law should
contain. Among others, it recommended relating duration or
number of weeks of benefits payable to the number of weeks
of prior employment; limiting benefits only to individuals
both able and willing to work; providing additional weeks of
benefits to individuals who have been long employed without
drawing benefits; limiting benefits of seasonal workers to
unemployment occurring within the usual season for their in
dustry; and provision of partial benefit formulas which en
courage claimants to take part-time or odd-job work when
possible. 32 Most states adopted some but not all of these pro
visions. The following two Committee recommendations
were incorporated into the 1935 Social Security Act as
federal program standards.
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Labor Standards
In the part of its Report titled "Suggestions for State
Legislation," the Committee on Economic Security stated
that claimants should be denied benefits if they refuse to ac
cept suitable work. "Workers, however, should not be re
quired to accept positions with wage, hour, or working con
ditions below the usual standard for the occupation or the
particular region, or outside of the State, or where their
rights of self-organization and collective bargaining would
be interfered with." 33
Although the Committee had not recommended these pro
tections be imposed as a federal standard, the original Social
Security Act required that each state include such labor stan
dards in its law as a condition for approval for tax credit.
These requirements were included probably to assure labor
that unemployment insurance would not become a means of
destroying unions or undermining existing wage, hour, and
working conditions. This apprehension had caused the
American Federation of Labor to oppose compulsory
unemployment insurance before 1932. 34
The Committee©s recommendation was translated into the
following federal standard that must, as a condition of ap
proval for tax credit, be included in a state law:
compensation shall not be denied in such State to
any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to ac
cept new work under any of the following condi
tions:
(A) if the position offered is vacant due directly to
a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute;
(B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of work
are substantially less favorable to the individual
than those prevailing for similar work in the locali
ty;
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(C) if as a condition of being employed the in
dividual would be required to join a company
union or to resign from or refrain from joining any
bona fide labor organization. 35
The purposes of parts (A) and (C) of these "labor stan
dards" are to prevent UI claimants from being used as
strikebreakers, and to protect the rights of claimants to join
unions of their choice. Part (A) provoked a conformity con
frontation with the States of Washington and California in
1949. The issue was whether workers who were separated
prior to a labor dispute could be disqualified for refusing to
return to their employer during the dispute. The Department
of Labor held that the jobs refused constituted new work for
those workers and that their disqualification violated the
standard. The case was dropped when Washington changed
its interpretation and California temporarily retracted its
decisions disqualifying the workers. 36
The issue led to a federal law amendment, sponsored by
Senator William Knowland of California, restricting the
Secretary©s authority. Enacted in 1950, it stops the Secretary
of Labor from finding that a state©s interpretation of its law
is preventing substantial compliance with the "labor stan
dards" requirements until either the opportunity for ad
ministrative review of the interpretation is exhausted under
the state law, or the interpretation is no longer subject to
judicial review in the state.
Part (B) of the "labor standards" is intended to protect
employed workers by preventing states from coercing
claimants to accept depressed wages and working conditions.
The provision is not easy to administer. It requires deter
minations of "new work," "similar" work, "prevailing"
wages, hours and working conditions for similar work, and
geographical boundaries of "locality." In 1950, DOL issued
a 34-page detailed guide describing how the provision should
be administered. 37 State claims and appeals adjudicators fre-
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quently still fail to identify a job offer as an offer of "new
work," which can be either a new job or a change in condi
tions of a current job which constitute a change in the
original employment contract. It is also still common to see
the labor standards requirements confused with the concept
of suitable work.
Suitable work criteria were intended originally to protect
claimants by allowing them to refuse jobs without dis
qualification that were wholly incompatible with their ability
or experience, constituted a danger to their health, safety or
morals, or were too far away from their homes. Suitable
work criteria were contained in draft bills of suggested state
legislation prepared by the Social Security Board and its suc
cessors and adopted usually with little change by most states.
In recent years, however, many states have narrowed the
conditions under which a claimant may refuse a job because
of its unsuitability. The most common change requires that
after a prescribed number of weeks of unemployment, deter
minations of suitability need not take into consideration the
claimant©s prior wage levels, work experience, or training.
Suitable work criteria relate to the individual, while the
labor standards (e.g., prevailing wage) relate more to the
nature of the job or job market. Accordingly, a job that pays
the prevailing wage and otherwise meets the labor standards
may not be suitable work. Conversely, a claimant may refuse
suitable work without disqualification if it is substandard in
terms of prevailing hours, wages or conditions.
The most common conformity issue in this area arises
from state amendments that ignore the prevailing wage re
quirement. Connecticut, for example, enacted an amend
ment to its law in 1973 which provided that a job offer shall
be considered suitable if it pays either the prevailing wage or,
"in the absence of a prevailing rate," a wage that is within 15
or 25 percent of the claimant©s normal wage, depending
upon whether the claimant had been unemployed six or more
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weeks or less than six weeks. Since a job that met these
criteria automatically would be considered suitable, a claim
ant must take it or be denied benefits. The agency was advis
ed by DOL that if claimants are disqualified for refusing a
job that falls within the prescribed percentages but still pays
less than the prevailing wage for similar work in the locality,
the provision would present a question of conformity with
the labor standards requirement (Part B, above). The Con
necticut provision was deleted. There have been many such
amendments and proposals.
Despite imperfect administration and less than universal
understanding of the labor standards, these requirements
have been important in preventing the unemployment in
surance program being used as a vehicle for strikebreaking,
depressing working conditions and otherwise undermining
gains made by American workers.

Experience Rating Standard
Experience rating is intended to provide an incentive for
employers to limit layoffs. Employers with favorable layoff
experience in relation to payrolls receive lower tax rates than
those with less favorable experience.
President Roosevelt had insisted that the unemployment
insurance program promote employment stabilization, and
experience rating appeared to be an appropriate vehicle for
that purpose. The House had passed the Social Security bill
without any experience rating provision on the grounds that
by allowing states to vary employers© tax rates, such a provi
sion would generate competition among the states in keeping
employers© costs low. The Senate restored the experience
rating provision partly because Wisconsin and several other
states had already enacted laws with experience rating, and
partly because a majority of the Senate Finance Committee
subscribed to the concept. 38
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The Committee on Economic Security recommended leav
ing to the states the option of whether or not they would
assign employers tax rates below 2.7 percent, the level
necessary for the full normal credit against the federal tax.
The Committee suggested that an employer assigned a reduc
ed rate should receive not only the normal credit for the state
tax against the federal tax, but also additional credit
amounting to the difference between the actual state tax paid
and the 2.7 percent level if the rate reduction was based on
the accumulation of adequate reserves or on low unemploy
ment experience. However, the Committee identified only
two approaches a state might apply: it could permit par
ticular industries or companies to have individual reserve or
guaranteed employment accounts, or it could permit reduced
rates on the basis of employers© favorable layoff experience.
The original Social Security Act and later the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act permitted states to allow reduced
rates only on those grounds. Although a few state laws
originally provided for individual reserve or guaranteed
employment accounts, 39 all states eventually came to pro
viding reduced rates only on the basis of employers© ex
perience. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act requires, as a
condition for additional credit, that a state law provide
reduced rates for an employer only on the basis of his
. . . experience with respect to unemployment or
other factors bearing a direct relation to unemploy
ment risk during not less than the 3 consecutive
years immediately preceding the computation
date. . . . 40
The law was later amended, first to permit reduced rates on
the basis of as little as one year of experience, and later to
newly covered employers "on a reasonable basis" (but not
less than 1.0 percent) until they have enough years to qualify
for a rate based on their experience.
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This standard is important because it makes experience
rating the only approach available to a state wishing to lower
tax rates. Reductions in rates to levels below 2.7 percent can
not be made uniformly for all employers, or by any means
other than the individual employer©s "experience with
respect to unemployment or other factors bearing a direct
relation to unemployment risk." Under most state ex
perience rating plans, this means that an employer©s tax rate
is keyed largely to the amount of benefits paid his former
employees based on work performed for him.
Experience rating as a feature of unemployment insurance
is unique to the United States, as is its federal-state system.
All other countries with UI have uniform national programs
and none establishes tax rates on the basis of individual
employer©s experience.
Once the experience rating standard was enacted, it has
always had Congressional support. At the outset, many
states did not provide for it at all, assuming they would need
the full 2.7 percent or more to finance benefits. However, it
soon became clear that costs were overestimated in many
states and too much revenue would be generated. During
World War II when unemployment levels were low, reserve
funds accumulated in many states far in excess of amounts
needed for benefit costs. Experience rating, which some
states were reluctant to adopt, represented the only means
available for reducing reserves. Although the degree of
adherence to experience rating continues to vary widely
among the states, Congress is committed to the concept. The
recent rise, effective 1985, in the FUTA rate to 6.2 percent
with a maximum tax credit of 5.4 percent seems designed to
strengthen experience rating by forcing states to raise their
maximum rates and thereby permit a wider range of rates.
There is continuing controversy over the merits of experience
rating, and these are better evaluated elsewhere. 41
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The important point here is that experience rating is man
dated by federal law and has strong adherents despite recur
ring efforts to change or delete the requirement. In 1968, an
administration-supported package of comprehensive UI
changes (H.R. 8282) contained a provision deleting the stan
dard. The proposal was opposed vigorously and removed
from the bill in an early stage. The National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation did not support a proposal by
its Chairman merely to relax the requirement by giving states
more flexibility. The proposal would have allowed the states
to experience rate on the basis of "employment" as well as
unemployment and to eliminate the requirement for a
"direct" relationship to unemployment risk. 42 As in the case
of every past effort to delete or modify the standard, the
chief opposition came from employer representatives,43 or
dinarily in favor of eliminating federal standards.
The requirement, that any reduced rate be based on the
employer©s "experience with respect to unemployment or
other factors bearing a direct relationship to unemployment
risk," has been the source of much intergovernmental fric
tion. DOL and its predecessors developed and applied very
detailed and subtle interpretations of the standard over the
years. So voluminous and complex were the interpretations
that by 1950 it became necessary for DOL©s Office of the
Solicitor to issue a precedent manual on experience rating
rulings "For Intra-Departmental Use Only." This "Ex
perience Rating Digest" contains 50 single-space typed pages
and well over 300 separate citations to formal and informal
communications. 44 Until the comprehensive 1970 amend
ments (P.L. 91-373) which generated more issues in other
areas, experience rating was the major source of conformity
issues.
DOL rulings cover all aspects of experience rating the
composition of particular formulas for allocating rates, rate
determinations for employers with gaps in experience, rates
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for employers involved in whole or partial transfers of
business, and procedures governing group accounts. The
Department has found acceptable many proposed factors for
measuring employers© experience (e.g., separations, compensable separations, benefits, payroll declines) and has rejected
others (e.g., the number of years the employer has been in
business, the amount of taxes paid). The most common fac
tor among the states is benefits charged to employers. The
most common experience rating formula is the reserve ratio,
under which the amount of an employer©s reserve is
calculated as contributions paid and credited to his account
over all past periods reduced by the amount of benefits
charged to his account during the same period. The reserve is
then divided by the employer©s recent annual payroll to pro
vide a reserve ratio. The employer is assigned a rate in accor
dance with a schedule of tax rates associated with reserve
ratios the higher the ratio, the lower the rate.
An early Social Security Board ruling provided that not all
benefits must be charged as long as those that were charged
provided a reasonable measurement of an employer©s ex
perience with respect to the unemployment risk of his
workers. This provoked pressure from a variety of sources
for relief from charges, and noncharging of benefits was per
mitted under a wide variety of circumstances: benefits paid,
without disqualification, to workers who quit their jobs with
good cause not attributable to the employer; benefits paid
following the serving of a disqualification; dependents©
allowances; extended benefits. Some of the noncharging was
permitted in the hope of easing pressure for more severe dis
qualifications. 45 Noncharging was justified on the grounds
that the measure of each employer©s experience would not be
seriously distorted by relieving them of these charges, par
ticularly in the case of benefits paid following separations
not caused by the employer©s action.
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The rationale for certain other kinds of noncharging is not
clear. There is lacking any coherent guiding principle and, as
a result, rulings have been inconsistent. The Department of
Labor has accepted noncharging of benefits paid for
unemployment caused by a natural disaster, but rejected
noncharging of benefits paid for other types of unemploy
ment also caused by circumstances beyond the employer©s
control; e.g., the permanent closing of a mine because of the
depletion of resources; the shutting down of a defense plant
due to loss of a government contract; the dissolution of a
business because of the illness of a partner. The Department
has accepted as consistent with federal law a Delaware provi
sion which provides some noncharging relief to employers
who hire handicapped workers. Delaware, which considers
the unemployed workers© wages instead of benefits in com
puting tax rates for employers, provides for disregarding,
i.e., noncharging all wages paid to handicapped workers
during the first 90 days of their employment. The Depart
ment, however, has barred similar relief from charges for
employers for hiring veterans or minorities, or for par
ticipating in programs aimed at employing youth and other
targeted groups. The Department permits no distinctions
based on industrial classification or employer size in assign
ing reduced rates (except for new employers).
Other than the experience rating requirements, states are
under no restrictions concerning the assignment of rates.
States are free, for example, to set rates higher than the stan
dard rate on any basis they choose. Accordingly, although
all states have minimum and maximum rates, these vary
widely among states. Tax bases also vary, so that effective
tax rates (the tax payable as a proportion of total payroll)
may be different even for employers with identical ex
perience and identical rates in different states. No two tax
structures are the same.
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The inconsistencies in rulings and lack of guiding prin
ciples make DOL positions vulnerable. There have been
relatively few conflicts over experience rating in recent years
only because the Unemployment Insurance Service has been
preoccupied with an avalanche of issues arising from new
legislation. It has ignored state law amendments that in past
years would have provoked conformity confrontations. For
tunately, the great majority of experience rating issues arise
over obscure provisions that have little or no significant im
pact on the program.

State Programs
The original Act followed the example of the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution by providing, at least im
plicitly, that all unemployment insurance responsibilities not
expressly delegated or implied to the federal government are
reserved to the states. While the states were required to
adhere to such basic requirements as those relating to deposit
and withdrawal of tax moneys, and to conform with other
federal requirements, originally there were relatively few
such requirements governing administrative matters (merit
system, fair hearing, payment through employment offices,
disclosure) before extensive interpretations were made of the
"methods of administration" requirement. Only two federal
program standards ("labor standards," experience rating
standards) inhibited state action in this area.
As described in chapter 1, originally the most significant
restraint on state autonomy in the program area was ig
norance of what an unemployment insurance law should
contain and consequent dependence on federal guidance.
States gradually acquired more experience and thereby more
independence, and concurrently, the federal government
developed more interpretations of existing statutory re
quirements, particularly in the administration and ex
perience rating areas. These developments were somewhat
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inevitable since reactions were needed to issues and new state
provisions constantly arising during the early years.
The interpretation approach, in contrast to the later
reliance on enactment of federal standards, proved compati
ble with the federal-state balance of authority. Federal inter
pretations were addressed to particular problems, developed
usually from a sound legal basis, and designed to be consis
tent with basic objectives of unemployment insurance. This
was not always true with enactment of federal program stan
dards. Equally important, interpretations of federal law
were more easily subject than federal law amendments to
successful challenge by the states often before they became
effective. Finally, interpretations were more likely than
statutory enactments to be the product of cooperative effort,
and consequently, more likely to represent realistic solutions
to problems. In effect, the basic structure provided by the
original Social Security Act permitted both state and federal
jurisdictions the flexibility necessary to allow state UI pro
grams to adjust to changing conditions while continuing to
serve fundamental principles.
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Chapter 3
Federal Program Standards:
Weakening the Balance

The states have never been entirely free to enact "complete
and self-sustaining" unemployment insurance laws covering
"all matters in which uniformity is not absolutely
essential . . . ," as recommended by the Committee on
Economic Security. The original Social Security Act includ
ed federal requirements covering the maintenance of tax
funds, distribution of administrative responsibilities and
other provisions establishing the system©s structural
framework. In addition to these "structural" requirements,
the original act contained two program standards. The
"labor standards" requirement barred states from disquali
fying claimants for refusing an offer of new work which was
substandard or which prevented them from joining a union
of their choice. The experience rating standard permitted
states to assign reduced UI tax rates to employers only on the
basis of their experience with unemployment.
These two original program standards, the "structural"
requirements outlined above, and interpretations of all these
provisions, remained the only federal requirements for 35
years. The program standards described in this chapter were
added in 1970, 1976, 1980, 1981 and 1982. They vary widely
in terms of their impact on the program. Each diminished
the scope of state autonomy over the program area and, to
that degree, also weakened the federal-state balance. In most
69
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cases, it is questionable that this result was offset by any
benefit the standard brought to the program. Their discus
sion here is organized according to their prevailing motiva
tion: to protect the rights of claimants, and to restrict
benefits rights to the "deserving" claimants. A third
category includes two complex standards that contain re
quirements aimed at both these objectives. Each standard is
examined in terms of the problem that produced it and the
issues it has presented. For very few of these program stan
dards can it reasonably be argued that uniformity imposed
by federal law was "absolutely essential" (the Committee©s
criterion). Most were enacted, not because uniformity was
necessary, but simply to supersede certain state provisions
Congress considered either too harsh in their impact on
claimants or too lenient. The latest standards were also the
products of two developments: inclusion of the unemploy
ment trust fund in the federal budget; and the financial crises
of the 1970s and early 1980s. The first made UI a potential
target for federal budget cutting efforts. The second provid
ed the motive for actual federal and state cost reduction
enactments.
Standards that Protect Claimants

Protection of Interstate Claimants
One of the perplexing problems faced by the Committee
on Economic Security was that posed by workers who move
from state to state. Under a strictly national system, all
workers could be treated the same; but under a system in
volving largely autonomous state programs, the interstate
worker could be left without protection. Soon after the
system began, the states developed a plan under which each
state would act as the agent for other states which were liable
for benefits claimed by workers based on employment and
earnings in the liable state but who moved to the agent state.

Federal Program Standards

71

The agent state took the claims of such workers for the liable
state. All states participated in this plan. Other interstate
plans allowed a worker to combine wages earned in two or
more states if the wages earned in any one state were not suf
ficient to qualify the claimant for benefits or if combining
would result in higher benefits. Not all states participated in
the combined wage plans. The result was that interstate
claimants were treated differently in different states.
In 1970, federal law was amended to require that all states
"shall participate" in a plan which combines the wages and
employment of an individual who worked in more than one
state so that eligibility for and amount of benefits could be
based on the combined wages and work when applying the
provisions of a single state. 1 This standard did not produce
issues of conformity with any state, but it did generate a
number of technical issues. One question, for example, con
cerned liability for benefit charges to an employer©s ex
perience rating account when a claimant©s wage credits earn
ed with that employer are transferred to another state for
combining purposes but are insufficient alone to qualify that
claimant in the transferring state. 2
A second standard affecting interstate claimants was also
adopted in 1970. 3 It too resulted from the failure of some
states to treat claimants equitably. In 1963 Ohio and Wyo
ming provided that an interstate claimant filing against these
states may not qualify for a maximum higher than that
payable in the agent state where they file their claim. Alaska,
as early as 1955, provided a maximum of $45 to claimants
filing within the state but a maximum of $25 to claimants
who filed claims against Alaska from outside the state.
Dependents© allowances were payable only for dependents
residing in Alaska.
These discriminatory provisions were characterized by a
Congressional Committee as:
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. . . not only inequitable to the individual claimant
and injurious to the proper functioning of the
unemployment insurance system but inhibit among
workers a very desirable mobility which is impor
tant to our economy. 4
The enacted federal standard bars states from denying or
reducing benefits to an individual solely because the claim is
filed from another state (or Canada) or because of a change
in residence to another state (or Canada) where the claim is
filed. 5 Ironically, the only exception to this federal ban on
discrimination against interstate claimants is another federal
provision enacted ten years later. That provision amended
the extended benefits program by prohibiting payment of
more than two weeks of extended benefits if the claimant fil
ed from a state where an extended benefit period was not in
effect. 6
It may be argued that the failure of some states to par
ticipate in combined wage plans and the enactment by others
of discriminatory provisions made federal intervention in
evitable. It is possible that, as their economies declined,
more and more states would have followed Alaska©s exam
ple. Representatives of that state argue that individuals who
work in Alaska, often in seasonal jobs, and then move south
represent a drain on the state©s economy. Their unemploy
ment benefit checks reflect high seasonal wages and an
economy with a high cost of living. When they move to lower
cost states, there may be little incentive to work for wages
that compare unfavorably with their unemployment
benefits. There may also be less incentive for an agent state
to test the availability or develop job openings for an in
terstate claimant than for an intrastate claimant drawing
benefits from the agent state©s fund.
The foregoing may be true in some situations, but the pat
tern is not characteristic of interstate claimants. There are
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sound reasons why each year thousands of workers move
from one state to another. In any event, the remedy to
abuses of the system by interstate claimants would seem to
lie in improved administration of the interstate program.
This is also the remedy for the unequal treatment interstate
claimants continue to receive despite the federal standards.
As noted in chapter 2, their claims are processed and paid
more slowly than intrastate claims, and their appeals also
take longer to complete. The delays are partly the result of
the additional processing necessary for an interstate claim,
but most of the unequal treatment is attributable to failure
of the federal partner consistently to insist upon promptness
as well as equal administration of these claims.
Among all the standards intended to protect claimants
against unfair disqualification, a strong case can be made
that those relating to interstate claimants provide a needed
uniform protection. It may be, however, that even those
standards would not have been necessary, given reasonable
interpretations of the original Social Security Act. For exam
ple, if the "withdrawal-of-funds standard" can be inter
preted as barring payment or denial of benefits on the basis
of need, presumably it could also have been interpreted as
barring discrimination against interstate claimants. The
same reasoning would seem to apply: under both situations,
benefits would be paid or denied on a basis other than the
claimant©s unemployment due to lack of work. It would
seem feasible also that the "methods of administration" re
quirement in the original Act could have been interpreted as
requiring all states to participate in a uniform combined
wage plan. In any event, the results would have been the
same. The only point is that they (and perhaps better results)
could have been achieved earlier through interpretation than
by enactment of new standards.
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Protection of Claimants Taking Training
The Department of Labor had long encouraged states to
provide training and retraining for claimants who would
benefit from new skills. The experience rating standard was
interpreted to permit states to relieve employers of charges
for benefits paid claimants engaged in approved training.
Benefits paid a claimant taking training were considered
benefits paid for unemployment even though the claimant
might be unavailable for work by reason of the training, and
even though he may refuse a suitable job because it in
terfered with his training. Not all states subscribed to this
position. Several disqualified claimants in training for refus
ing work and some held them unavailable if the training
precluded an active search for work.
The federal standard adopted by Congress in 1970 bars the
states from disqualifying claimants in approved training on
the grounds that they are unavailable, are not making an ac
tive search for work, or have refused an offer of suitable
work. 7 According to the Senate Finance Committee Report
on the 1970 amendments, these provisions "should not be
used to discourage claimants from entering training which
has been approved by the state agencies. 8 In commenting on
the new requirement, DOL recommended that states develop
regulations to assure that before approval, it is established
that the training will enhance the claimant©s employability. It
advised, however, that under the requirement, "each state is
free to determine what training is appropriate for a claimant,
what criteria are established for approval of training for an
individual, and what safeguards are established to assure
that the claimant for whom the training has been approved is
actually attending such training." 9
Few issues have been presented by this federal standard
because not all states actually developed criteria for approv
ing an individual for training, and not many unemployment
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insurance claimants are involved in training or retraining
anyway. The federal requirement may be circumvented easi
ly by a state either refusing to approve training for any
claimant, or setting prohibitive conditions on the approval
of training.
A potential issue was presented by a number of state laws
which deny benefits to claimants taking any training pro
viding cash or other allowances. Since an individual taking
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
training (which usually paid allowances) had approval of the
state employment security agency, it was argued within DOL
that the state laws denying benefits to claimants taking
allowance-paying training were inconsistent with the UI
training standard. However, the issue was never raised.

Protection Against Excessive Penalties
Another standard aimed at protecting claimants from
unreasonable penalties was a reaction to a trend toward in
creasingly severe disqualifications. For many years, DOL
fought a losing battle in this area, trying to persuade the
states of the advantages of limiting disqualifications to a
postponement of benefits for about six weeks (the national
average duration of a spell of unemployment). In 1944 the
experience rating standard was interpreted to permit states to
noncharge employers for benefits paid following a dis
qualification. It was hoped that this would help ease the
pressure for harsher disqualifications. 10
The standard enacted in 1970 prohibits states from
cancelling the wage credits (earnings on which benefits are
based) or completely eliminating the benefit rights of any in
dividual disqualified for any cause except discharge for
misconduct connected with the work, fraud in connection
with a claim, or receipt of disqualifying income. ! l According
to the Senate Finance Committee Report,
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This proposal is directed solely to the preservation,
in all but the excepted cases, of some portion of an
individual©s monetary entitlement for his benefit
year, the "bank account" of benefits against
which, if otherwise eligible, he can draw. The re
quirement would affect only those few State laws
which cancel wage credits or totally reduce
benefits. 12
Although the standard caused a few states to amend their
laws, it actually represents a very modest restraint on states.
The provision in no way restricts states in establishing any
conditions it sees fit as eligibility requirements for benefits.
It does not prevent any state from increasing the number or
type of infractions for which a disqualification may be ap
plied. It does not really inhibit, in any significant way, a state
from imposing as severe a disqualification as it wishes for
any cause. The provision does not preclude a disqualification
for the duration of the claimant©s unemployment and until
the claimant obtains another job, works at least a prescribed
minimum period, earns at least a specified minimum amount
and is then separated from the job for nondisqualifying
reasons. This is permitted under the standard, even though
failure to obtain another job is tantamount to complete
denial of benefits. Most states now apply such a disqualifica
tion for one or all of the major causes of disqualification.
The standard prohibits any cancellation of wage credits
(except in the three specified situations). This means the state
may not cancel for benefit purposes wages earned from an
employer from whom the claimant separated under disquali
fying conditions. The standard bars only "total" reduction
of benefit rights. Cancellation of wage credits may not be as
severe a penalty as reduction of benefit rights, particularly
for claimants with more than one base-period employer. For
example, a state may be consistent with the standard if, in
the case of a claimant otherwise entitled to 26 weeks of
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benefits, it disqualifies the claimant for 25 weeks, with an
equal reduction in benefits. Since this leaves the claimant
with one week of benefits, and thus preserves "some portion
of an individual©s monetary entitlement," it satisfies the
standard. The impact of such a disqualification is denial of
all but one week of benefits for a year, not only six months.
This is because every claimant must wait a year, beginning
when his first claim is filed, before new benefit rights can be
accumulated based on fresh wage credits. 13
At least one state14 actually provides precisely for wiping
out all but one week of a claimant©s benefit entitlement if the
claimant left work voluntarily or refused an offer of work.
This clearly was not the result Congress had hoped to ac
complish:
Severe disqualifications, particularly those which
cancel (as opposed to postpone) earned monetary
entitlement, are not in harmony with the basic pur
poses of an unemployment insurance system. Most
disqualifications under State law provisions are ap
plied for voluntary terminations without good
cause (frequently cause must be attributable to an
employer), or for refusals of suitable work. Such a
situation may represent an error in judgment on the
part of the worker, or be the result of cir
cumstances over which he had no control. The
penalty for a disqualifying act should not be out of
proportion to the disqualifying act. 15
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa
tion made only one recommendation to Congress in the area
of disqualifications. It went beyond the standard described
above and recommended that Congress prohibit not only
total reduction of benefit rights, but any reduction of benefit
rights, except for fraud or receipt of disqualifying income. 16
As of early 1983, a dozen states provided for some reduction
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of benefit rights as the penalty for voluntarily quitting work
without good cause and 15 reduced benefit rights of
claimants disqualified for refusing suitable work. 17

Protection Against Automatic
Disqualification for Pregnancy
A third standard intended to protect claimants from
unreasonable penalties sought elimination of the provisions
of 19 states as of the mid-1970s,
. . . which, in effect, deny benefits because of
pregnancy. They vary from State to State, but they
are all inequitable in that they deny benefits
without regard to the woman©s ability to work,
availability for work, or efforts to find work.
Under eligibility provisions applicable to all
claimants, including pregnant women, anyone who
is physically unable to work or who is unavailable
for work is ineligible for benefits. These determina
tions are made on the basis of the facts of each in
dividual case and make discriminatory disqualifica
tions because of pregnancy unnecessary. 18
The standard, enacted in 1976, prohibits benefit denial solely
on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy.
Provisions of the 19 states concerning pregnant women
varied considerably in application and severity, ranging from
Delaware©s disqualification only for any week the individual
was actually unable to work because of pregnancy, to Utah©s
automatic denial of benefits for 12 weeks before the date of
childbirth and 6 weeks following childbirth. Ironically, some
of the state provisions may have been based on the following
Social Security Board©s 1942 suggestion for state legislation:
Provided further, however, that a woman shall be
considered unable to work for the period within
two weeks before the anticipated date of childbirth
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and four weeks after childbirth unless it is shown
by facts such as a doctor©s or midwife©s certificate
or by her work record during previous periods of
pregnancy that she is able to work during such
period. 19
By the time the 1976 standard was enacted, the Utah
pregnancy provision had been declared unconstitutional by
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court had ruled that:
. . . the Utah unemployment compensation
statute©s incorporation of a conclusive presumption
of incapacity during so long a period before and
after childbirth is constitutionally invalid. . . . 20
The adoption of the federal standard, which categorically
prohibits denial of benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy
or termination of pregnancy, settled any questions that may
have remained even after this decision, including the
legitimacy of pregnancy provisions that contained rebuttable, rather than conclusive, presumptions of unavailability
or inability to work.
In any event, no special provisions dealing with pregnancy
now exist in state UI laws. The standard, however, covers
only one aspect of sex discrimination found in these laws. A
number of states still provide special disqualifications for
claimants unemployed because they left work to marry, to
accompany their spouses to a new location, or to meet
domestic obligations. In most cases, the individual is dis
qualified for benefits until another job is found, a specified
minimum amount is earned, and the individual is then
separated for nondisqualifying reasons. Almost invariably
women are the victims of these disqualifications.
Dependents© allowance provisions and practices in the
dozen or so states that provide these supplements are another
example. Such allowances are often granted to male
claimants more readily than to female claimants. The latter
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must usually make a greater effort to prove her children are
her dependents.
Women are also disproportionately represented among
claimants subject to certain voluntary quit provisions. Most
states do not exempt from disqualification claimants who
had good personal cause for leaving work. Unless the in
dividual had good cause "attributable to the employer," the
disqualification is imposed. This limitation on good cause
results in benefit denial for any individual who must leave
work to meet a domestic emergency (e.g., to care for a sick
child or spouse, to accompany a spouse to another job) or
for other compelling personal reasons. The usual reasoning
for so limiting good cause to that connected with the work or
the employer is that it is not reasonable to expect the
employer to bear the costs of unemployment he did not
cause. This assumes a necessary linkage between benefit and
financing provisions, which experience rating encourages. In
any event, for those concerned with eliminating
discriminatory provisions, the prohibition of disqualifica
tion on the grounds of pregnancy represented a gain, but did
not go far enough. 21

Proposed Benefit Standards
No discussion of federal program standards aimed at pro
tecting claimants would be complete without mention of pro
posed benefit standards which, though never enacted, have
generated more controversy than any other. 22 The controver
sy arises because standards affecting weekly benefit amounts
and the duration of benefits payable pose a greater cost
potential than any other type of requirement. Proposed
benefit standards sometimes have also covered qualifying re
quirements and disqualification rules. Four national ad
ministrations have fought for benefit standards without suc
cess. The states continue to exercise complete authority over
these areas, the most important aspects of unemployment in-
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surance. In 1950, President Truman proposed comprehen
sive UI changes, including minimum benefit standards, as
part of a special message to Congress. The bill incorporating
the proposed standards did not survive the House Ways and
Means Committee. President Eisenhower did not propose
benefit standards, but recommended instead that the states
seek on their own to meet appropriate benefit adequacy
goals. In 1959, a benefit standards bill failed by one vote to
clear the Ways and Means Committee. The Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations included benefit standards in their
UI legislative proposals. The 1965 bills (S. 1991 and H.R.
8282) included the following requirements for states:
(a) a weekly benefit amount equal to at least 50 percent
of the claimant©s average weekly wage;
(b) a maximum weekly benefit amount equal to at least
66-2/3 of the statewide average weekly wage, to be
phased in by July 1, 1971;
(c) a qualifying requirement of not more than 20 weeks
of work or the equivalent in earnings during the prior
base period;
(d) a maximum of at least 26 weeks duration of weekly
benefits payable for claimants meeting such require
ment;
(e) a maximum of six weeks suspension of benefits for
disqualification for most causes, with no reduction or
cancellation of benefit rights.
No state law met all of these proposed requirements and few
met any of them at that time. Following hearings in 1966,
most of these standards passed the Senate, failed the House,
and could not be agreed upon in the House-Senate con
ference. No UI legislation was adopted because of the im
passe.
The Nixon Administration©s 1975 UI proposals included a
weekly and maximum benefit amount standard similar to (a)
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and (b) above. The proposed standards were defeated sound
ly on the House floor.
In July 1975, a majority of the state agency administrators
comprising the Interstate Conference of Employment Securi
ty Agencies supported the same kind of federal benefit
amount standard. Four years later, the same organization
overwhelmingly reversed its position. In 1980, by a 7 to 5
vote, the National Commission on Unemployment Compen
sation endorsed substantially the same standard, to be phas
ed in gradually by 1986.
Cost is probably the major reason weekly benefit amount
standards have regularly been defeated. The Commission
estimated that the increase in costs in 1980 of setting benefit
ceilings to at least 55 percent of average wages would be
about 15 percent overall; ranging from no increase in states
that already provide a maximum at least that high, to over
100 percent increase in Alaska. If maximums were raised to
60 percent, the national cost would rise by about 19 percent;
and at 66-2/3 percent, it would rise by about 25 percent
above 1979 levels. 23
A second, less significant, reason for opposition to weekly
benefit amount standards is apprehension that they will lead
to additional standards and ultimately to federalization of
the program. To prevent states from compensating for the
increase in costs caused by higher weekly benefits by tighten
ing qualifying, duration and disqualification provisions,
Congress may consider standardizing all benefit provisions,
thereby finally removing all remaining vestiges of state
autonomy. As a further calamity, it is argued that at the
same time Congress eliminates state authority over substan
tive program matters, it is likely to saddle the states with
responsibility for raising the taxes needed to meet the in
creased costs.
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Most opponents of a weekly benefit amount standard do
not contest the need to maintain adequate benefit levels.
Most even agree with the minimum 50 percent weekly wage
replacement goal. The sticking points are the level of the
maximum weekly benefit amounts and, equally important,
whether it should be the subject of a federal standard. 24

Standards that Restrict Payment
If Congress determined at certain times that the states
were too harsh on claimants, at other times it focused on
state provisions and practices it considered too lenient. In re
cent years, financial crises and the desire to find ways of
reducing costs have produced additional motivations for
restrictive federal standards. Whether protective or restric
tive, the results of imposing federal standards were the same:
a further diminution of state authority; the removal of an
issue from the arena of debate; and inequities that invariably
follow decisions adopted without adequate consideration. In
very few cases has a program standard adopted by Congress
been based on careful consideration of available experience
at the state level. This is ironic since the federal-state system
provides the opportunity for individual states to serve as ex
perimental laboratories. Indeed, the Committee on
Economic Security believed that the lack of experience in this
country with unemployment insurance,
. . . clearly suggests the desirability of permitting
considerable variation, so that we may learn
through demonstration what is best. 25
The failure to base standards more on state experience
may simply reflect the fact that individuals with different
values assess experience differently. What is the "best"
qualifying requirement from the standpoint of low-wage
workers, for example, may be the least desirable from a
budget cutter©s perspective. This does not detract from the
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advantages of having individual laboratories or the value of
individual state experience to other states, if not to Congress
for standard setting purposes. Many program improvements
now in most states© laws originated first in single states on an
experimental basis.

"Double Dip" Restriction
In 1970 Congress reacted to an apparent loophole in some
state benefit formulas that made it possible for claimants to
qualify for two successive rounds of benefits without in
tervening employment. The so-called "double dip" was
possible because in many states there is a substantial gap in
time between an individual©s base period and his benefit year
(see footnote 13). In some states, when an individual first
files a claim for benefits, he automatically establishes a fourquarter base period in the recent past for the purpose of
measuring his work experience. The amount of work per
formed and the wages paid during the base period determine
if he qualifies for benefits and, if so, the weekly benefit
amount and the number of weeks of benefits payable. The
filing of the claim establishes also the individual©s benefit
year. This is a one-year period, usually beginning with the
date of the first claim, during which he may draw his benefit
entitlement.
In most states, the base period is defined as the first four
of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately
preceding the first claim. These states usually maintain
records for every worker showing the wages paid, as
reported by employers on a quarterly basis. The gap between
the claimant©s base period and benefit year eases administra
tion by making it likely that complete information on the
claimant©s wages is available for the first four of the last five
completed calendar quarters. The fifth quarter, or the most
recent completed quarter, is called a "lag" quarter. Wage
credits earned during the lag quarter and in the following
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quarter will not be available for benefit purposes until after
the claimant finishes his benefit year, files another first
claim, and establishes a new benefit year and base period.
For example, a claimant who first filed any time between
April 1 and June 30, 1982, would have the four quarters of
calendar year 1981 as a base period. The wages earned dur
ing the first and second quarters of 1982 would not be
counted. However, those "lag" wages would be included in
the claimant©s next base period if he filed a new claim and
established a new benefit year before July 1, 1983.
The "double dip" occurred because some states did not
require earnings in more than one quarter, or in much more
than one quarter, in order to qualify for benefits. In those
states the individual in the example could collect benefits in a
second benefit year solely on the basis of those first and sec
ond quarter 1982 lag-period wages that were not used before,
without having been employed since the beginning of his first
benefit year.
The claimant would have to be unemployed in order to
establish a new entitlement and meet all the eligibility condi
tions of the law. Collecting benefits solely on the basis of his
lag-period wages could reasonably be considered an abuse on
the claimant©s part. However, it did constitute an ad
ministrative loophole in that it provided more than was
probably intended. In 1970 the "double dip" was possible in
15 states. Other states either required substantially more
than one quarter of wages to qualify, or some employment
subsequent to the start of the first benefit year, or operated
without a base period-benefit year lag by requesting recent
information on each claimant from the employer when the
claim was first filed.
The federal standard requires, as a condition for tax
credit, that a state law provide,
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... an individual who has received compensation
during his benefit year is required to have had work
since the beginning of such year in order to qualify
for compensation in his next benefit year. 26
Prior to adopting the standard, no effort was made to
evaluate the experience of states where the "double dip" was
possible in terms of the work experience of individuals who
qualified for it, cost to the state, or any other criteria. It is
not clear why this issue was considered sufficiently serious to
warrant a federal standard prohibiting anyone from qualify
ing twice without intervening work but not serious enough
for Congress to bother prescribing precisely how much work
should be required. That was left to the states. DOL recom
mended not more than three weeks of work or the equivalent
in wages (e.g., six times the weekly benefit amount), but it
provided no reason for choosing this amount. 27 As of 1983,
state requirements ranged from amounts equal to from three
to ten times the claimant©s weekly benefit amount. 28

Restriction of Benefits
to Certain Aliens
A second restrictive standard was adopted in 1976 as part
of a comprehensive unemployment insurance bill. The stan
dard was provoked by the belief of its sponsor, Congressman
Sisk of California, that despite illegal aliens being ineligible
for UI (because they are not genuinely available for work in
this country), many are nevertheless drawing benefits. The
standard appears to have been a reaction to abuses of the UI
system alleged in a television program. It represented a reac
tion also to a recent California agency decision to stop ask
ing claimants whether they are citizens or aliens.
The standard requires states to prohibit benefits based on
services performed by an alien unless he was lawfully present
in the United States either for the purpose of performing
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such services, or was admitted for permanent residence, or
was residing in the U.S. under color of law at the time the
services were performed. 29 In discussion of how the stan
dard, which provides no specific penalties, would prevent il
legal aliens from drawing benefits, Congressman Sisk advis
ed that,
. . . really when we get down to it, on the basis that
a person might swear to anything in order to get
some money if he wants to do it, this statement
really becomes a sense-of-Congress statement that
we do not believe illegal aliens should draw
unemployment compensation. 30
During the House floor discussion on the standard, no facts
and no estimates were offered concerning the number of il
legal aliens collecting unemployment benefits.
The standard did generate concern that it might lead to ad
ministrative harassment of minority ethnic groups, whether
or not they were citizens or otherwise eligible for benefits.
This and other concerns were reflected in discussion of
amendments to the standard aimed at ensuring that benefits
are denied only to aliens not lawfully admitted, without
penalizing either citizens or lawfully admitted aliens. Under
the amendments, any information required by a state agency
to determine a claimant©s alien status shall be uniformly re
quired of all applicants for benefits, and that no determina
tion denying benefits under the standard shall be made ex
cept on a preponderance of the evidence. 31
In conforming their unemployment insurance laws with
the standard, as amended, most states used the same
language as the standard.
The Unemployment Insurance Service (UIS) issued in
structions advising the states that all claimants should be
asked the same basic questions on the claims forms as
follows:
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©Are you a citizen of the U.S.?©
©If "no," when you were working in the U.S., were
you issued an Alien Registration Card, Form 1-151,
commonly called a "green card"?©
©If "no," when you were working in the U.S., what
document or form number were you issued?©
To guide staff with regard to the last two questions, the UIS
issued almost 30 pages of instructions describing different
categories of aliens and the various documents issued to
them identifying their status and whether or not they are per
mitted to work. 32 This was followed by a substantial number
of detailed procedural instructions. Neither the Department
of Labor nor the states keeps records showing how many, if
any, individuals are denied benefits on the basis of the re
quirements of the standard.
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa
tion recommended unanimously that the entire standard be
eliminated as it was ineffective, unnecessary, and inap
propriate as a federal standard. It concluded that the stan
dard would not deter a determined alien from filing for UI,
that there is no record of a single individual being denied by
reason of the standard, that aliens not legally in the U.S. are
ineligible anyway for benefits, and that the provision has un
necessarily burdened the administration of the program and
delayed payment of benefits to aliens who are eligible. 33

Restriction of Benefits
to Professional Athletes
Another restrictive federal program standard enacted in
1976 sought to curtail another alleged abuse of the system.
As with the standard on aliens, this one was apparently also
a reaction to abuses alleged in a television program which in
cluded an interview with "a professional golfer who collects
unemployment benefits." It was discovered that not only
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golfers, but also professional ball players apparently were
eligible for benefits. According to Congressman Sisk,
. . . it is a matter of record that regulations of some
States make professional athletes eligible for
unemployment compensation. It was reported last
March, for example, that the president of the
Milwaukee Brewers confirmed that some members
of the team have been drawing jobless payments
for a number of years. 34
In the House floor discussion of the standard, no facts were
presented and no estimates given of the number of profes
sional athletes collecting benefits and the circumstances
under which such benefits were paid.
The standard requires states to deny benefits based on any
services,
. . . substantially all of which consist of par
ticipating in sports or athletic events or training or
preparing to so participate, for any week which
commences during the period between two suc
cessive sport seasons (or similar periods) and there
is a reasonable assurance that such individual will
perform such service in the later of such seasons (or
similar periods). 35
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa
tion unanimously recommended that the standard be
eliminated, as unnecessary, discriminatory and difficult to
administer. It was unnecessary because athletes on a
12-month contract would not be considered unemployed
during the off season. In no state would benefits be permit
ted if the athlete limits his availability during the off season
to participation in his sport. It was discriminatory because it
would automatically deny benefits to athletes during the off
season (if they have a reasonable assurance of resuming the

90

Federal Program Standards

sport the next season), regardless of whether or not they are
available for other kinds of work during the off season.
The standard is difficult to administer because it requires
the following special determinations:
1. If "substantially all" the individual©s services during
the base period were in sports or athletic events;
2. Of the beginning and ending of a "sport season" and
the length of the period between successive seasons (which
vary among different sports and individuals);
3. If the individuals who performed services as profes
sional athletes in the last season have a reasonable
assurance that they will do so in the next season;
4. If the individual performing the services was selfemployed or an employer. 36
As in the case with the standard concerning aliens, there is no
record of how many individuals have been denied benefits
under the terms of the standard.
The standard restricting the eligibility of athletes, like the
standard discussed below prohibiting benefits to school
employees between terms, represents an attempt to deal with
prominent aspects of the general issue of seasonal unemploy
ment. This issue was first identified by the Committee on
Economic Security in reporting that English experience
demonstrated that seasonal industries would cause a heavy
drain on unemployment funds "unless the benefits to
seasonal workers are limited to unemployment occurring
within the usual season for that particular industry." 37
However, most states that applied special seasonal restric
tions for certain industries or operations or workers en
countered administrative problems as difficult as those
described above. Moreover, it was never demonstrated that
benefits to seasonal workers constituted substantial drains
on state UI funds. As of early 1983, fewer than a dozen
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states had special seasonal provisions, and some of these are
rarely applied or applied only with respect to a few specific
industries. 38 In most states no distinction is made between
seasonal and nonseasonal work or wages in crediting a
worker©s employment toward meeting the qualifying require
ment. Adequate minimum wage and work qualifying re
quirements have succeeded in automatically screening out in
dividual claimants whose only or primary employment has
been in limited seasonal work. Moreover, most states ques
tion carefully the availability for work of UI claimants who
earned a large part of their base-period wages in seasonal
employment, particularly if they are filing for benefits dur
ing the off season of the industry in which the wages were
earned. 39

Deduction of Retirement
Income from Benefits
There has been less agreement on the question of whether
or not retirement income should be deducted from benefits
than on most issues. 40 Those who favor reducing a
claimant©s weekly benefit amount by the prorated weekly
amount of his pension argue that no individual should
receive duplicate payments for not working. Moreover, if the
individual is already receiving a pension, he is not in need of
unemployment benefits. They contend that eligibility and
receipt of a pension are proof of the recipient©s withdrawal
from the labor force. They claim also that it is unfair to ex
pect any employer to finance a former worker©s pension as
well as his unemployment benefits.
Those who oppose deducting pensions from unemploy
ment benefits counter these arguments on the grounds that
retirement benefits and unemployment benefits are not
duplicate payments, since they are paid for different con
tingencies. They argue that any presumption that a pension
recipient has withdrawn from the labor force should be

rebuttable, not conclusive. Moreover, it can be tested by ap
plying regular availability and work search requirements. It
may be true that a pension recipient may be in less need than
other claimants for unemployment benefits, but the same
reasoning could apply to others with nonwage sources of in
come such as rents or interest. In any event, need is not sup
posed to be a consideration in determining eligibility. As for
the unfair double burden that may fall on employers, they
point out that this can apply only to a claimant©s base-period
employers since only they would be financing both
unemployment and pension payments.
Prior to adoption of a federal program standard, the lack
of consensus on the desirability and manner of pension
deduction was reflected in the variety of state provisions on
the issue. Most states provided for reduction of benefits by
pension income, but only pensions financed in whole or in
larger part by base-period employers. Some deducted all
pension income but Social Security, and several provided for
no deduction at all. There were variations of each of these
provisions.
In 1976 the Senate Finance Committee, in reporting out a
bill containing comprehensive unemployment insurance
amendments, included a pension deduction standard. The
standard would have disqualified from unemployment in
surance completely any individual receiving any retirement
income regardless of the amount. This severe proposal was
amended in its final form, as enacted in 1976, to require each
state to simply reduce a claimant©s weekly unemployment
benefit by the prorated weekly amount of any pension or
retirement benefit he receives. Even this standard was more
stringent than any existing state provision. Perhaps for that
reason, the standard©s effective date was postponed to 1979,
. . . thereby permitting the National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation an opportunity for
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a thorough study of this issue and the Congress to
act in light of its findings and recommendations. 41
In its first interim report issued November 1978, the Com
mission recommended unanimously that the pension deduc
tion standard be eliminated. This recommendation was
repeated in its July, 1980 Final Report with an additional
recommendation that, failing repeal of the standard, Con
gress move to reduce its severity.
By the time the NCUC Final Report was issued, Congress
had already acted, not to abolish the standard, but at least to
modify it. 42 The resulting federal standard on pension deduc
tion represents a minimum requirement. States may enact
provisions that are more severe, but they may not enact less
restrictive pension deductions. As amended, the standard re
quires states to deduct from the UI benefit the employerfinanced portion of a pension contributed to by a UI baseperiod employer if that employer©s contribution affected the
claimant©s eligibility for or increased the amount of the pen
sion. Social Security Act or Railroad Retirement Act pen
sions are deductible regardless of the effect of the baseperiod employer©s contribution. The state may, but is not re
quired to, adjust the amount of the pension deduction after
taking into account any contributions to the pension made
by the employee. 43
In considering the latter provision, the Senate rejected an
amendment proposed by Senator Javits of New York that
would require, rather than permit, a state to take into ac
count any and all contributions the individual made to his
pension. The amendment was vigorously opposed by the
manager of the bill, Senator Boren of Oklahoma, who
declared that the Javits amendment was not "based upon a
correct observation of what the unemployment insurance
system is meant to do." The amendment, he said,
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. . . would allow an abuse of the system by people
who are not in the work force, who are retired, who
have decided to retire and draw a pension and
simply are looking to gain additional unemploy
ment benefits on the side when they are no longer
part of the work force. 44
After being advised by Senator Bellman that the Javits
amendment would add between $5 and $10 million to the
fiscal year 1980 cost of the unemployment insurance system,
and being urged by that senator to reject the amendment on
those grounds, the Senate voted down the Javits amendment
69 to 23. 4S
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa
tion considered any federal standard in this area wholly inap
propriate, presumptuous and unnecessary in light of the fun
damental disagreements among states as to the desirability of
deducting retirement pay from UI and even greater dif
ferences concerning the extent to which deductions should
apply.
The standard was clearly not an area where uniformity
was absolutely essential. It was not based on any significant
evaluation of state experience with pension deduction provi
sions. It had little or no support or input from state agencies.
It reflected three factors that have increasingly influenced
federal decisions on unemployment insurance matters: a
suspicion of unemployed workers who apply for benefits; a
skepticism of the ability of the system to correct abuses; an
overriding concern with the cost implications of program
proposals.
Standards With Both Protective
and Restrictive Features
Two important standards, coverage and extended benefit
standards, cannot be classified solely as either protective or
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restrictive. Each is a conglomerate of several related re
quirements, not all adopted at the same time, and not all
reflecting the same motivation.

Coverage Standard
Universal coverage of wage and salary employment has
been an unemployment insurance objective since the begin
ning of the program. Coverage extension has been a gradual
process over the years, with some states pioneering in this
area but with major advances coming from federal legisla
tion. The latter extensions (employment in small firms,
agricultural, and domestic household service) have been ac
complished by broadening the applicability of the federal
unemployment tax. This was done either by redefining sub
ject "employment" or "employer" to include the new
groups, or simply by eliminating prior exclusions. State UI
coverage followed, since without coverage by state law and
application of the state UI tax, the employers in question
would not qualify for credit against the federal tax and their
employees would not be protected by unemployment in
surance.
Nonprofit and Public Employment
Unlike all other coverage extensions, most employment in
nonprofit organizations and in state and local governments
was brought into the system by the 1970 and 1976 FUTA
amendments making state coverage of these groups a federal
standard. 46 Failure of a state to cover a political subdivision
or a nonprofit hospital, for example, would threaten the
denial of tax credit for all covered and taxable employers in
the state. Coverage of these categories was accomplished this
way to avoid making nonprofit organizations subject to the
federal tax47 and to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against imposing a federal tax on states or their
subdivisions. 48
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State coverage of nonprofit organizations with four or
more employees was mandated by the 1970 amendments to
the FUTA. It extended the UI umbrella to about two million
nonprofit jobs. 49 The 1970 amendments also extended
coverage to some state jobs (those in state hospitals and in
stitutions of higher education) but the bulk of state and local
government employment was brought into the system as a
result of the comprehensive 1976 amendments to the FUTA.
By that time, 29 states had already extended coverage to
most state government workers without any federal incen
tive, but only eight states had covered local government
employees on a mandatory basis (some allowed voluntary
coverage). The 1976 amendments brought approximately
600,000 jobs in state government and some 7.7 million jobs
in local government into the program. There seems little
question that coverage of these groups would not have been
accomplished to any comparable extent by the states acting
alone, in the absence of the 1970 and 1976 federal amend
ments.
Adoption of the coverage standard for these categories
raised two types of issues. The first included broad questions
such as the following:
Does the standard require unqualified state coverage of
every category of public employment, or was it enough
if a state covered only substantially all employment in a
category, such as only those subject to the state merit
system?
Does mandatory state coverage of state and local
government workers as a condition for tax credit for
other covered employers so intrude the federal govern
ment into state budgeting and personnel matters as to
violate the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution?
Does mandated coverage of employment in primary and
secondary schools extend to church-related schools, or
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do the latter continue to be exempt by reason of certain
remaining FUTA exclusions of religious organizations?
These questions were resolved only after conformity hear
ings or Supreme Court decisions. They are discussed in
chapter 5.
The second category of issues related to interpretations of
specific exclusions from the otherwise required coverage.
These exclusions include services performed in the employ of
a church or an organization operated primarily for religious
purposes; services performed by a minister or by members of
a religious order in the exercise of religious duties; and ser
vices performed for a nonprofit organization with fewer
than four employees. Permitted exclusions to state and local
government coverage, as well as nonprofit organizations, in
clude services performed by employees in the exercise of
their duties as: elected officials; members of legislative
bodies or the judiciary; members of the State National
Guard or the Air National Guard; employees hired for the
duration of such emergencies as fire, storm, snow, earth
quake, flood; participants in sheltered workshops; inmates
of a custodial or penal institution; participants in publicly
financed unemployment work-relief or work-training pro
grams; and employees in major nontenured policymaking or
advisory positions, or in policymaking or advisory positions
requiring eight or fewer hours of work per week. 50
In addition, services already excluded from the federal act
could continue to be excluded even if performed for a non
profit organization or state or local government. These in
cluded service performed by a student for a school in which
he is enrolled, service not in the course of the employer©s
business for which remuneration is less than $50, service for
a foreign government or international organization, service
performed in the delivery of newspapers by an individual
under 18, and others. 51
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Within a short period, issues concerning the scope of the
permitted exemptions were resolved. They included, for ex
ample, a Kentucky provision excluding temporary employees
of the state legislature; refusal by the Idaho legislature to ex
tend coverage to the Boise Symphony Orchestra; an Ohio
provision excluding state employees paid on a commission
basis; and a proposal at the federal level in 197752 to add
substitute teachers to the list of exclusions. In each case, the
state exemptions were found inconsistent with the federal
standard and eventually disapproved. The federal proposal
was not enacted.
Questions concerning services already excluded from the
federal act focused on the scope of the exclusion of services
performed in the employ of a school by a student enrolled
and regularly attending classes at the school, and services
performed by individuals under the age of 22 who are enroll
ed in work study programs. Issues arose over the phrase
"regularly attending" and its application to doctoral can
didates, and proposals to apply the work-study exemption to
individuals older than 22. In each case, the Unemployment
Insurance Service (UIS) offered interpretations which resolv
ed these and a host of other issues. The UIS issued an 85
page Draft Bill providing draft statutory language for state
consideration in implementing the 1976 amendments, com
mentary and explanatory material and five lengthy and
detailed supplements covering a wide range of questions,
many of which related to the coverage standard and its im
plications. 53

Reimbursement Financing
A significant part of the conglomerate coverage standard
concerns the financing of benefits paid to employees of non
profit organizations and state and local governments. For a
number of reasons, these groups of employers were given a
special advantage in the form of a financing option other
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than taxes and experience rating. For many years, the most
important obstacle to extending coverage to nonprofit
organizations was recognition that since many had very tight
budgets and depended on voluntary contributions for finan
cing, they "should not be required to share in the costs of
providing benefits to workers in profit-making
enterprises." 54 In other words, they should not be forced to
finance benefits through taxes which cover not only their
own costs but pooled costs as well, including benefit costs
charged to but not financed by the employer who is already
at the maximum tax rate, costs attributable to employers
who go out of business, and noncharged benefit costs.
States that had taken the initiative and already covered
their own employees were never forced to be subject to the
experience rating standard. That standard required only that
reduced rates to "persons" be based on their experience, as
measured by the state©s system of experience rating. Govern
ments are not "persons" for this purpose.
Accordingly, Congress directed the following preferred
treatment for nonprofit organizations and state and local
governments:
. . . the State law shall provide that a governmental
entity or any other organization (or group of
governmental entities or other organizations)
which, but for the requirements of this paragraph,
would be liable for contributions with respect to
service to which paragraph (1) applies may elect,
for such minimum period and at such time as may
be provided by State law, to pay (in lieu of such
contributions) into the State unemployment fund
amounts equal to the amounts of compensation at
tributable under the State law to such service. The
State law may provide safeguards to ensure that
governmental entities or other organizations so
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electing will make the payments required under
such elections. 55
The requirement, that states offer governmental entities
and nonprofit organizations the reimbursement option,
generated more issues than did the provisions requiring
coverage of these employers. Since they paid no federal tax,
the administrative costs attributable to their workers (and
the federal share of extended benefits paid to their former
employees in the case of nonprofit organizations) are ab
sorbed by private sector employers. The major issue was the
extent, if any, states could shift still other costs to the private
sector by not charging reimbursing employers for certain
benefits. This issue was the subject of a conformity hearing
and is treated in chapter 5.
Most other reimbursement issues were resolved soon after
issuance of Department guidelines. Early issues arose over a
proposed amendment in one state to set the effective period
for an election to reimburse or contribute at no less than ten
years; another state proposal to require any employer
wishing to elect the reimbursement method to post a bond
equal to $50,000; a proposed amendment to limit the reim
bursement option only to the state as a whole and not to its
component units; a proposed state regulation requiring
deposit of reimbursements in special state funds; a bill to
allow employers with a positive experience rating balance to
apply that balance to offset future liability incurred as a
reimburser; and another to prohibit employers whose ex
perience rating accounts showed that their benefit charges
exceeded their contributions from electing the reimburse
ment option. All these provisions were reviewed by DOL and
considered inconsistent with the reimbursement standard.
The reimbursement option is likely to continue to be a
source of friction, particularly during high cost and high tax
periods. Yet, this sole departure from experience rating in 35
years helped make possible the coverage of nonprofit
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organizations and governmental entities by overcoming
arguments that coverage would be inequitable since the taxes
collected would far exceed the benefit costs of these tradi
tionally low turnover employing units.
Equal Treatment Requirement
In extending coverage to jobs in nonprofit organizations
and state and local government, Congress apparently an
ticipated that states might adopt measures to cut costs that
would undermine the intent of extending protection to
workers in these jobs on the same basis as others. For exam
ple, states conceivably could establish special qualifying re
quirements, a separate benefit structure, or separate eligibili
ty conditions applicable only to public and nonprofit
employees. For a number of reasons, states might be more
likely to single out public employees for restrictive treatment
than other workers. Each state is directly liable for financing
the benefit costs of its own employees, and it might be sub
ject to substantial pressure from political subdivisions for
relief from benefit costs they incur. Pressure for cutting
public employee benefit costs might also ensue from tax
payer groups as well as competing interests for public funds.
In the case of nonprofit organizations, their employees
might be the subject of special treatment as a reaction to
their employers© immunity from federal tax and the advan
tage they enjoy of electing to finance benefit costs on a reim
bursement instead of a state tax basis.
Some evidence existed that states might discriminate
against certain employees. A 1960 federal amendment56
allowed states to extend coverage to services performed on
American ships under certain conditions. Although the law
provided that these maritime employees be treated the same
as other workers, no penalty for violation was included.
Ohio enacted special restrictive requirements relating to
Great Lakes seamen. Consequently, the 1970 federal law
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amendments included a special provision denying maritime
employers credit against the federal tax if a state does not
treat their employees on an equal basis with other workers. 57
Regardless of whether or not such Congressional ap
prehensions either existed (relevant Congressional reports
provide no explanation) or were realistic, the result was
enactment of an "equal treatment" standard requiring all
states to provide compensation to employees of nonprofit
organizations and state and local government employees,
... in the same amount, on the same terms, and
subject to the same conditions as compen
sation . . . payable on the basis of other service
subject to the State Law. 58
School Employees: Between-Terms
Denial Requirements
The extension of coverage to nonprofit organizations and
state and local government workers in 1970 and 1976 was not
an unqualified blanket protection of all such workers. Most
school employees did not perform services for the school
during the break between terms. They were not considered
by Congress to be "unemployed" then, within the meaning
of unemployment insurance, particularly if they were
assured of reemployment with the school the second term
and certainly if they were employed under 12-month con
tracts. It is not clear how this category of workers is
distinguishable from other groups of workers similarly cir
cumstanced. Automobile workers are regularly laid off on a
temporary basis during recurring model change-over
periods. Longshoremen, fishermen, farm workers arid many
other occupations are no less seasonal than school
employees.
School workers are large in numbers, often well organiz
ed, relatively well paid and usually regularly employed. But
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the main distinguishing feature is that most are public
employees, subject to public criticism and tight budgetary
restraints. Most, particularly teachers, were generally con
sidered fortunate to enjoy a lengthy "vacation" each year
and indeed this was probably a strong motivation of some
for entering the profession. The prospect of paying benefits
to these workers during school breaks was considered neither
consistent with unemployment insurance objectives nor
desirable from the standpoint of fund solvency. Congress
was skeptical that the states© availability and work search re
quirements could limit benefits to the few teachers genuinely
ready, willing and able to work during the school break.
Evidently, Congress was distrustful even of the states© will
ingness or ability to enact appropriate restrictions.
The special protection afforded nonprofit and public
employees by reason of the equal treatment requirement
was, therefore, counterbalanced by a standard providing a
special disqualification applicable to school employees:
. . . with respect to services in an instructional,
research, or principal administrative capacity for
an educational institution . . . , compensation
shall not be payable based on such services for any
week commencing during the period between two
successive academic years or terms (or, when an
agreement provides instead for a similar period be
tween two regular but not successive terms, during
such period) to any individual if such individual
performs such services in the first of such academic
years (or terms) and if there is a contract or
reasonable assurance that such individual will per
form services in any such capacity for any educa
tional institution in the second of such academic
years or terms. 59
The above paragraph requires the denial of benefits to
"professional" employees of schools (instructors, research-

104

Federal Program Standards

ers, principal administrators) during the periods between
school terms if they worked for the school during the first
term and have a contract or a reasonable assurance of work
for the school during the next term in the same or another
professional capacity. States were given the option to extend
the between-terms denial to nonprofessional employees
(e.g., bus drivers, cafeteria workers, school crossing guards)
of schools below the college level, but not to nonprofessional
employees of colleges and universities. Apparently the latter
were not made subject to any between-terms requirement
because the thinking in 1970 (when they were first covered)
was that they were less likely than professionals to have
12-month contracts, and in addition their jobs were not real
ly different from their counterparts in private industry. They
remained untouched by extension of the restrictive provi
sions in 1976, apparently on the grounds that once the condi
tions of their coverage had been established, it would be un
fair to subject them to new restrictions. This anomalous
result was corrected in 1982 by an amendment requiring
states that choose the option to deny benefits to nonprofes
sional employees of primary and secondary schools to in
clude in the denial nonprofessional employees of colleges
and universities. In other words, nonprofessional employees
of all educational institutions in a state must now be treated
alike. 60
Most states had adopted the option relating to nonprofes
sional employees of primary and high schools. Subsequent
legislation enacted in 1977 permitted states to extend the
blanket denial not only during periods between school terms
but also during established vacation or holiday periods oc
curring within terms. 61 Over half the states have adopted this
option. Further permission was given, also in 1977, to states
to apply the between-terms denial provisions not only to
school employees, but also to employees of educational ser
vice agencies, defined as governmental agencies or entities
established and operated exclusively to provide services for

Federal Program Standards

105

schools. 62 Few states adopted this option. This is the only ex
tension of the denial provisions to individuals other than
school employees.
The between-terms denial requirements have generated
more controversy than most standards. They have
necessitated a large variety of federal interpretations, in
cluding definitions of "educational institutions,"
"reasonable assurance," "principal administrative
capacity," and "term." For example, they presented such
questions as: Whether the denial applies to a school principal
who has reasonable assurance only for a teacher©s job for the
coming term; if the denial applies when reasonable assurance
of reemployment is conditioned upon community approval
of a budget; if the denial applies if reasonable assurance is
given but the individual©s union has not yet signed a con
tract; if reasonable assurance is valid when it is provided 200
former employees but budget cuts permit only 150 jobs to be
filled during the next term; what assurance of reemployment
is appropriate in the case of substitute teachers who worked
less than full time the preceding term; if the between-terms
requirement is satisfied if an individual, provided reasonable
assurance, finds that there is actually no job available during
the succeeding term and is then paid benefits retroactively
for the summer; if the between-terms denial may apply to
school crossing guards employed by governmental entities
other than schools. The last two questions were the subjects
of conformity hearings, discussed in chapter 5. The question
concerning retroactive payment for the summer was finally
resolved by a 1982 amendment requiring that nonprofessionals denied benefits between terms and not offered a job
for the second term shall be entitled to a retroactive pay
ment, provided they had continued to file claims during the
between-terms period. 63
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa
tion found the between-terms denial requirement not an ap-
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propriate federal standard. According to the Commission, it
reflects a wholly unwarranted Congressional apprehension
that, absent the standard, the states would otherwise pay
benefits during the summer indiscriminately to school
employees who do not really want jobs. However, the action
of the great majority of states, in adopting the option to ex
tend the denial to nonprofessional employees of primary and
secondary schools, demonstrates that states will indeed act to
prevent benefit payments to school employees during school
breaks. A divided Commission (8-4) recommended removing
all federal between-terms denial requirements, limiting the
equal treatment requirement to periods other than school
breaks, and thus allowing the states to handle between-terms
issues as they see fit under the state law. 64
Extended Benefit Standard
One of the most significant federal program standards was
first enacted in 1970. 65 It requires states to provide additional
weeks of benefits during heavy periods of unemployment for
individuals who exhausted their regular entitlement.
Unemployment insurance was intended to tide workers over
a temporary period of unemployment. Over the years this
objective was translated to mean that enough weeks of
benefits should be provided to see the great majority of
beneficiaries through their entire spell of unemployment.
The average potential duration provided by the states of
about 24 weeks seemed adequate in good times when, na
tionally, only about 20 percent of those filing first claims ex
hausted their benefits (i.e., drew all their entitlement before
finding a job). It was not adequate during recessions, when
the exhaustion rate rose to 30 percent or more. Such were the
circumstances in the late 1950s by which time most state
duration provisions allowed benefits up to a maximum of 26
weeks.
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A number of states tried to resolve the issue by raising
their regular duration maximum beyond the usual 26 weeks.
Other states adopted provisions for temporary extensions of
benefits, triggered on only during periods of high unemploy
ment. The federal government approached the problem in
the recessions of 1958 and 1961 by enacting temporary pro
grams of extended benefits. The first, the Temporary
Unemployment Compensation Act (TUC), provided for
voluntary participation by the states and was financed at
first by U.S. Treasury advances eventually repaid by state
funds. The second, the Temporary Extended Unemployment
Compensation Act (TEUC), was financed by FUTA
revenues with mandatory participation by all states. Both
programs extended benefit duration by 50 percent with an
overall maximum of 39 weeks in the second program. 66
Enactment of a permanent program of extended benefits
in 1970 reflected a Congressional conclusion that unemploy
ment during recessions was a joint federal-state responsibili
ty, to be met by state standby programs of extended benefits
payable during high unemployment periods and financed on
a 50-50 federal-state basis. The extended benefit (EB) pro
gram answered long-standing questions of how much of an
increase in benefit duration should be provided (an overall
limit of 39 weeks was adopted for regular and extended
benefits); whether the same number of weeks of EB should
be paid to all claimants, or whether EB entitlement should
relate directly to regular benefit entitlement (the latter course
was chosen); at what level of unemployment EB should
become payable (state and national triggering indicators bas
ed on insured unemployment rates were specified); whether
EB should be voluntary or mandatory (it is mandatory);
whether EB claimants should be subject to additional
eligibility requirements beyond those required of regular
benefit claimants (no added requirement was specified in the
1970 law).
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As demonstrated by the 1971 and 1974-76 recession ex
periences, EB did not obviate the occasional resort to addi
tional federally mandated emergency benefits. 67 The 1970
EB law did, however, effectively relieve the states of any fur
ther pressures to provide their own protection beyond the
26th week of unemployment, at least under recession condi
tions.
Enactment of the EB program represented a major federal
intrusion into a substantive program area (duration of
benefits) that had (with the brief exceptions of TUC and
TEUC) long been the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.
However, the extended benefits program was not entirely
dominated by the federal partner. Generally, the same
eligibility and disqualification provisions that applied to
regular claimants applied also to EB claimants. Qualifying
requirements and weekly benefit amounts were determined
by applying state regular benefit provisions. States thus re
tained control of these aspects of extended benefits.
Beginning in 1980, however, federal authority expanded
even more over the extended benefits area. In the process of
developing the fiscal 1981 and subsequent federal budgets,
the Administration and Congress sought ways to reduce
nondefense spending. In the UI area these proposals took the
form of restrictions on the extended benefits program. There
have always been many advocates of such restrictions in any
case. The budget imperatives of this period helped increase
these numbers.
Beginning with the recession of the mid-1970s, the federal
and many state unemployment insurance funds were in dif
ficulty. After 1978, liabilities mounted year by year because
of unremittingly heavy unemployment. By early 1983 over 20
states had outstanding loans from the federal loan fund
amounting to more than $10 billion. More states were ex
pected to borrow in 1983. These deficits provided a negative
climate at both state and federal levels for any amendments
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that would result in increased costs, and an ideal climate for
virtually any cost-cutting measure. Pressure to cut benefit
costs increased at the state level as unemployment rates con
tinued to climb, deficits increased, and federal amendments
were adopted to require interest on moneys borrowed by
states from the loan fund.
Most of the restrictive amendments to the EB provisions
of the federal UI statute were included in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1980 and 1981. The first three
of those summarized below were estimated to reduce federal
program costs in fiscal year 1981 by about $150 million. 68
Waiting Week
Three of the amendments to extended benefit provisions
represented reversals of long-standing federal policy express
ed in DOL policy statements and recommendations to the
states. The first was intended to provide an incentive for all
states to require that claimants serve an uncompensated
week of unemployment before they may become eligible for
benefits. It provides for elimination of the federal 50 percent
matching share for the first week of extended benefits in any
state which does not have a waiting period for regular
benefits. This applies to states with no waiting week provi
sions (11 as of October 1981); to states which have a waiting
week for which the individual is later reimbursed if still
unemployed after a specified period (7); to states whose laws
authorize the suspension of the waiting week under emergen
cy conditions (1); and even to states that waive a waiting
week requirement if it would interrupt a continuous period
of unemployment (5). The amendment affected 24 states in
all.
Since 1950, DOL had recommended that states consider
eliminating their waiting week requirement. 69 It no longer
serves an administrative need, the chief original argument
for a waiting period, and it causes a serious delay in pro-
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viding claimants (many of whom delay filing claims to begin
with) with needed income in the early stages of their
unemployment. Even in a state meeting the prompt payment
standards, payment of the first benefit check will occur no
earlier than three full weeks following the first claim, and it
will represent compensation for no more than one week of
unemployment. Elimination of the waiting week does not
shorten the time it takes to process a claim, but the first
check covers two weeks of unemployment.
The main argument to eliminate the federal 50 percent
matching share for the first week of EB in any state that has
no waiting week for regular benefits was that it would save
an estimated $25 million in federal costs in fiscal year 1981.
The cost savings argument is the most persuasive. There is no
question that elimination of the waiting week is a relatively
expensive step. In addition, a waiting week requirement
represents less of a burden on claimants than most alter
native means of cutting comparable amounts of benefit
costs. Most unemployed workers have enough resources to
get by a payless week at the outset of their unemployment.
Moreover, if a claimant remains unemployed and exhausts
his benefit entitlement, he will have collected his full entitle
ment regardless of the waiting week.
A less persuasive argument advanced by supporters of the
amendment, is that restoration of the waiting week would in
duce unemployed workers to look for work rather than
"beat a hasty track to the government office":
If the State wants to go ahead and do away with the
1-week period, if they want to follow the policy of
saying that a person has no responsibility to even
try to seek employment before drawing the
benefits, that would be left to the States. But the
Federal taxpayers, including the taxpayers of those
States which have already put their own houses in
order, should not be asked to fund such a program.
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Mr. President, I would suggest that it is certainly
not too much to ask that a person try to find work
for just 1 week before he turns to the Government
and asks for unemployment benefits. 70
It is not clear how the waiting period would cause
unemployed workers to forego filing claims temporarily and
begin earnest work searches, since with or without a waiting
period, a delay in filing a claim means a delay in benefits. As
one Senator observed:
There is no evidence that a 1-week waiting period
provides any incentive to find work, rather it only
creates an additional hardship for a worker who
has lost a job. 71
Unless he has first filed a claim and thereafter certifies,
with respect to such week, that he was able and available for
work and seeking work, no individual can receive credit for
either a waiting week or a compensable week of unemploy
ment. This is one reason why DOL has consistently recom
mended that individuals file claims as soon as they are
separated. The other reason is to ensure that individuals have
exposure as soon as possible to job finding, training, and
other assistance available through the employment service.
Disqualification for Duration
of the Unemployment
The second amendment that reversed a prior federal posi
tion requires all states to provide that extended benefit
claimants who were disqualified from regular benefits for a
voluntary quit, discharge for misconduct, or refusal of
suitable work, meet a subsequent work requirement before
they can qualify for extended benefits. Most states have
moved to this type of disqualification over the years but
some still apply a specific period of benefit suspension after
which regular benefits can be paid. This rework or duration
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type of disqualification is particularly harsh as an extended
benefit requirement since it is during periods when EB is
payable that jobs are likely to be particularly scarce. It had
been consistently opposed for state provisions in the past by
the Department of Labor. The disqualification also creates
inequities. Claimants whose skills are in demand will be able
to meet the requalifying requirement easier than others.
Moreover, the disqualification is harder on claimants seek
ing permanent, full-time work than on claimants looking on
ly for temporary jobs.
The most serious inequity will occur in those states which
prescribe a voluntary quit and misconduct disqualification
for regular benefits which is different from the disqualifica
tion imposed for extended benefits. Claimants who have
already satisfied a suspension disqualification may find
themselves ineligible for EB because of the same separation
that provoked the first disqualification. For this reason, and
because of the administrative burden of determining if all EB
claimants have had some work since any disqualifying
separation, some states with a suspension disqualification
for regular benefits have subsequently enacted the more
severe duration of the unemployment type of disqualifica
tion for regular benefits simply to provide uniform treatment
and avoid administrative difficulties. The trend was in that
direction before; the new requirement has accelerated it.

Suitable Work and Work Search
The third amendment that reverses federal policy required
all states to add special suitable work and work search provi
sions applicable to extended benefit claimants. Except for in
dividuals whose prospects for work in their usual occupation
within a reasonably short period are good, suitable work for
an extended benefit claimant is defined as any work within
the individual©s capabilities that pays at least the higher of
the minimum wage or the individual©s average weekly benefit
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amount, and is otherwise suitable within the meaning of
state law, disregarding state criteria concerning consistency
with the individual©s prior training, education, work ex
perience and wage level. All extended benefit claimants must
engage in a systematic and sustained effort to obtain work
and must provide tangible evidence of that effort. Claimants
who fail to meet these requirements must be disqualified for
the duration of their unemployment and may become eligible
only if they have been subsequently employed for at least
four weeks after the disqualification and earned wages equal
to at least four times their weekly benefit amount.
This suitable work definition differs substantially from the
definition first recommended by the Social Security Board
and later in DOL draft bills:
In determining whether or not any work is suitable
for an individual, the (State) Commission should
consider the degree of risk involved to his health,
safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior
training and experience, his length of unemploy
ment and prospects for securing work in his
customary occupation and the distance of the
available work from his residence. 72
This definition reflects the premise that suitable work should
vary with the circumstances of each claimant, and the
assumption that if a skilled worker is required to accept a job
far below his level of skills, the individual is not likely to be
there long and, meanwhile, the job is closed to those for
whom it really is suitable work. All states already require
claimants to lower their sights in terms of the kind of work
and level of wages they will accept, as the period of their
unemployment lengthens. The new suitable work re
quirements applicable for EB limit the flexibility of both
claimants and state agencies by requiring that the claimant©s
prior experience and wage levels be eliminated from con-
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sideration in determining if a given job offer constitutes
suitable work for EB claimants.
Conformity with the new provisions would oblige most
states to have one definition of suitable work for regular
claimants and another for EB. As observed by one Senator:
Many States may prefer to avoid that confusion,
and if the Congress enacts this provision, the only
route open to them would be apply this unfair
Federal rule to the regular State program as well. 73
As for requiring "tangible evidence" of a claimant©s ef
forts to obtain work, DOL recommended against such a pro
vision in the past:
Proof that a claimant has actively sought work may
be an empty gesture, demoralizing to the claimant
and a nuisance to employers when no work is
available in an area. Such proof should not be re
quired of all claimants by statute. While claimants
should be active candidates for jobs as a condition
for receiving benefits, the test of availability should
be realistic, taking into consideration such factors
as business conditions, the penetration of the
employment service, the hiring methods in the in
dustry in which the claimant is seeking work and
the claimant©s individual circumstances. 74
In advocating the new suitable work provisions for EB, no
attempt was made to distinguish between them and the con
ventional provisions of most state laws which were patterned
after the DOL draft bill recommendation.
Since the suitable work requirements for EB were made
conditions for credit against the federal tax, at stake for a
state considering not to adopt the requirements was not
simply denial of the 50 percent federal share of EB but
forfeiture also of tax credit for all the state©s employers and
of all administrative grants.
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These three requirements were estimated to reduce federal
program costs by $25 million, $32 million and $94 million,
respectively, in fiscal year 1981. The appeal for their enact
ment was made largely, but not only, on that basis. The
argument that the claimants affected were long term
unemployed and, therefore, lacking in initiative, and the fact
that federal funds are used to finance 50 percent of extended
benefits were added as justification for the amendments.
Triggers
In 1981 Congress adopted additional restrictive amend
ments to the EB program. Three involved the criteria for
triggering on and off the availability of extended benefits in
a state. The first amendment eliminated the national trigger.
Prior to the amendment, extended benefits in a state could
be made available either by high levels of insured unemploy
ment in the state activating a state trigger, or by a national
seasonally adjusted insured unemployment rate of 4.5 per
cent or more over a 13-week period. The objective of the na
tional triggering of EB was to help limit the impact of a na
tionwide business downturn. Another argument was that EB
meets the needs of the long term unemployed in states with
low insured unemployment rates.
In urging elimination of the national trigger, the Ad
ministration advanced two arguments: first, that the result
would be to target extended benefits only to those states
whose workers genuinely need such extra help and thereby
save money; and second,
In addition, I submit that the present system works
as a disincentive for the unemployed to become
quickly reemployed in those States with low
unemployment when the national trigger is on. 75
The second 1981 trigger amendment increased the level of
insured unemployment necessary to activate the state trigger.
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Prior to the amendment, extended benefits became payable
when a state©s insured unemployment rate (IUR) averaged 4
percent or more for 13 weeks and was at least 120 percent of
the average IUR for the corresponding 13-week periods in
the two preceding years. A state could opt to disregard the
120 percent requirement and trigger on if its current 13-week
rate was as much as 5 percent. The 1981 amendments in
creased from 4 percent to 5 percent the required state IUR
trigger level and from 5 percent to 6 percent the optional trig
ger level for states choosing to waive the 120 percent require
ment.
In recommending adoption of the higher trigger points,
the Administration argued that "structural changes in the
labor force have contributed to a generally higher level of
normal unemployment," and that
The new laws for extended benefits will better
reflect these changes and provide these additional
benefits where they are truly needed. 76
The third 1981 trigger change altered the method of
calculating the insured unemployment rate (IUR). Prior to
the change, the IUR calculation included individuals filing
claims for extended benefits as well as regular benefit
claimants. The amendment eliminated extended benefit
claimants from the count. The Administration©s explanation
for the change was, in part, that the prior method was
"technically flawed and produces several anomalies." 77
Qualifying Requirement
The final EB standard adopted in 1981 prohibited states
from granting federally shared extended benefits to any
claimant with fewer than 20 weeks of work, or an equivalent
earnings pattern, in his base period. In states that do not use
weeks of work as the qualifying requirement, the equivalent
to 20 weeks would be total base-period earnings of one and
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one-half times the claimant©s highest quarter of wages, or 40
times the claimant©s weekly benefit amount. This amend
ment was consistent with the 1980 pattern of using EB
amendments as leverage for accomplishing changes in states©
regular benefit programs. Of course, the amendment also
helped cut costs since some claimants did qualify for regular
benefits in many states with limited employment or earnings.
According to the Administration, the advantage of the
amendment was that it would prevent EB being paid to
workers who were employed for less than 20 weeks in the
base period.
Extended unemployment benefits are paid general
ly from the 27th up to the 39th week of unemploy
ment. Such long-term benefits should not be paid
to workers who were employed for less than 20
weeks in the base period. . . , 78
Actually, extended benefits may be paid to some claimants
for weeks of unemployment coming much earlier as soon
as the fourth or fifth week in a few cases since EB is
payable to claimants after they exhaust their regular benefit
entitlement which could be much less than 26 weeks. In
many states, claimants with less than 39 weeks of baseperiod work would qualify for fewer than 26 weeks of
benefits, and those who worked less than 20 weeks would
usually be eligible for less than 15 weeks of regular benefits
plus only a few weeks of EB.
The impact of the 1981 EB changes on unemployed
workers was substantial, mostly because of changes affecting
the triggers. These changes resulted in the payment of ex
tended benefits in many states and in much lower EB outlays
overall during the recession year of 1982. On the basis of
DOL estimates, outlays for extended benefits that were ex
pected to amount to $4.9 billion in fiscal 1983 under the old
law were cut to $1.2 billion as a result of the changes. In
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fiscal 1984, EB outlays had been estimated at $3.3 billion,
but the changes reduced that total to $302 million.
Put another way, 3.3 million people who would
have been eligible for the 13-week extended benefits
in fiscal 1983 will not be eligible. Another 2.6
million will be excluded in fiscal 1984 and about
600,000 in fiscal 1985. 79
Despite the restrictions, the severe unemployment prob
lems of the 1982 recession nevertheless resulted in the
establishment of another temporary post-EB program, as oc
curred in the mid-1970s, although more limited. Congress
enacted, with Reagan Administration agreement, a special
6-month program of emergency benefits, wholly federally
financed out of general revenue, to become available from
September 12, 1982 through March 31, 1983. An individual
in a state already triggered on could qualify for a maximum
of 10 weeks of "federal supplemental compensation." Eight
weeks were available in states not triggered on, but with
lURs of at least 3.5 percent. Up to six weeks were available
in all other states, regardless of the level of unemployment. 80
The program was expected to cost about $2.1 billion and
help about two million workers, thereby temporarily restor
ing part but not all of the reductions made by the 1981
amendments. 81 The 1981 amendments remained untouched.
Aside from the pressures of an election year, it is not clear
how the 1982 rationale for making emergency extended
benefits available in states with lURs of less than 5 percent
could be reconciled with the 1981 decision to eliminate the
federal trigger in the regular EB program and to raise the
state "on" triggers from 4 to 5 percent. As it turns out, the
only advantage that seems to have resulted from the EB trig
ger changes with respect to the 1982-1983 period has been a
financial one from the point of view of state UI funds and
employers, in that federal general revenues replaced UI tax
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financing for some of the long term benefit protection pro
vided.

Rounding
One additional EB standard was enacted in 1982. 82 It pro
vides a condition (in addition to the waiting week require
ment) of state entitlement to the federal 50 percent share of
EB costs: if a state does not provide for a benefit formula
under which regular benefits are rounded down to the next
lower multiple of one dollar, the state will not be entitled to
the federal 50 percent matching share on the amount by
which extended benefits exceed the amount that would have
resulted from such rounding down. The rounding applies to
weekly regular benefits, weekly extended benefits, state
minimum and maximum weekly benefit amounts, partial
benefit payments, amounts payable after deduction for pen
sions or after any other deductions.
Most states (if not all) currently round uneven benefit
amounts to the next higher whole dollar. Although the
amendment was expected to save $10 million and $19 million
in fiscal years 1984 and 1985, respectively, it is not clear how
the excess resulting from current practices will be calculated
or how the standard will be enforced in states that do not
adopt this requirement. 83 As of early 1983, fewer than a
dozen states had adopted the rounding-down requirement.
The extended benefit standards of 1980, 1981 and 1982
were adopted despite the objections of those who questioned
the wisdom of making permanent substantive changes
". . . on a piecemeal basis prompted by a sudden fever to
cut the budget." 84 Nor were arguments effective that appeal
ed against the provisions from the perspective of the
unemployed:
This is an attempt to change the system which aids
the unfortunate, and once again, it is the unfor-
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tunate without jobs who will suffer. When job
prospects are so poor, why are we trying to lessen
the support of the unemployed? We are doing this
as a cost saving measure, but indirectly we are ask
ing those who can least afford it to pay. 85
The issue of federal-state relations was raised only briefly:
. . . these amendments allow increased Federal en
croachment into a program functioning quite well
at the State level. 86
without effect.
These standards are clearly not absolutely essential to the
program. They are not based on states© experience or any
particular problem then confronting the system. They reflect
not only the overriding motivation to cut costs but also the
same distrust of the unemployed and skepticism of the
system©s ability to prevent abuses that are characteristic of
most recent federal program standards.
The extended benefit standards are highly significant for
several reasons. They preempt the issue of long term
unemployment for federal determination. They affect more
workers than any of the other standards. By adopting
amendments that reversed long time federal recommenda
tions, almost solely on cost savings grounds, Congress broke
precedent with a 45-year practice of enacting legislation at
least intended to enhance the program©s objectives and effec
tiveness. Through this legislation, Congress seemed to com
municate four messages to the states. First, federal respon
sibility for maintaining a strong and balanced federal-state
partnership is secondary to budget considerations. Second,
as long as "federal funds" are involved, Congress is justified
in imposing its will, notwithstanding traditional state areas
of authority. Third, past federal recommendations in the
program area are not to be considered immutable. Fourth,
additional federal standards are likely to follow unless more
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states take steps to "improve" their programs to reflect
prevailing federal attitudes toward workers who file for
unemployment insurance.
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Chapter 4
Administration of Federal Standards:
Direct Federal-State Confrontation

Federal statutory enactments are of no consequence at all
unless implemented by state legislation. No change of any
kind will affect a single worker, claimant or employer unless
and until the state UI law is amended to reflect that change. l
In converting Congressional mandate to actual practice,
federal-state confrontation occurs directly and frequently.
How that confrontation arises and is resolved, the parties or
machinery involved at the state and federal levels, and trends
in experience over the years constitute the subject matter of
this chapter.

State Legislation
The volume of proposed unemployment insurance legisla
tion in all states averages about 2,000 bills a year. The
number varies widely year to year, particularly in relation to
the volume of federal UI amendments and the consequent
need for implementing state legislation. In most states, when
conforming legislation is needed, the state agency responsi
ble for administering the law takes the initiative for develop
ing a UI legislative program. This unit is the most
knowledgeable about the subject matter and usually the only
state organization in communication with a federal DOL
regional UI office about issues or problems presented by
federal requirements. The state administration usually has
127
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the bill introduced in the legislature and provides
background and support during the legislative proceedings.
This pattern is less likely to be the approach taken in the
case of substantive program legislation not involving new
federal requirements. In some states, a three or more
member advisory council, appointed for staggered terms and
representative of labor, management and the public, plays
an active (and in some states a dominating) role in the
development of UI legislative programs. In such cases, the
state agency provides technical advice to the council, par
ticularly on conformity matters. In a few states, legislative
committees assume a leadership role in formulating UI
legislative programs.
In all states, interest groups attempt to influence the fate
of bills that may affect them. Their efforts are reflected in
the advisory council and in appropriate legislative commit
tees. As in other areas, their success in UI varies greatly
depending on their expertise, popularity, organizational and
financial strengths, with the most important determinant
usually being the quality of opposing interest groups, if any.
Management groups are usually more effective than labor in
UI. They have a concrete objective (lowering costs) that sus
tains an interest in all aspects of UI. State labor organiza
tions seem usually less interested in UI than workers© com
pensation, and theirs has often been a single issue (e.g., max
imum weekly benefit amount) focus. This may be because
they usually have less staff and fewer resources for lobbying
efforts than their management counterparts. Nor is there the
same close consensus among labor representatives on such
issues as disqualification penalties as exists among business
groups.
In some states, the fate of UI legislation is often greatly in
fluenced by the dominant personalities of a few persons or
even a single individual. It may be a state agency represen-
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tative, an employer, an employers© group representative, or,
less frequently, a representative of a labor group.
Characteristically, these individuals have long experience,
great expertise, and command wide confidence and in
fluence.
There are, of course, many variations of these patterns,
even within a single state at different times. There are con
siderable variations also in the quality of legislative drafting
among the states. A number of factors are responsible.
Larger states with legislatures regularly in session often have
more specialized committees, more skilled staff continuity
and, accordingly, more knowledge and experience in both
the subject matter and legislative drafting. But even in larger
states, regularly occurring changes in the political climate
determine the composition of the legislature, its committees
and staff, as well as the executive branch and agency of
ficials. Given the program©s complexity, frequent change of
key legislative and executive personnel makes difficult the
accumulation of the knowledge and understanding necessary
to produce sound laws.
In any event, a relatively large number of bills are poorly
drafted. They may be incomplete or simply too ambiguous
to accomplish the framer©s intent. One of the most common
problems is for the author of an amendment to a state law
provision to neglect to take account of its implications for
other elements of the law. The various components of
benefit formulas, particularly, are interdependent and
changes in one aspect may have an automatic and sometimes
undesirable impact on other aspects. A simple increase in a
state©s maximum weekly benefit amount may affect qualify
ing requirements, benefit duration, partial benefits, and dis
qualification provisions. With a qualifying requirement, for
example, expressed as a multiple of the weekly benefit
amount (as in almost one-third of the states), an increase in
the maximum will result automatically in an increase in the
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qualifying wages for the maximum. In most states where the
number of weeks benefits are payable is determined by
dividing the total amount of entitlement (set as a specified
proportion, usually one-third, of total base-period earnings)
by the weekly benefit amount, an increase in weekly amounts
may translate into fewer weeks or payments for many
claimants. An increase in the maximum weekly benefit will
have implications in states where partial earnings limits and
disqualifications are expressed as multiples of the
individual©s weekly benefit amount.
Although the secondary impacts are often anticipated, this
is not always true; and the results are not always desirable, as
when, for example, an increase in the minimum weekly
benefit results in substantial numbers of unemployed
workers failing to meet the minimum qualifying require
ment, or when an increase in the maximum weekly benefit
results in individuals with substantial high quarter earnings
failing to qualify for any benefits. 2

Federal Review of Proposed
State Legislation
As of 1983, a staff of two or three skilled legislative
analysts in the Department of Labor©s Unemployment In
surance Service reviews proposed state UI legislation for
conformity with federal law. The bills come directly from the
state UI agency to the UIS pursuant to the Secretary of
Labor©s responsibility for certifying each state©s law for tax
credit or administrative grants. A second source of UI bills is
Commerce Clearing House, and a third source is DOL©s
regional offices. The review is not confined to conformity.
The staff comments on the technical adequacy of a bill. At
least until 1982, when it seems that the practice was suspend
ed, they also made recommendations with respect to the bill
from a policy standpoint. The responsibilities of this unit ex-
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tend to negotiating the resolution of issues if a problem bill is
actually enacted. Finally, if it comes to that, they are respon
sible for developing support for DOL©s position in a hearing
on state legislation containing conformity issues. This activi
ty of the UIS is described in some detail because it is a critical
factor in maintaining a viable federal-state partnership.
The UIS staff works closely with the one or two attorneys
from DOL©s Solicitor©s Office assigned to unemployment in
surance. Earlier in its history, Solicitor©s Office staff assign
ed this responsibility was much larger and played a signifi
cant role in the review process. All communications by UIS
to the states directly or through the regional offices were re
quired to be "cleared" with the Solicitor©s Office before
release. The resulting delays and internal disputes were
tolerable when issues were relatively few and generally con
fined to technical experience rating proposals. The pro
cedure was abandoned when the volume of federal UI
legislation and subsequent issues increased significantly as a
result of the 1970 and 1976 amendments. By 1980, the UISSolicitor©s Office relationship became more analogous to a
conventional lawyer-client arrangement, with clearance
generally confined only to maturing conformity issues, and
with the UIS selecting the issues on which it seeks advice or
interpretation.
DOL regional office staff dealing with UI matters also
participate in the legislative review process, but the extent of
their involvement varies substantially among regions. It
depends on their interest, their skill in this area, the pressure
of other business, and their relations with their "client" state
agencies. Some regional offices operate only as transmission
belts, forwarding bills and whatever relevant information is
available to the National Office and transmitting National
Office reactions to the state agencies. Others play an active
role not only in the review process (adding often valuable
observations to other information about bills they send to
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the National Office) but also in the promotion of needed or
desirable legislation, and in "translating" National Office
comments to the state agencies, not to change the substance
of the communication, but either to personalize the response
or to add or soften emphasis where appropriate from their
standpoint.
Some regional offices have acquired a paternal, protective
relationship with their state agencies. Others share their state
agencies© negative attitudes toward National Office com
munications. Both types tend to defend state actions,
diminish the significance of nonconformity issues, and seek
compromise favorable to the states in the resolution of con
flicts. Most regional offices, however, invariably adopt Na
tional Office positions as their own, and some are vigorous
and highly skilled proponents of DOL positions on specific
state bills. No regional office presumes to act independently
of the National Office on state legislation except in the case
of familiar, routine bills which have been the subject of
previous correspondence. On the other hand, no regional of
fice welcomes direct state agency-National Office com
munications except in occasional situations where contact
needs to be quick and the subject is highly technical or com
plicated.
The regional offices that are knowledgeable in the
legislative area provide a valuable service in helping the Na
tional Office assess the prospects of conflict-producing
legislation. They are often aware of the motivation of the
bill©s sponsor, the political climate in the state legislature and
the Governor©s position on the bill. Not the least of their
contributions is information they provide about the intent of
bills that may be so ambiguous or obscure as to defy
analysis. Some state agencies provide a thorough analysis of
unemployment insurance bills for the benefit of their ad
ministrations or advisory councils and these are usually for
warded to the National Office.
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Review Priorities
The small percentage of the thousands of UI amendments
introduced each year that actually are reviewed carefully by
the UIS legislative analysts are the bills that state agencies or
regional offices indicate will receive serious consideration by
the states© legislatures. These include state administrationbacked bills (particularly those designed to implement
federal law requirements), bills introduced by influential
legislators or on behalf of established interest groups, and
bills supported by the state©s advisory council on unemploy
ment insurance. Bills not identified as likely to receive
serious consideration are not usually analyzed unless they
contain obvious or serious conformity issues or unless they
begin to receive favorable action. State agencies© indications
of probable legislative activity are only preliminary
estimates. The analysts© priorities may change as bills begin
to move through the legislative process. Each action taken
on a bill, as well as copies of each introduced bill and its
amendments are communicated on a reasonably current
basis to the UIS by Commerce Clearing House (CCH), a
private organization headquartered in Chicago. This is a ser
vice subscribed to by the UIS and funded from the DOL
budget.
Since bills may sometimes move quickly through a
legislature, the CCH "action sheets" showing the status of a
bill will reveal what new bills will need review and also dic
tate the analysts© priorities and the means they use for com
municating comments on issues. A matter involving
technical corrections of a bill will be shelved temporarily to
treat a bill with provisions that are undesirable from a policy
standpoint. These bills will in turn be sidetracked in order to
give priority to a bill that has strong support, particularly if
comments were specifically requested by the state agency.
This priority will yield to a bill containing a conformity
issue, and all other actions will be suspended, if necessary, to
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handle a potential conformity issue in a bill that has been
reported favorably by a committee or already passed one
House of the state legislature. As each of the more demand
ing priorities is satisfied, attention reverts to the less urgent
matters.

Technical Adequacy
The review of state legislation is not easy. Unemployment
insurance is a very complicated program, with 53 variations
of each major ingredient. Nearly fifty years of precedent
decisions, recent comprehensive changes in federal laws, in
numerable interpretations and policy positions take time to
absorb. Another skill, that of applying federal requirements
to proposed state legislation, takes long experience. The
ability to communicate opinions, either orally or in writing,
clearly and succinctly takes time to develop. It is usually a
minimum of two years before a UIS analyst can handle even
routine reviews and correspondence without close supervi
sion.
Many state legislative proposals are technically inade
quate. Ambiguous language, misplaced punctuation, miss
ing sentences, inappropriate positioning, erroneous cita
tions, are not uncommon. These are in addition to the most
common failing, already mentioned, of neglecting to take ac
count of the implications of a proposed amendment on
other, interrelated elements of the program.
Legislative drafting skills are certainly not confined to
federal officials, but DOL technicians have an advantage
over most of their state counterparts simply because they are
continuously engaged in reviewing and commenting on pro
posed and enacted UI legislation from 53 jurisdictions. The
advantage is most obvious when enactment of new state
legislation is necessary to implement federal law re
quirements. Following adoption of any changes in federal
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law requirements or definitions, DOL develops suggested
draft language for states that will conform with the new
amendments. Federal technicians will thus have already con
sidered the disadvantages of deviations from the recom
mended language. Moreover, they are more likely to have a
better understanding of precisely what is required, since the
new federal requirements may well have been drafted by
them originally, and in any event, they will usually have had
more direct knowledge than state officials of the relevant
legislative history. Accordingly, it is common for states to
adopt suggested DOL draft language either verbatim or with
no more changes than the minor adjustments necessary to
tailor the language to the peculiarities of each state law.
In matters solely within the scope of state jurisdiction,
federal recommendations on program policy may go unheed
ed, but DOL advice on technical adequacy is usually
welcome and followed. If a proposed state amendment will
conflict with federal requirements, federal technicians may
offer alternative language that will serve the intent of the
sponsor, consistent with federal law, even if DOL considers
the result undesirable from a program standpoint.

Program Policy
The same degree of state acceptance of DOL technical sug
gestions does not extend to recommendations for program
improvements. In many, if not most, states, qualifying re
quirements, eligibility conditions, disqualifications, benefit
duration, and benefit formulas are more often the result of
labor-management negotiations and compromises than
careful evaluation of the merits. A common compromise,
for example, involves trading an increase in the maximum
weekly benefit amount in return for a tightening of the
eligibility or disqualification requirements. Benefit increases
are often simply not possible without concomitant actions to
minimize costs.
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Undeterred by the usually cool reception it receives to its
program recommendations, DOL has in the past continued
to urge states to adopt its recommendations for a sound pro
gram. They range from key program elements (e.g., max
imum weekly benefit should equal two-thirds of the
statewide average weekly wage) to highly technical matters
(e.g., for qualifying requirements, the specified minimum re
quired high-quarter wage should not exceed one-fourth of
the minimum base-period wage required, so that no claimant
who meets the latter requirement will be denied benefits sole
ly because his base-period earnings were distributed evenly
among the four quarters of the base period). 3
The latest comprehensive compilation of DOL policy
recommendations, issued in 1962,4 still constitutes DOL
policy on benefit formulas and other matters not subse
quently affected by federal legislation. Until the late 1970s,
DOL vigorously advanced policy recommendations, in react
ing to specific individual state legislative proposals, and
through general legislative planning sessions. Following the
1970 and 1976 federal amendments, for example, DOL ex
ploited the opportunity to capitalize on states© interest in the
new legislation by conducting nationwide seminars for state
agency officials and not only explaining new conformity
conditions but also advocating improvements in program
areas untouched by Congress. Some state agencies that
agreed with DOL were successful in getting improvements
enacted, perhaps because of the heavy volume of necessary
legislation and the confusion that regularly exists between
amendments required for conformity and those advanced
only on a policy basis.
Since the 1976 seminars, there has been a hiatus in DOL©s
active advocacy of program policy recommendations. The
1974-76 recession and the consequent depletion of funds in
several states produced an inhospitable climate for DOL©s
benefit duration and disqualification recommendations.
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Many otherwise sympathetic state agencies were apprehen
sive that any attempt to amend the state UI law would serve
only to provide an opportunity for the introduction of
restrictive legislation. In addition, DOL was somewhat com
mitted to delaying any major recommendations, pending the
Final Report of the National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation (NCUC).
Diminished DOL policy pushing was also due to the 1970
and 1976 federal amendments. Creation in 1970 of the per
manent program of extended benefits left states little incen
tive to extend regular duration beyond 26 weeks, or even to
liberalize their duration formulas. Extensions of coverage
mandated by the federal amendments left relatively few jobs
still unprotected, thereby reducing the need to press the
states to expand coverage on their own. The three remaining
major program policy areas, benefit adequacy, fund solven
cy, and disqualification severity, not yet preempted by
federal amendments, offered little promise. Most states had
already adopted the recommended "escalator" concept of
tying the maximum weekly benefit amount directly to
changes in the statewide average weekly wage so that a
change in the latter automatically produces a change in the
former. By 1978, about a dozen states had established the
maximum as an amount equal to as much as two-thirds of
the statewide wage, the recommended level. But any further
improvements in benefit amount and duration seemed
unlikely, at least until many states© programs were on a
firmer financial footing.
States have also been reluctant to adopt DOL recommen
dations on tax and financing provisions. This advice general
ly concentrated on the need for each state to establish an ade
quate reserve, and offered as a guideline a measure based on
the state©s past experience. Such a reserve, it was suggested,
taken as a percent of total payrolls in the state, should equal
at least one and one-half times the highest benefit cost rate
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(total benefit outlays as a percent of payrolls) in any
12-month period during the preceding ten or more years.
While proportionately more states adhering to the guideline
avoided the need to borrow than those with reserve levels
below this minimum, not all states that followed the
guidelines succeeded in remaining solvent.
Federal financing recommendations also stressed methods
for predetermining annual tax yields, having higher or lower
tax rate schedules take effect in response to realistic fund
level measures (e.g., reserves as ratios of total payrolls rather
than as fixed dollar amounts made obsolete by inflation), en
suring adequate financing of pooled costs (noncharged
benefits and benefits ineffectively charged to employers
already at the maximum rate) through a reasonable
minimum or surtax rate.
In recent years, financing recommendations have been
aimed largely at assisting debtor states to evaluate the op
tions available in repaying loans, regaining solvency as
quickly as possible, and maintaining adequate reserves on a
long term basis. Of course, the expansion of federal loan
repayment requirements has moved the federal-state
dialogue in regard to financing beyond the advisory level.
Even in good times, DOL was never successful in per
suading states to adopt its recommendations on disqualifica
tions. DOL had always urged that a disqualification for
voluntary quit, discharge for misconduct, or refusal of
suitable work should result in denial of benefits only for the
period of unemployment presumed attributed to the claim
ant©s own action, or about six weeks, the length of the
average spell of unemployment. After that period, the in
dividual©s continued unemployment could reasonably be
considered due to economic conditions and, therefore, compensable. Most states consistently rejected this concept,
preferring instead to consider a disqualification as punish
ment for irresponsible action.
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The cessation of DOL policy recommendations was also
attributable to personnel changes within the Labor Depart
ment. UIS staff had been steadily reduced over the years.
The number of analysts responsible for reviewing and com
menting on state legislation was cut from eight to four. The
number of attorneys in the Solicitor©s Office solely responsi
ble for unemployment insurance matters was reduced from
six to one. Corresponding reductions were made in the
research staff. UIS library facilities were eliminated entirely.
Perhaps most significant, virtually every UIS staff member
with long experience in the program, some dating back to its
origin (and usually with a correspondingly firm commitment
to its original principles and orientation), was gone by 1980.
Beginning that year, the UIS was headed for the first time by
an individual with no prior UI background, operating under
a hierarchy of officials for whom the unemployment in
surance program was clearly not a high priority. During this
period, the UIS and even DOL became considerably less in
fluential than the Office of Management and Budget, for ex
ample, in determining unemployment insurance policy.
Finally, by 1982, the making of policy recommendations
by staff on state legislation seems to have been discontinued.
This includes even recommendations which simply follow
established policy as contained in the draft bills or the com
prehensive DOL policy statement issued in 1962.

Conformity
Only once has a state been assessed any penalty for non
conformity with PUTA provisions. Only twice have ad
ministrative grants been withheld for violations of Social
Security Act provisions, and then only for brief periods. It is
rare for an issue even to go to a hearing, as evidenced by a
history of only about a dozen conformity hearings since
1937.
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The infrequency of hearings is certainly not due to the lack
of serious issues. Each year there may be as many as 50
potential conformity issues presented by proposed or
enacted state legislation and a residue of 15 to 20 actual
issues requiring negotiation. The small number of hearings is
due primarily to the mutual interest of both levels of govern
ment to avoid formal confrontations that could produce
disadvantages for both. For the state, an adverse Secretary©s
decision means either sanctions or, if they are to be avoided,
capitulation and a change in law or practive which the state
does not really want. At stake for DOL is the potential, exer
cised on a few past occasions, of Congressional intervention,
possibly with a consequent diminution of the Secretary©s
authority. 5
To keep the number of serious confrontations to a
minimum, it is not enough for the two levels of government
simply to share an interest in this objective. Other factors
must also be present, including a federal staff skilled in
detecting issues, communicating opinions and reasons, and
initiating and negotiating solutions. Nor is it always enough
that issues are settled. Resolution of an issue on the
grounds of political expediency, or intimidation, or on any
other basis than the best available judgment of what the
federal law requires and the most practical means of achiev
ing conformity is only a temporary settlement.

Identifying Issues
It is very unusual for an issue to be overlooked, although
the likelihood increases as federal review staff and resources
are reduced. A major incentive to be thorough is the known
difficulty and embarrassment involved in trying to persuade
a state legislature to remove a conflicting provision from its
law when no indication had been made of the existence of an
issue at the time the bill was still pending and there was op
portunity to defeat or amend it. Because of its staff©s
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familiarity with the federal law, it is also very unusual for
DOL to be successfully challenged on an allegation of non
conformity. Conformity issues are not raised lightly by
analysts; issues are always raised with the recognition that it
may be necessary to defend their position at a hearing. If the
analysts are not confident of their position, they will advise
the state that the possibility of a conformity issue is being ex
plored and hope that because of the doubt raised, the bill will
not survive.
A typical memorandum will pinpoint the language of the
bill that raises an issue, describes DOL©s understanding of
the language and its intent; cite applicable federal law provi
sions and their interpretations; and describe as clearly as
possible the basis for the opinion that if the provision is
enacted, the state law, as so amended, will not meet federal
law requirements. The DOL analysis is always expressed as
an opinion, since only the Secretary can decide that a provi
sion is out of conformity, and then only after he has notified
the Governor, extended to the agency an opportunity for
hearing, conducted a hearing, if one is desired, and submit
ted his findings to the state. If there does not appear to be
time for a written communication, the UIS may wire its opi
nion directly to the state agency, or it may telephone state
agency officials either directly or in concert with the regional
office. If a bill with a serious issue is enacted, the UIS may
request the Governor to veto it. All communications will
contain full explanations of the reason for DOL©s opinion.
Reactions by state agency officials to DOL comments con
cerning the conformity of pending state legislation range
from relief to hostility. Experienced state officials are
seldom surprised by a DOL position. In many cases they will
have been alerted to the possibility of an issue being raised by
the regional office on an informal basis, usually after a quick
consultation with National Office staff. Often, the state
agency officials will request an opinion on the conformity of
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a questionable bill. State officials have a considerable incen
tive in making sure the state legislature knows at an early
stage about any potential conformity issues associated with a
bill. It is very awkward for state officials who have not given
their legislature the DOL warning at the earliest opportunity
to advise against enactment of a problem bill that has
already gained momentum.
Most bills containing conformity issues are not ad
ministration bills or even supported by the state administra
tion. Often they would create serious administrative prob
lems for the agency if they were enacted, or otherwise disrupt
established practices or principles. It is not uncommon for
state agency officials informally to express the hope that
federal analysts will somehow find a conformity issue in the
bill so that DOL, rather than state agency officials, will bear
responsibility for its defeat. For example, from time to time
several states have sought to combine in one organizational
structure all state administrative adjudicatory functions and
staff, including unemployment insurance referees as well as
hearings officers in workers© compensation and other state
programs. DOL has recommended strongly against this ap
proach as inimical to both the quality and the promptness of
UI hearings. But to the disappointment of state agency of
ficials, DOL has found no basis for challenging the confor
mity of such a practice, provided federal performance stan
dards are met and granted funds are used only to meet UI
responsibilities.
A hostile reaction to a negative DOL opinion on the con
formity of a provision sometimes occurs but is unusual even
among state agency officials who disagree with the federal
position. When such a reaction has occurred, it has often
been a manifestation of an underlying animosity toward all
federal intervention in state affairs. Generally, an indication
from DOL that enactment of a pending bill would present a
question of conformity with federal law is recognized as
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reflecting the DOL analysts© best judgment. It is accepted if
the reason for the opinion seems persuasive, and it is usually
enough to deter enactment of the vast majority of problem
bills.

Avoiding Confrontation
If it appears that a bill posing a conformity issue will be
enacted despite DOL recommendations that it be defeated,
withdrawn or amended, the state is usually urged to adopt a
"savings clause" along with the bill. The one recommended
by DOL provides that the provision in question will not take
effect unless and until the Secretary of Labor finds that it is
consistent with federal law requirements. Adoption of this
type of savings clause gives the Secretary ample time to act
and avoids the necessity of a conformity hearing. Although
DOL is often successful in persuading a state to adopt a sav
ings clause, usually the clause provides that the challenged
provision will become effective unless and until the Secretary
finds the provision inconsistent with federal law re
quirements rather than DOL©s version.
The advantage of any savings clause is that it permits a
provision to become null and void without further action by
the legislature. This can be important to a state confronted
with an adverse decision by the Secretary issued during a
period when the state legislature is not in session. It is also
advantageous to DOL since it obviates the possibility of a
sanction, and it usually ends the issue without judicial
review. A number of states have rejected adoption of any
kind of a savings clause on the grounds that by allowing the
fate of an amendment to be determined by the Secretary of
Labor, it constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.
Once a bill containing a conformity issue is enacted. DOL
will usually request an opinion from the state agency or the
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state©s attorney general as to how it will be interpreted; DOL
will advise the state if there is a possible interpretation of the
law or the provision that will avoid the issue. For example, as
indicated in the preceding chapter, some states amended
their definition of suitable work to include any job paying
the higher of the minimum wage or the claimant©s weekly
benefit. However, both federal and state laws prohibit dis
qualification of a claimant for refusing a job paying less than
the prevailing wage for such jobs. To avoid an issue that
could be raised if an individual were disqualified for turning
down a job that paid the minimum wage but not the prevail
ing wage, DOL recommended that the states interpret their
laws as requiring disqualification for refusal of a minimum
wage job only if that wage was also the prevailing wage for
that type of work.
A more common attempt to avoid a conformity issue by
interpretation concerns the so-called automatic coverage
provisions in most state laws which require that any employ
ment that is either subject to the FUTA or required by the
FUTA to be covered under state law as a condition for tax
credit shall be considered covered under state law. Upon
enactment by the state of a bill excluding services that are re
quired by federal law to be covered, DOL will ask if the state
law will be interpreted to make the automatic coverage re
quirement controlling.
Less dependable a basis for avoiding a conformity issue
are general savings clauses in some state laws that provide
for the automatic nullification of any provision found by the
Secretary to be inconsistent with federal requirements for tax
credit or administrative grants. On the few occasions when it
would have been helpful, DOL has not succeeded in per
suading states to apply this provision. On the other hand,
there have been occasions when a flexible attorney general
has found an interpretation never contemplated by DOL. In
one instance, a problem provision was interpreted to have a
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meaning opposite from that suggested by its crystal clear
language, on the grounds that the state legislature would
never knowingly have enacted a bill that would jeopardize
employers© tax credits.
Infrequently, DOL will recede from a position by chang
ing its interpretation of the federal law. For example, a posi
tion held for many years that federal law bars states from
relieving employers of benefit charges to their accounts
(which could affect their tax rates) for unemployment caused
by so-called "Acts of God." DOL had argued that natural
calamities such as earthquakes and storms were part of the
risk of doing business. The fact that such unemployment was
beyond an employer©s control was not persuasive, since most
unemployment is regarded as beyond an employer©s control.
In 1972 a severe flood caused considerable disruption and
job dislocations in Pennsylvania and other states. DQL was
persuaded to adjust its position at least to the extent of per
mitting noncharging of benefits paid for unemployment if
caused by a natural disaster declared as such by the President
pursuant to the terms of the Disaster Relief Act.
Even more infrequently, DOL will agree not to pursue an
issue of nonconformity. This occurs usually only when the
offending provision has limited, temporary application. For
example, in 1973, New York law was amended to permit
noncharging to reimbursing employers of benefits paid over
a one-year period to former employees unemployed because
of a flood. Up to that time DOL interpreted federal law as
prohibiting any noncharging of employers financing benefits
on a reimbursable basis. However, since the noncharging in
the New York case was a one-time situation, and since the
Department itself then intended to seek a change in federal
law permitting the practice, the issue was not pursued. Occa
sionally, a state court will decide a case on the basis of an in
terpretation of the state UI law that will present a conformity
issue. DOL will sometimes not pursue the issue if the state
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agency can convince the Department that the court©s deci
sion has no applicability other than to the instant case, that
the state will continue to adhere to a conforming interpreta
tion and that it will appeal the court©s ruling, if possible.

Resolution of Issues
With these few exceptions, conformity issues that are once
raised with a state are pursued until they are resolved. There
is no single approach to resolution. One determining factor
will be the seriousness of the issue, as indicated by factors
such as the number of individuals affected, the impact on
claimants or employers, and the potential consequences to
the program. For example, the South Dakota issue described
below satisfied all criteria. So did the failure of some states
to extend coverage to church-supported schools, as required
by the 1976 federal law amendments, according to DOL in
terpretation. These are usually the most difficult to settle.
The South Dakota issue, for example, took two and one-half
years to resolve. Even more time can be expected if a state
seeks judicial review of a Secretary©s adverse determination,
as in the case of the church schools issue. In light of these
delays, if DOL fails to achieve at least a temporary suspen
sion of a serious nonconforming provision, it will quickly
begin the procedures that culminate in a hearing.
The pattern followed is different in the case of less serious
matters which constitute the large majority of issues. Instead
of moving directly toward a formal confrontation, DOL will
follow a variety of alternate roads to eventual settlement
which will avoid the burden and risks involved in a hearing.
The most common approach is to determine if the state agen
cy and presumably the state administration will introduce
and support a bill next year that will correct the problem. If
the agency agrees, and concurrence is reached on the
language of the corrective legislation, DOL will hold the
issue in abeyance until next year©s state legislature has had an
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opportunity to act on the bill. Failure of the legislature to
correct the issue will usually set in motion the procedures for
a hearing.
The law requires that the Secretary of Labor certify to the
Secretary of the Treasury on October 31 of each year all
states whose laws have been approved so that employers may
receive credit against the federal tax. The Secretary of Labor
cannot deny certifying a state law for tax offset credit and
cannot withhold administrative funds until the state agency
has had an opportunity for hearing. There are built-in time
constraints in the federal laws for each step between notifica
tion to the Governor of the issue, notice of hearing, schedul
ing the hearing, exchange of briefs, mailing of proposed
decisions, issuance of the administrative law judge©s recom
mended decision, Secretary©s decision, and opportunity for
judicial review. The result is that unless the initial steps are
taken by early summer, the state©s law must be certified on
October 31 and the issue moves over to the following year.
Usually, the state legislature will then have another oppor
tunity to correct the problem. If it does so within a
reasonable time, the issue will be resolved. Although the Oc
tober 31 deadline does not apply to issues involving the
possible denial of granted administrative funds, there are
still substantial delays between notification of an issue and
the application of that sanction.
The issues that linger the longest are often relatively minor
problems that could be corrected by a change in state agency
regulations or procedures. If the state agency is not really in
terested in making the necessary change, and DOL is reluc
tant to go to a hearing because the issue is not important
enough to warrant the time and work, the conforming
changes can be delayed almost indefinitely. Resolution of
such an issue may well await the eventual appointment of
new, more amenable state agency leadership. One of the
longest continuing issues involves a state©s regulations which
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apply different filing and reporting requirements to partially
unemployed claimants (claimants entitled to a reduced or
partial unemployment benefit for a week in which some
wages were earned but less than a specified amount) than
those prescribed in the federal Employment Security
Manual This document contains interpretations of federal
law requirements and spells out acceptable state practice in
various administrative situations. Before a nonconformity
hearing on the state©s regulations can even be scheduled, the
Manual prescribes a procedure requiring federal evaluation
of whether the state provisions, while differing from the sug
gested Manual provisions, could nevertheless still be con
sidered consistent with federal law. The evaluation must be
made in concert with state authorities. This particular issue
has remained unresolved for almost a decade, although there
have been several exchanges of proposed regulations and
comments over the years.
A number of personal factors also influence success in
resolving issues short of a hearing. Mutual respect between
federal staff (regional and national) and state agency of
ficials as well as competence in the art of negotiation can be
critical. Conversely, heavy pressure ordinarily has negative
results. The application of pressure on a Secretary by the
state©s legislative delegation, for example, usually has no ef
fect. But this is not invariable. There have been instances
where a change in federal position appears to have been in
fluenced by political pressure.
The traditional pattern of resolving most issues prior to a
hearing may be altered in the future. First, the federal stan
dards enacted in 1980 as well as additional amendments
enacted in 1981 are viewed by many states as serious and
threatening intrusions into state authority. Unlike the com
prehensive amendments enacted in 1970 and 1976, there was
neither opportunity nor effort made in 1980 to obtain and
consider reactions from the states either individually or
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through the Interstate Conference of Employment Security
Agencies (ICESA). Moreover, some states considered
unreasonable the short deadlines imposed for implementa
tion of the amendments (matter of a few months in some
cases), in contrast to the two-year period that is usually per
mitted. Second, since 1970 states have had the opportunity
for judicial review of an adverse determination by the
Secretary. Only a few states have exercised that right, but in
the one instance to date in which the courts ruled against the
state in 1980, the consequences were far less severe than the
potential penalty. 6 Armed with this precedent, states can
now consider contesting a decision with less fear that the full
sanctions will be imposed. Finally, the UIS has lost substan
tial credibility in recent years, its advice is increasingly
disregarded. This is due in part to the loss of effective, ex
perienced and authoritative personnel and the consequent
deterioration of performance; the relinquishment of leader
ship to agencies other than DOL, and the consequent rever
sal of many long-standing policies; and the increasingly fre
quent pattern of failing to follow up warnings of sanctions
or even to pursue issues at all. In any event, the increased fre
quency of hearings suggests that apprehensions concerning
the prospect of a conformity hearing are disappearing.
Many of the elements involved in a conformity case can be
illustrated best by examining one in detail. The issue describ
ed in the appendix to this chapter is one of the most signifi
cant to confront the system. It arose over a proposal for
amendment to the South Dakota law which the state agency
submitted on June 22, 1962, to the DOL regional office in
Kansas City for comment. The issue was resolved December
11, 1964.
The chronology of the South Dakota issue documents
some of the common approaches toward resolution of an
issue prior to a hearing, including informal attempts of each
party to persuade the other, consideration of alternative pro-
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visions, and adoption of a savings clause that appeared to in
vite a determinative DOL decision on the basis of an infor
mal hearing. 7
The chronology also shows the development of strategy by
each party, including the utilization of interest groups, con
gressmen and other state agencies. None of these efforts was
successful in heading off a hearing. Why did resolution of
this issue (and only about a dozen others) require a hearing,
while many hundreds of other issues have been resolved in
formally, including almost identical issues in other states at
other times? Certainly the following factors contributed: the
Governor©s support of the questioned amendment; poten
tially significant savings in benefit costs, and consequent
strong support by business groups; strong convictions con
cerning federal versus state authority by proponents and op
ponents of the amendment; and the existence of more than
one contentious issue.
Whatever disadvantage the state incurred because the
hearing was conducted in Washington, by a federal ad
ministrative law judge, on the basis of which the decision as
to the state©s conformity with federal law is made by the U.S.
Secretary of Labor, was eliminated six years after the South
Dakota hearing by amendment of the federal law (Public
Law 91-373) under which a state may seek judicial review of
an adverse Secretary©s decision.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Chronology and Anatomy of a Conformity Case
6-22-62 P.J. Maloney, Commissioner and Counsel of the
South Dakota Employment Security Department, submitted
a legislative proposal to the Kansas City Regional Ad
ministrator of DOL©s Bureau of Employment Security, for
comment. The proposed amendment would effectively deny
payment of unemployment insurance to claimants by
lengthening the waiting period from 1 week to 7 to 13 weeks,
depending on the amount of the claimant©s base-period earn
ings. Only those who earned $6,000 or more would be sub
ject to the proposed benefit postponement schedule:

Amount of base-period
earnings

Number of weeks
of benefit delay

$6,000 - 6,999.99
7
7,000 - 7,999.99
9
8,000-8,999.99
11
9,000 - over
13
6-29-62 The Regional Administrator©s response advised
Maloney that the proposed amendment would raise ques
tions of conformity. The amendment injects a consideration
of "need" as a condition of eligibility for benefits. Under
the proposal, benefits would not be paid solely with respect
to unemployment, as required by federal law.
The regional office mailed a memorandum to Robert C.
Goodwin, Administrator, Bureau of Employment Security,
attaching copies of the agency©s letter and the Regional Ad
ministrator©s response.
7-20-62 Memorandum from William Norwood, National UI
Office, Director, UIS, to the Regional Director advised that
the National Office concurs with the June 29, 1962 regional
office letter to the state and provided further comment in
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support of the position along the following lines: The pro
hibition against a needs test as a condition for the payment
of compensation is implicit in the FUTA definition of "com
pensation." Sections 303(a)(5) of the Social Security Act and
3304(a)(4) of the FUTA require, as a condition for the cer
tification of state unemployment insurance laws, that such
laws provide for the use of all moneys withdrawn from the
state unemployment funds solely in the payment of
unemployment compensation, with certain exceptions not
relevant to the present problem. "Compensation" as defined
in Section 3306(h), FUTA, means "cash benefits payable to
individuals with respect to their unemployment." This
limitation on the expenditure of moneys withdrawn from
unemployment compensation funds negates, by necessary
implication, the disbursement of such moneys on a needs
basis.
7-25-62 Letter from Regional Administrator to Maloney
transmitted the National Office comments and reasserted
that the proposed legislation would raise a question of con
formity.
7-31-62 Agency response from J.V. Yaukey, South Dakota
Chief of Benefits, to Regional Administrator advised that
the proposed amendment had the support of several large
and influential employers in the state who are trying to solve
the problem of paying benefits in the winter months every
year to claimants who consistently earn high wages plus
overtime about nine months of the year and then draw
unemployment benefits for the remaining three months,
even though they had already put in a full year©s quota of
hours worked. The agency requested a counter-suggestion as
to how to solve this problem.
8-3-62 Charles Wilkins, UIS Regional Director in Kansas Ci
ty, transmitted agency letter to UIS, National Office (Nor
wood) with a request for assistance.
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8-24-62 Norwood©s response reiterated the position that the
proposal to increase the waiting period for claimants whose
base-period earnings exceed $6,000 would introduce the con
cept of "need" as a condition of eligibility and would pre
sent a question of conformity with federal law. The
memorandum advised that although the Bureau was reluc
tant to recommend seasonality provisions because of the dif
ficulty of administering them equitably and effectively, it
was submitting a draft seasonality provision for the agency©s
consideration that would provide a better solution to the
state©s problem than the proposed amendment.
9-4-62 Letter from Wilkins transmitted to Maloney the Na
tional Office comments and the suggested seasonality provi
sion.
9-10-62 Letter, Yaukey to Regional Administrator, argued
that the Bureau is looking at the "needs" test concept too
narrowly. It rejected the seasonality provision because it
would be "devastating in its effect on low income people"
while the additional waiting period proposal "would prob
ably not affect more than 100 or 150 claimants."
9-18-62 Wilkins© letter to Maloney advised that the National
Office was preparing comments and attached a copy of an
earlier Bureau paper entitled "Entitlement to Unemploy
ment Benefits Based on Consideration Involving Need: Con
formity with Requirements of Federal Law." This
monograph was prepared by DOL National Office staff and
distributed at a legislative meeting held in Kansas City in
1961.
9-19-62 Wilkins transmitted to Norwood copies of the latest
correspondence as well as a report of a discussion with state
agency officials indicating the agency©s belief that
dependents© allowances added by some states to weekly
benefits are based as much on need as the proposed amend
ment, and yet they are not held out of conformity.
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10-8-62 National Office (Norwood) memorandum to the
regional office (Wilkins) referred to the article, "The Means
Test and Dependents© Allowances" in the July 1961 issue of
the Employment Security Review, a monthly publication of
the Department of Labor, reiterated the Bureau©s position
and explained again why it believes the proposal in question
does not meet the requirements of federal law. The
memorandum pointed out that the position taken is consis
tent with prior advice given other states and disagreed that
the suggested seasonality provision would unjustly deny
benefits to low-income workers.
10-24-62 Letter to state agency from regional office discuss
ed desirable legislation for the 1963 legislative session and
recommended against adoption of the increased waiting
week proposal.
11-16-62 Memorandum to Norwood from Wilkins transmit
ted a savings clause that the agency wished to add to the pro
posed amendment. It provided that the provision would be
inoperative if on or before January 2, 1964, the Secretary of
Labor found it inconsistent with federal law.
12-10-62 Wilkins informed Norwood that the State Advisory
Council approved the proposal on November 28, 1962. He
also forwarded a copy of an agency study indicating that in a
nine-month period, about 4 percent of claimants would be
affected and in a 12-month period, there would be a reduc
tion of $45,000 in benefits paid. The regional office also
transmitted copies of a letter to the agency from an attorney
for the Greater South Dakota Association, an organization
of businessmen, supporting the proposal. Wilkins advised
that the proposal probably would be enacted during the 1963
legislative session.
12-21-62 National Office telephone call to Wilkins advised
that suggested language for a savings clause would be mailed
within a few days. This followed a December 17, 1963

Administration of Federal Standards

155

memorandum to the Bureau from the Solicitor©s Office sug
gesting revisions in the Bureau©s proposed language.
12-16-62 Memorandum from Bureau Director (Goodwin)
advised Norwood (Director, UIS) of a call from Assistant
Director of the Social Security Department of the AFL-CIO,
Ray Munts, concerning the state proposal and requesting in
formation about the issue.
12-27-62 National Office (UIS) memorandum to regional of
fice suggested a savings clause under which the operation of
the amendment would be made conditional upon the
Secretary©s finding that the amendment was consistent with
federal requirements. The memorandum advised that if the
agency continued to support the savings clause it had pro
posed, at least reference to a specific date in the clause
should be omitted.
1-1-63 Wilkins advised the National Office by phone that the
agency had rejected the DOL-suggested savings clause and
supported a clause providing that the proposal would
become effective January 1,1964, unless, prior to January 2,
1964, the Secretary found that the proposal failed to meet
federal law requirements.
1-4-63 Wilkins transmitted to Norwood the South Dakota
legislative proposal together with other bills that had been in
troduced.
1-28-63 Memorandum from Bureau Director Goodwin to
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz informed him "of the
background and present status of an issue which may even
tually present a question for your determination concerning
the conformity of the South Dakota Employment Security
Law, as it is expected to be amended, with requirements of
the Internal Revenue Code and the Social Security Act."
2-5-63 National Office memorandum informed Wilkins that
Commerce Clearing House (CCH) reported that the pro-
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posal had been introduced as Senate Bill 89, and that the
CCH version of the bill contained erroneous citations to the
federal provisions.
3-7-63 Wilkins informed Norwood that Senate Bill 89 had
passed both Houses of the state legislature and that Gover
nor Archie Gubbrud was expected to approve it.
3-25-63 Regional office forwarded certification, made
March 14, 1963, by the South Dakota Secretary of State,
that the attached document was a true, correct and examined
copy of Senate Bill 89, as approved by the Governor, March
13, 1963. The bill as enacted included a savings clause which
provided that the amendment would become effective on
January 15, 1964, unless the United States Secretary of
Labor, prior to January 8, 1964, found that it failed to meet
the requirements of federal law.
4-29-63 Submittal prepared for Secretary of Labor, with the
Solicitor©s Office participation, included summations of
both state and Bureau arguments, a chronology of develop
ment, and a proposed letter to the Governor.
6-13-63 Letter from Goodwin to Maloney advised that the
Bureau©s recommendations were being prepared for the
Secretary©s consideration and that a copy of the statement
would be furnished the agency July 1, 1963. The letter re
quested the agency to furnish a statement of its position by
July 22 so that an informal hearing could be scheduled dur
ing the week of July 29.
6-26-63 Yaukey letter to Wilkins described the Governor©s
recent speech at a state meeting of the American Legion in
which he used as his principal theme federal encroachment
on states© rights. Almost 10 minutes of the 25-minute talk
was devoted to the conflict over Senate Bill 89. The letter at
tached an article from a Huron, South Dakota newspaper
describing the provision and the issue.
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7-7-65 Letter from Goodwin to South Dakota Governor
Gubbrud advised that an informal hearing would be schedul
ed during the week of July 29. The letter enclosed a copy of
the Bureau recommendation to the Secretary, "for your in
formation."
7-12-63 Letter from Governor Gubbrud to Secretary Wirtz
transmitted a brief on the state©s position and requested ad
vice on the date of the hearing.
7-26-63 Letter to Secretary of Labor Wirtz from Cliff W.
Shrader, President, South Dakota State Federation of
Labor, submitted a brief urging a finding of nonconformity.
7-29-63 Letter to Secretary from U.S. Senator George
McGovern of South Dakota indicated receipt of State
Federation of Labor brief, urged that it be given full con
sideration, and requested to be informed of the determina
tion.
8-1-63 "Informal" hearing in Washington between DOL©s
Administrative Assistant Secretary, Leo R. Werts, as the
Secretary©s representative and South Dakota agency of
ficials.
8-7-63 Goodwin letter to President Shrader, South Dakota
State Federation of Labor, acknowledged receipt of brief.
8-9-63 Letter from Secretary to Senator McGovern indicated
that all expressions of opinion would be taken into con
sideration, including the State Federation of Labor©s brief.
8-13-63 Letter from Goodwin to Ben H. Radcliffe, Presi
dent, South Dakota Farmers Union, responded to 7-31-63
inquiry and advised that Secretary would consider views
from all interested parties.
9-3-63 Letter to Secretary Wirtz from Nelson H.
Cruikshank, Director, Department of Social Security, AFL-
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CIO, transmitted the AFL-CIO©s detailed views on the issue,
urging a finding of noncomformity.
9-11-63 Secretary©s letter to U.S. Senator Karl R. Mundt of
South Dakota responded to the Senator©s letter of August
29, 1963, which questioned the propriety of DOL©s con
sideration of the state law©s conformity with federal law re
quirements. The Secretary©s response described the savings
clause which prompted the state agency to request a finding
from the Secretary.
9-11-63 Letter, Jeremiah D. Murphy to Leo Werts, submit
ted a brief on behalf of the Greater South Dakota Associa
tion in support of the position taken by the state. Letter con
tained the assumption that formal hearings on the conformi
ty issue would be held if Werts found that the provision was
inconsistent with federal law.
9-25-63 Maloney to Werts transmitted final summary of the
state©s arguments.
10-8-63 Letter, Werts to Murphy, advised that the certifica
tion of the state law for tax credit and administrative grants
was not at issue since Senate Bill 89 provided that if the
Secretary found that the provision did not meet federal law
requirements, the provision would become inoperative and
not part of the state law. Since state law certification was not
at issue, there was no provision in federal law for a hearing,
although the state had already been given a full opportunity
to present its views. Accordingly, no further hearing would
be held.
1-3-64 Letter from Secretary Wirtz to Governor Gubbrud
advised that "After careful consideration, I have concluded
that Senate Bill 89 is not consistent with the requirements of
the Social Security Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act." The basis for the conclusion included legislative
history showing that Congress intended unemployment, not

Administration of Federal Standards

159

need or lack of need, to be the test of a worker©s eligibility
for benefits; that although details such as the length of
waiting periods were to be left to the states, they must be
consistent with "the fundamental concepts of unemploy
ment insurance and in the context of the cooperative
Federal-State system." It argued that the state provision
constituted a needs test and that other states© provisions for
weighted benefit schedules and dependents© allowances were
distinguishable from the South Dakota bill.
1-6-64 A summary of the Secretary©s decision was mailed to
all UIS Regional Directors.
1-17-64 Memorandum from Ralph Altman, Director, UIS
Office of Program Policies and Legislation, to Norwood
reported on telephone conversations with Wilkins on
developments in South Dakota. Wilkins advised Altman that
the State Attorney General was considering a memorandum
opinion that Senate Bill 89 was not inoperative because the
Secretary had not provided a hearing to South Dakota.
Wilkins had advised Yaukey that the state law had already
been certified for 1963 tax credits but that the next ad
ministrative grant could be affected. The Secretary could
either proceed to the grants question alone (which then re
quired no hearing) or proceed to the FUTA question which
did require a hearing.
1-20-64 Memorandum, Wilkins to Miller, Deputy Director
of the Unemployment Insurance Service, summarized
developments in the state following issuance of Secretary©s
1-3-64 decision and identified parties interested in pursuing
the issue and those ready to accept the Secretary©s decision.
1-17-64 Senator Mundt advised Secretary Wirtz of being in
formed by Mr. Goodwin that the 8-1-63 meeting between
Leo Werts and the South Dakota agency officials was not a
hearing of record, but rather a preliminary hearing, and that
no finding by the Secretary would be forthcoming before a
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hearing of record. He questioned why a finding of noncon
formity had been issued without adherence to the statutory
provision calling for a formal hearing and why a promise
from Mr. Goodwin, that there would be a hearing of record
before any final action was taken, had been violated.
1-22-64 Letter from Senator Mundt to the Secretary
acknowledged receipt of Secretary©s January 17 notification
to him of the nonconformity of the South Dakota provision
with federal law. He reiterated his understanding, from talk
ing with Mr. Goodwin, that the August 1 meeting was only
informal.
1-28-64 Memorandum to the Secretary from Charles
Donahue, Solicitor of Labor, concluded (1) that the South
Dakota "savings clause" is not an unconstitutional delega
tion of legislative power to the Secretary, and (2) that South
Dakota could not complain of the lack of notice and hearing
provided for in the FUTA since the state had declared a clear
legislative intent to establish a streamlined procedure to take
place prior to and outside the procedures prescribed in the
federal statute.
1-28-64 Letter, Goodwin to the Secretary, advised that a bill
(Senate Bill 179) pending in the state legislature would make
inoperative the provisions of Senate Bill 89 until June 30,
1964, and operative thereafter unless the Governor certifies
otherwise:
WHEREAS, in order to demonstrate the good
faith of the people of the Sovereign State of South
Dakota, it is hereby declared the policy of the
legislature of the State of South Dakota to make
the provisions of Chapter 125 of the Session Laws
of 1963 inoperative for a limited period of time in
order to give the Secretary of Labor an opportunity
to follow the applicable federal statutes relating to
the conformity of State acts, thereby preserving
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comity between the Sovereign State of South
Dakota and the United States Government.
1-30-64 Wilkins called and reported to Norwood that the
South Dakota Attorney General had ruled against the
Secretary©s decision because a hearing was not held.
2-3-64 Memorandum from Wilkins to Miller forwarded
copies of Senate Bills 179 and 180 (a seasonally provision) as
well as other bills and a news item which described State At
torney General©s opinion that Secretary©s "finding" was not
valid since no notice was given and no hearing held. The
legislature was authorized to last 30 legislative days begin
ning 1-7-64. More than 20 days had elapsed.
2-4-64 Altman reported to Norwood that the Regional office
indicated that Senate Bills 179 and 180 had passed the State
Senate, were reported favorably by the House Committee,
and were expected to pass February 6. Senate Bill 180 was
the seasonally provision, which provided that benefits
would be paid a claimant in a calendar quarter only to the ex
tent they could be based on the claimant©s employment in the
corresponding quarter of the base period. There would be no
benefits paid to a claimant in the first quarter of 1964, for
example, if the claimant had not worked in the first quarter
of 1963. The bill would allegedly adversely affect over 40
percent of the claimants. The legislature was expected to ad
journ in a few days.
2-13-64 Governor approved Senate Bill 179 providing that
previously enacted Senate Bill 89, at issue, would become in
operative through June 30, 1964, but would become
operative on and after July 1, 1964,
. . . unless the Governor of the State of South
Dakota on or before December 31, 1964, declares
the same to be inoperative by certifying such
declaration to the Secretary of State and the Com
missioner and Counsel of Employment Security.
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[Available record not clear as to the action at this time on
Senate Bill 180. It appears, on the basis of subsequent
events, that the bill was indeed enacted but never became ef
fective because of labor©s successful referendum drive and
the bill©s subsequent defeat at the polls, as noted in entry for
11-4-64.]
3-10-64 Governor requested Secretary, at his early conve
nience, to afford the state reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard, as provided in federal law.
3-30-64 Memorandum to the Secretary from Charles
Donahue and Robert C. Goodwin advised that although
conformity proceedings could begin before July 1, 1964 no
finding could be made unless and until Senate Bill 89 should
become operative. Until then the Secretary could not legally
find that the state has amended its law so that it no longer
contains the provisions required by the FUTA.
3-30-64 Separate letter from Goodwin to Secretary pointed
out that Goodwin accepted the judgment of the Solicitor©s
Office that a finding could not be made prior to July 1. He
indicated, however, that he was hopeful of at least a hearing
before then since the Governor clearly is seeking early ac
tion; delay could cause the hearing and decision to occur
during state and national political party conventions and the
finding could become a campaign issue; it will be difficult to
hold a hearing after July 1 and issue a decision prior to Oc
tober 1, which would be necessary in order for it to become
effective December 31, as required by the FUTA.
4-7-64 Memorandum from Wilkins to Miller attached copy
of letter dated 4-6-64 from Yaukey to Wilkins which advised
that the state law permits new laws passed by the state
legislature to be considered by the voters at the election, pro
vided appropriate petitions are filed by May 15. Letter in
cluded article from the Aberdeen American News which
quoted Cliff Shrader, President of the South Dakota Federa-
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tion of Labor, as saying that petitions to get Senate Bill 180
(seasonality provision) referred in the general election in
November would be circulated throughout South Dakota.
4-29-64 Letter from the Secretary to the Governor pointed
out that under federal law it would be premature to proceed
with the conformity matter prior to July 1. However, as a
preliminary step to a hearing, and as required by the FUTA,
he notified the Governor that he had reason to believe that
the state may not be certifiable for taxable year 1964.
5-12-64 Memo from Wilkins to Miller advised that the South
Dakota State Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, succeeded in
getting 19,701 names on petitions although only 12,500
minimum were needed. Accordingly, Senate Bill 180 will not
go into effect after June 30, irrespective of any action taken
by the Governor on Senate Bill 179. The fate of Senate Bill
180 would be decided by the voters in November.
5-22-64 Internal UIS staff memo indicated it would require a
minimum of 650 man-hours to research the following items
in DOL files: conformity, dependents© allowances, seasonal
employment, waiting period, legislation, rules and regula
tions.
6-9-64 Secretary letters to Governor and Maloney enclosed a
notice of hearing for 10:00 a.m. on July 7, 1964 in the main
labor building in Washington. Clifford P. Grant, a hearing
examiner, was designated to preside over the hearing.
6-11-64 Letters from Goodwin to Congressmen Reifel and
Berry of South Dakota and Senators Mundt and McGovern
advised them of the notice of hearing.
6-12-64 Letter from Norwood to Maloney requested infor
mation on the number of covered workers who earned
$6,000 or more over a recent 12-month period broken down
by major industry groupings.
6-13-64 Notice of hearing published in the Federal Register.
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7-6-64 Memorandum from Norwood to Goodwin advised
that Georgia, Texas and Virginia had indicated their inten
tion to send representatives to appear at the hearing, that
Jeremiah Murphy will appear on behalf of the Greater South
Dakota Employers© Association and that there will be a
spokesman for the AFL-CIO as well as the South Dakota
Federation of Labor.
7-7-64 Memorandum, Miller to all Regional Directors,
enclosed a summary of the arguments presented at the hear
ing.
The Department argued:
(1) The provision would deny benefits on a basis other
than claimants© unemployment.
(2) The basis for the denial is an income test, similar to
those used in programs for the needy.
(3) Dependents© allowances do not involve a means test
since they do not condition payment on base-period
earnings, nor is dependency the basis for qualifying.
(4) The average claimant who earned over $6,000 would
not have received any benefits for his first spell of
unemployment since the disqualification period (7-13
weeks) is longer than the average spell of unemploy
ment.
(5) As the claimant©s earnings increased from $6,000 to
$9,000 or more the disqualification would increase from
7 to 13 weeks and wipe out many compensated weeks in
later spells of unemployment.
(6) A South Dakota agency study made in June 1964 at
DOL©s request shows that 81,560 workers would have
met the qualifying wage requirements of the state law.
The new amendment could have adversely affected the
benefit rights of 16,800 or 21 percent of these workers
since their earnings were $6,000 or more.
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South Dakota argued:
(1) Since the Secretary had already issued an adverse
finding, they did not really expect the Hearing Examiner
to reverse the Secretary©s findings.
(2) The state has a right to impose a delay period upon
claimants following their separation from employment.
States have wide latitude to adopt programs to their
own circumstances.
(3) There is no specific federal requirement that benefits
should be paid as a matter of right and not on a needs
basis.
(4) Compliance with federal statutes need be only of a
general nature, and minor specific points should be
resolved in favor of the states.
(5) Many state laws treat groups of claimants differently
without raising conformity issues.
(6) There is no authority for holding the South Dakota
provision inconsistent on the basis of a requirement not
expressly contained in federal laws but which is merely
derived by "necessary implication" from such
language. An administrator cannot enlarge by inter
pretation the regulatory power spelled out in the statute.
(7) The provision in question is not a prohibited means
test because:
(a) It does not require an examination of a claim
ant©s present income or other resources.
(b) It applies not more of a means test than does
the program itself, which is based on the presumed
need of the unemployed as a class.
(c) It is no different in principle than dependents©
allowances, or weighted benefit schedules, which
vary benefit amounts according to earnings or
presumed needs of recipients.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties of record agreed
to file initial briefs within 14 days and reply briefs within 7
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days thereafter. Other interested parties had a 21-day period
prescribed for filing briefs in the Notice of Hearing.
7-20-64 Brief of the State of South Dakota argued that
federal law requires only that money be withdrawn solely in
the payment of unemployment compensation, and that the
South Dakota amendment meets this requirement. The
money is paid only for unemployment benefits and not for
anything else. However, "because the South Dakota amend
ment does not square with the concepts of social thinkers in
the Bureau, this ©paraphrased law,© with the aid of a strained
interpretation of ©compensation,© sprinkled with a goodly
amount of poetic license and academic reasoning, threatens
to become a ©compliance club© held over the head of a
Sovereign State."
A second point was that, like other states© provisions, the
South Dakota amendment recognized "that for certain
groups, presumed needs on the average were different from
those of other groups and there could be a certain tailoring
of the unemployment insurance theory and procedures to
meet those varying presumed needs."
A third point was that the state provision did not deal with
individual need, and that is all that the federal law prohibits.
7-27-64 Georgia brief©s main thrust was that DOL had no
statutory or judicial authority to interpret federal law
beyond the specific terms of the Acts and that a "necessary
implication" can arise only when there can be no other
reasonable interpretation. The administrative interpretation
relating to the South Dakota provision had no basis in the
Act.
8-4-64 The Department of Labor©s Reply Brief transmitted
to Maloney by Solicitor©s Office Counsel for Unemployment
Compensation, Louise Freeman, argued that although South
Dakota and the other states acknowledged that a means test
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is prohibited by federal law as inconsistent with basic
unemployment insurance principles, they nevertheless argue
that as long as money withdrawn from the fund is paid for
the relief of unemployment, there can be no conflict with
federal law. According to the Department, if the withdrawal
standard was interpreted as permitting use of fund moneys
for any program in relief of the unemployed, as urged by the
states, it could not then be said that the federal law pro
hibited either a means or an income test even though the
states had agreed that it did contain such a prohibition.
8-13-64 Stanley Rector, writing in the Advisor (a periodical
published by an organization, headed by Rector, that pro
vided UI advice to business) disagreed with DOL and argued
that the South Dakota decision (and an earlier decision con
cerning a New Hampshire provision) would provide the
necessary momentum for a Judicial Review Bill. "There is
now no semblance of due process in the procedure in which
the Department of Labor is judge, jury, and executioner."
8-24-64 Recommended decision of Hearing Examiner Clif
ford P. Grant held that under the South Dakota provision,
eligibility for benefits would be premised upon not exceeding
a specified amount of income from earnings in the base
period, "a condition of entitlement unrelated to the fact or
cause of unemployment and therefore inconsistent with the
stated requirements of the Federal law. It is difficult to
understand, by any stretch of the imagination, how this con
tributes to the goals of economic stability and the relief of
the unemployed."
If the language of the Federal law is not in itself
sufficiently plain to preclude the application to the
income-from-earnings test as a condition of entitle
ment unrelated to the fact or cause of unemploy
ment, one need look only to the intent of Congress
and its mandate for ©genuine unemployment com-
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pensation laws© for the principle that unemploy
ment compensation is to be paid as a matter of
right without any test of means or other condition
of entitlement not reasonably related to the in
surance program or to the insured risk, involuntary
unemployment.
9-1-64 South Dakota©s exception to the recommended deci
sion of the Hearing Examiner argued that the law con
templated that the states were to be given wide latitude as
long as they did not examine the poverty or need of the in
dividual claimant or violate the few other limitations in the
federal law; that other state provisions deviated from the
principle that benefits must be based solely on unemploy
ment in that they grouped claimants (Great Lakes seamen in
Ohio, interstate claimants in Alaska, women, students and
claimants with dependents) for reasons wholly unrelated to
their unemployment and treat them differently. In each case,
the specified category is singled out for special treatment:
Great Lakes seamen were subject to a special seasonality
provision in Ohio; interstate claimants received lower
benefits than intrastate claimants under Alaska law;
claimants with dependents receive special allowances in some
states; women are the subject of special pregnancy and leav
ing work disqualifications; and students are subject to
special restrictions.
9-4-64 Record of proceedings certified to Secretary of Labor
by Clifford Grant.
9-25-64 Secretary©s letter to Governor of South Dakota
enclosed copy of Secretary©s decision in which the Secretary
concurred in and adopted the findings and conclusions con
tained in the recommended decision of the Hearing Ex
aminer. This decision
. . . finds that the South Dakota Employment
Security Law, as amended by Chapter 125 of the
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Session Laws of 1963, no longer contains the provi
sions specified in Section 3304(a)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 and Section 303(a)(5) of the
Social Security Act.
10-2-64 Unemployment Insurance Program Letter 787
distributed decision to all state Employment Security agen
cies.
11-4-64 Wilkins advised Miller that agency officials planned
to meet with Governor during the week of November 16.
Also, with one-half the returns counted, the referendum on
Senate Bill 180 was defeated and the seasonality provision
would not go into effect. South Dakota AFL-CIO had
distributed 20,000 copies of "Questions and Answers on
Senate Bill No. 180" throughout the state in the ten days to
two weeks preceding the election and had put newspaper ads
in the six leading state papers in the October 24, 27 and 31
issues.
11-16-64 Wilkins advised Miller that the Governor had
declared Senate Bill 179 inoperative as of November 16,
1964.
12-11-64 Letter from Secretary acknowledged receipt of cer
tified copy of Governor©s action and advised that it con
stituted the necessary remedial action so that the finding of
nonconformity would not be a basis for noncertification of
tax credit or denial of administrative grants.

NOTES
1. This, of course, is true only of the regular unemployment insurance
system. It does not apply to the two federal unemployment compensa
tion programs for ex-servicepersons (UCX) and federal employees
(UCFE). In those cases federal legislation is implemented not through
state legislation, but through agreement with the states to act as agents
for the federal government.
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2. Where the weekly benefit amount is computed as a fraction of high
quarter earnings and base-period wages must equal a multiple of the
weekly benefit amount, an increase in the maximum benefit amount
could result in some individuals with substantial high quarter earnings
failing to meet the base-period requirements unless the state has a
"stepdown" provision. For discussion of other benefit formula inter
relationships, see U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment
Security, Unemployment Insurance Legislative Policy, Recommenda
tions for State Legislation 1962, BES No. U-212A, October 1962, pp.
44-50, particularly.
3. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
4. Ibid.
5. See, for example, discussion of the "Knowland Amendment" in
William Haber and Merrill G. Murray, Unemployment Insurance in the
American Economy (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p.
450.
6. See discussion of New Hampshire case (1980) under Coverage Issues
in chapter 5.

7. This chronology was compiled from an examination of cor
respondence in the Department of Labor©s South Dakota conformity
files, Washington, DC.

Chapter 5
Major Federal-State Conformity
and Court Cases

This nation©s system of unemployment insurance would
simply not survive without continuing cooperation between
the federal and state partners. Mutual respect, understand
ing, and appreciation for each other©s responsibilities are key
factors in keeping the system going. But the day-to-day
demonstrations of these qualities are buried and taken for
granted. Rather, it is the occasional conflict that produces
the drama, attention, and sometimes significant change in
the program©s direction.
The foregoing chapters identified two categories of con
flicts. First are those that are almost constantly erupting and
are not subject to permanent or complete resolution. They
are the inevitable result of the division of responsibilities be
tween two levels of government. They would not exist under
either a wholly federal or a wholly state program, but they
are more than offset by the advantages of the hybrid system.
The other category includes conflicts over the meaning of
federal law actually over the meaning of unemployment in
surance. These conflicts are usually resolved through
negotiation and the informal means described in chapter 4.
The issues not so settled are decided in either of two ways.
Increasingly, issues are resolved by federal imposition of
program standards. As chapter 3 pointed out, this approach
171
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is often incompatible with a program grounded on in
tergovernmental cooperation. Federal program standards
have not only produced resentment and disruption, but in
most cases their adoption has been either unnecessary or
undesirable.
The other way issues have been resolved is through confor
mity hearings and litigation. This is not to say that conformi
ty hearings are alternative means of settling the same issues.
Federal standards create new law while conformity pro
ceedings merely test interpretations of existing law. Still,
both are means of settling issues and coping with problems.
Standards adopted in recent years have provoked resent
ment, undermined confidence in federal judgment,
generated administrative problems and, most important,
weakened the balance of power, the key to the program©s
success. In contrast, conformity hearings have proved to be a
successful means of renewing the program. They too are ac
companied by the heat of conflict. Disputes have been
serious, highly controversial and often volatile struggles over
basic principles. But by providing an arena for full expres
sion of opposing views, the conformity process reveals
weaknesses to be corrected. It provokes continual reexamination of original principles, and it satisfies the need of
the states for their "day in court" and a fair hearing and
determination of their grievance.
Every past major federal-state conflict over the meaning
of federal law which went to formal hearing is described in
this chapter. Aside from the 1963-1964 South Dakota case
first discussed and described in chapter 4 to illustrate the
process, these conflicts are grouped for convenience into
four subject categories by the nature of the issues involved:
administrative; coverage; experience rating and benefit
charging; and labor standards. The final section in this
chapter deals with fair hearing and promptness issues which
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were not raised in conformity actions by the federal govern
ment. They were instead brought by claimants against states
and pursued through the courts. Their actions have pro
foundly affected the federal-state system.

South Dakota (1963-64) Issues
The South Dakota case was the most important of all con
formity cases so far and one of the few that involved more
than a single issue. There were four. The most prominent
was whether the state©s variable waiting period keyed to the
level of base-period wage earnings constituted a prohibited
income test. The problem with the state provision was that,
among otherwise equally eligible claimants, payment or
denial would be conditioned on a factor (variation in baseperiod earnings) bearing absolutely no relationship to
unemployment. This violated one of the most significant in
terpretations of two federal provisions: that money
withdrawn from the fund may be used only for unemploy
ment compensation, and that "compensation" means
benefits payable to individuals with respect to their
unemployment. The decision was that the federal law provi
sions preclude not only a clear-cut needs test as a condition
for benefits, but also an income test of the type enacted by
South Dakota.
The second issue concerned the extent of federal authority
to interpret federal laws. The state had argued that only re
quirements expressly contained in the statutes were binding
and DOL had no statutory or judicial authority to interpret
beyond the specific terms of the Acts. DOL could only draw
necessary implications, and these arise only when there can
be no other reasonable interpretation. A decision in favor of
the state on this issue would have resulted in a substantial
realignment of federal-state authority. Many conformity
issues, particularly experience rating issues, are provoked by
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interpretations considerably more fragile than DOL©s con
struction of the federal requirement that money withdrawn
from the fund must be used only for unemployment compen
sation. The issue was not really joined at the hearing except
that once the state had acknowledged, as it did, that an in
dividual needs test was inconsistent with federal law, DOL
pointed out that since the law did not contain an explicit pro
hibition, the state©s conclusion, with which it agreed, could
be reached only by reasonable interpretation.
The third issue was also raised in two subsequent confor
mity cases. The states involved contended that federal law
did not contemplate application of the awesome sanctions
(total loss of federal tax credit and administrative grants) for
minor violations. It was wholly unreasonable, they argued,
for a provision affecting a relatively small handful of
claimants to incur a penalty threatening the continued ex
istence of the state©s program. It was enough for a state to
conform substantially with the federal requirements.
However, the language of the law is in absolute terms. It
requires, as a condition for tax credit and administrative
grants, that the state law "shall provide," with no allowance
for deviation. Acceptance of the state argument would, in
addition, invite endless debate over the meaning of
"substantial" in individual cases, and it is for this reason
that DOL has consistently rejected the de minimus argu
ment. The South Dakota hearing was no exception.
The last issue concerned the fairness of the proceeding.
The states had argued that they were disadvantaged by a pro
cess under which only the Department of Labor challenges
and judges the conformity of the state law, and because the
hearing is held in Washington, before an administrative law
judge appointed by the Secretary of Labor, with the issue
finally determined by the same Secretary of Labor. The
Department did not answer these allegations at the hearing,
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but it did not object to a provision, included in the 1970
amendments (P.L. 91-373), establishing a state©s right to
judicial review of an adverse Secretary©s decision.

Administrative Issues
The first two issues in this category concerned violation of
an explicit federal provision (payment only through public
employment offices or such other agencies as the Board may
approve), and interpretation of the requirement that ad
ministrative grants may be used only for purposes found by
the Secretary to be necessary for proper and efficient ad
ministration. The third concerned interpretation of the
"methods of administration" requirement and the provision
restricting the use of money withdrawn from the fund to
unemployment compensation purposes. This case, suspend
ed indefinitely, demonstrated that there are limits to inter
pretation, even of the most ambiguous (methods of ad
ministration) federal requirements.

South Dakota (1939)
In early 1939, the state legislature adjourned without ap
propriating any funds to match (as was then required by the
Wagner-Peyser Act) federal grants for the employment ser
vices. The state proposed to pay UI benefits through the
state welfare offices instead of employment offices. Provi
sions of the FUTA and the Social Security Act require state
laws to provide payment of benefits only through public
employment offices or such other agencies as the Social
Security Board (now Secretary of Labor) may approve. 1 The
Board had not approved welfare offices for this purpose and
therefore federal UI administrative grants were withheld.
Subsequently, the state provided the necessary money and
public employment offices were reopened in September
when grants were resumed. By the time of year-end certifica-
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tion for the federal tax credit, the state program was in con
formity.

Arizona (1941)
In January 1941, the Arizona Unemployment Compensa
tion Commission abolished the position of Executive Direc
tor, which was included in the state©s merit system, and
discharged its incumbent. On June 2, 1941, the state
Supreme Court held that the incumbent had been illegally
released by the Commission and ordered him reinstated with
back pay. He was reinstated June 5, 1941 and held his posi
tion until June 15, 1941, when an amendment to the state UI
law designating the Director of the state Employment Service
as Executive Director of the entire agency became effective,
thus legally removing the previous director.
The issue was whether administrative grants could be used
to pay the salary of the former Executive Director during the
period he rendered no service to the agency. 2 The Social
Security Board concluded that the Commission had not
acted in good faith and, therefore, the salary payments could
not be considered necessary for proper and efficient ad
ministration.

New Hampshire (1964)
The issue in this case concerned a state practice in which,
on request by the attorney who represented a claimant in a
successful court appeal on the claimant©s right to benefits,
the agency sent the claimant©s benefit checks to the attorney.
The agency considered this tantamount to delivery to the
claimant. The question was whether the state law, as so inter
preted by the agency, violated provisions of the FUTA and
Social Security Act3 which require that all money withdrawn
from the state©s unemployment fund may be used only for
payment of unemployment compensation. Another question
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was whether the practice violated the Social Security Act re
quirement4 that the state law provide methods of administra
tion reasonably calculated to ensure full payment of benefits
when due.
At a conformity hearing held by DOL in May 1964, six
other states appeared or filed briefs indicating that they too
mailed checks to persons other than the beneficiary under
certain circumstances. In July 1964, the Secretary of Labor
dismissed the proceedings and directed the Department©s
Bureau of Employment Security to review various state prac
tices and recommend an appropriate standard. No standard
was ever issued because of the failure of the Bureau and the
Office of the Solicitor to agree on its content, and the prac
tice continues.

Coverage Issues
State law coverage of certain employing units was made a
matter of conformity for the first time in 1970 by the
employment security amendments enacted that year (P.L.
91-373). All coverage prior to that time, and some coverage
since, was effected by making specified services subject to
the federal tax. States invariably extended coverage to the
same services in order to permit the newly covered employers
to enjoy the credit against the federal tax, to ensure that the
bulk of the employers© unemployment insurance taxes would
be paid to the state, and to extend the protection of the pro
gram to those performing the newly covered services. A state
that did not provide coverage at least as extensive as under
the federal law would forfeit these advantages with respect to
the specific employers and workers, but such failure would
not present an issue of conformity with federal law. The
1970 amendments, however, required, as a condition for tax
credit for all a state©s employers, that state law cover certain
nonprofit organizations and state hospitals and institutions
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of higher education. This approach was taken because these
employers were not subject to the federal UI tax and
therefore were not affected by loss of tax offset for failure to
cover them. Required coverage was similarly extended by the
1976 amendments to most services performed by employees
for state and local governments. All the coverage issues to
date arise under either the 1970 or 1976 amendments.

New York (1974)
The 1970 amendments added a provision in the FUTA5 to
require state coverage of employment by nonprofit organiza
tions and state hospitals and institutions of higher education.
The FUTA was also amended to prohibit the Secretary of
Labor from certifying any state he finds,
. . . after reasonable notice and opportunity for
hearing . . . has failed to amend its law so that it
contains each of the provisions required by reason
of the enactment of the Employment Security
Amendments of 1970 to be included therein, or
has . . . failed to comply substantially with any
such provision. 6
The State of New York, in amending its law to effect the
necessary coverage, deliberately retained the following exclu
sions from the definition of "employment":
(1) golf caddies;
(2) students in elementary or secondary schools who
work part-time during the school year or regular
vacation periods;
(3) minors engaged in casual labor consisting of yard
work and household chores not involving the use of
power driven machinery;
(4) all employment performed by persons under 14 years
of age.
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However, there were no comparable exclusions in the federal
law definition of "employment" contained in the FUTA. 7
Nor were the services among those specified in the FUTA
that a state was permitted to exclude from the otherwise re
quired coverage. 8 The New York law was challenged and a
hearing was held on August 7, 1974. The Administrative
Law Judge issued a Recommended Decision on November
11, 1974, and the Secretary of Labor issued his decision on
June 6, 1975 holding the law out of conformity.
New York offered two arguments. First, it pointed out
that the exclusions from the state©s definition of "employ
ment" apply equally to profit, nonprofit, and state institu
tions. It then argued that the 1970 provision added to the
FUTA required only that coverage for service performed for
nonprofit organizations, state hospitals and state institutions
of higher education be co-extensive with the coverage the
state requires for service performed for all other employers.
This conclusion was based on the following "equal treat
ment" requirement of the FUTA provision that state laws
provide that:
. . . compensation is payable on the basis of service
to which Section 3309(a)(l) applies [nonprofits and
State hospitals and institutions of high education]
in the same amount, on the same terms, and subject
to the same conditions as compensation payable on
the basis of other service subject to such law. . . . 9
Since profit making enterprises, the state©s institutions, and
nonprofit organizations were all subject to the New York ex
clusions, the state argued that such even-handedness
satisfied the "equal treatment" requirement and, according
ly, the coverage requirement. In other words, New York in
terpreted the federal law as permitting certain services per
formed for nonprofits and state institutions to be exempt
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from coverage, if the same services are also excluded when
performed for profit making employers.
The argument was rejected on the grounds that the "equal
treatment" requirement merely describes the manner in
which benefits are to be administratively dispensed. Accord
ing to the Secretary©s decision,
It does not follow that a provision which deals with
terms and conditions of compensation can be cited
as justification for eliminating categories of
coverage. . . . 10
On the contrary,
The whole thrust of Congressional intent was the
extension of coverage, and the limitation of excep
tions to the new coverage. . . . The only exceptions
to coverage which may properly be applied, and the
only persons (or categories of persons) who may
properly be excluded from coverage, are those
which are set forth in the Federal statute. To allow
otherwise is to fly in the face of the 1970 Amend
ments. Congress can hardly be deemed to have
engaged in a self-defeating exercise by, on the one
hand, providing for the extension of coverage, and,
on the other hand, allowing the States to carve out
exceptions to the new coverage as the States see
fit. 11
New York©s second argument concerned the nature of the
exclusions in question. The state argued that since few or
none of the excluded individuals work for nonprofit
organizations or state hospitals or institutions of higher
education, the whole affair was de minimus. Substantial
compliance of its legislation with the 1970 Amendments was
really all that is required. Minor deviations should be per
missible. This argument also was rejected:
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Statutorily, there is no provision allowing mere
©substantial compliance© of the State law with
PUTA requirements placed upon the law, itself.
Substantive compliance is relevant only to the
operation of the State under its law. Nor is
©substantial compliance© in the operation of its law
some sort of substitute for conformity of the State
law with the Federal statutory mandate. If the State
law has not been amended to contain each of the
provisions required by reason of the 1970 Amend
ments, it cannot, by terms of 26 U.S.C. 3304(c), be
certified by the Secretary. 12
The issue was important, particularly in light of the later
substantive extensions of required coverage under the 1976
Amendments. If New York had prevailed on the basis of its
first argument, there would have been doubt as to the extent
of DOL©s authority to require coverage of any category of
state, local or nonprofit occupation, if the state excluded
corresponding occupations in the private-for-profit sector. If
the de minimus argument had prevailed, DOL would have
faced the difficult task of establishing reliable criteria for
determining when a violation was too minor to pursue.

Pennsylvania (1979)
A conformity hearing was held with Pennsylvania August
21, 1979 on three separate issues. One is discussed below as
an experience rating issue. The remaining two issues involved
provisions of the 1976 Amendments extending coverage to
school employees. Under these amendments, the federal law
prohibits states from paying benefits, based on services per
formed in an instructional, research or principal ad
ministrative capacity for an educational institution during
the period between school terms if the individual performed
such services during the first term and had a reasonable
assurance of performing similar services during the sue-
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ceeding term. 13 States had the option of applying the same
between-terms denial provisions to nonprofessional primary
and secondary school employees. Aside from this exception,
federal law required states to provide governmental and non
profit employees the same treatment as applied to other
covered workers.
Pennsylvania had adopted the option of applying the
between-terms denial provisions to nonprofessional
employees, but it included a unique provision. An in
dividual, denied benefits during the summer school break
because of a reasonable assurance of reemployment the
following term, could collect benefits for the summer period
retroactively,
... if upon presenting himself for work at the end
of such period between academic years or terms,
the individual is not permitted to resume work of
the same capacity, or resumes it for less than twen
ty working days. . . , 14
Pennsylvania argued that its law could be denied certifica
tion only if it plainly conflicts with the FUTA. Also, it ques
tioned DOL©s authority to impose on a state its interpreta
tion of the FUTA as a matter of conformity. The Secretary
of Labor rejected both contentions and ruled on October 31,
1979 in support of the Administrative Law Judge©s conclu
sion that the retroactive provision conflicted with the FUTA.
The basis for that conclusion was that federal law prohibited
payment between terms to an individual who had bona fide
reasonable assurance of returning to work, regardless of
whether the job actually materialized. The provision also
violated the "equal treatment" requirement since no other
category of workers was offered the opportunity for retroac
tive benefits. Finally, the Department pointed out that in
enacting the 1976 Amendments providing for the coverage of
primary and secondary school employees and the benefit
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restrictions, Congress rejected an amendment providing a
retroactive benefit provision similar to Pennsylvania©s.
The second issue also involved the between-terms denial
provisions, which apply to persons performing specified ser
vices "for an educational institution" or persons performing
such services, "in an educational institution while in the
employ of an educational service agency." Educational ser
vice agencies are defined as "a governmental agency or
governmental entity which is established and operated ex
clusively for the purpose of providing such services to one or
more educational institutions. . . , 15 Pennsylvania inter
preted its law to apply the between-terms denial to school
crossing guards and others who are not employed directly by
either an educational institution or an educational service
agency, but who perform services for schools and whose
employment is tied to the academic calendar. The Depart
ment argued that the phrase "for an educational institution"
was intended to mean only individuals actually employed by
a school, or an educational service agency, not school cross
ing guards if employed by the police department or other
agency. It pointed out that the Congress evidently shared
that view because, prior to the specific amendment, 16 not
even employees of educational service agencies were con
sidered within the scope of the between-terms denial. If the
phrase "for an educational institution" had been intended to
apply to individuals other than actual school employees, the
later amendment would not have been necessary. The
between-terms denial was intended to be a limited exception
to the equal treatment requirement. The Department argued
that in extending the denial to nonemployees of schools (or
educational service agencies), Pennsylvania violated the
equal treatment requirement.
Pennsylvania argued that the between-terms denial provi
sion as it applies to nonemployees of schools should be
disregarded, since under another section of the Pennsylvania
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law municipal employees such as school crossing guards are
denied benefits anyway, as not available for suitable work.
The Administrative Law Judge rejected this argument and
held that what the state©s availability requirement provides
was irrelevant and that the Pennsylvania between-terms pro
vision, as interpreted by the agency, was inconsistent with
federal law. The Secretary adopted this position.

New Hampshire (1980)
In 1978, the New Hampshire legislature passed legislation
intended to meet the coverage and the requirements of P.L.
94-566, the 1976 amendment. The bill was vetoed by Gover
nor Meldrim Thomson. The Governor and the state agency
argued that the federal law requirements represented an im
proper intrusion upon the state©s sovereignty and were thus
unconstitutional:
Is there not to be some time, some place, some one
who will say that the sovereign rights reserved to
this state by our Founding Fathers are an integral
part of our constitutional fabric and cannot be rip
ped asunder by a power-crazed Federal Govern
ment. 17
On October 30, 1978, after a conformity hearing, the
Secretary of Labor found that the New Hampshire law failed
to conform to FUTA requirements for certification. The ac
tual withdrawal of certification was held in abeyance pend
ing outcome of the state©s appeal to the courts. Of the
following six issues, the most important involves the state©s
failure to extend coverage to the extent required by the
FUTA as a condition for certification.
(1) The state law excluded service performed for political
subdivisions from coverage as well as service performed
for the state by individuals not on the state classified ser-
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vice and not employees of state hospitals and institutions
of higher education.
(2) The state also excluded employees of nonprofit
elementary and secondary schools.
(3) No provision was included permitting governmental
entities to elect either the tax or reimbursement method of
financing benefit costs.
(4) The state©s language concerning the denial of benefits
to uncertified aliens differed considerably from the FUTA
requirement.
(5) Similarly, the state©s language concerning denial of
benefits during the off-season to professional athletes also
differed from the corresponding FUTA requirement.
(6) The state©s between-terms denial provisions applied to
nonprofessional employees of colleges and universities, in
consistently with the FUTA.
At the conformity hearing held in September 1978, the
New Hampshire agency contended that the federal statute is
not phrased in absolute terms and that substantive com
pliance with federal law is sufficient to avoid withholding of
certification. The agency argued also that because of New
Hampshire©s unique base period and benefit year, 18 no
benefits based on 1978 wages would be payable before April
1, 1979, so the hearing was premature. The Secretary re
jected both contentions on the grounds that the FUTA pro
hibits certification under either of two conditions: either the
state law fails to contain certain required provisions, or the
state has failed to comply substantially with any such provi
sion during the 12-month period. 19 The first condition re
quires strict conformity between the state law and the
FUTA. Substantive compliance assumes the existence of
conforming state law provisions and is aimed at their ad
ministration. All the issues involved the conformity of the
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state law, not the manner of its administration. Accordingly,
the concept of substantial compliance was not at issue, and
the fact that no New Hampshire claimant may yet have been
deprived of benefits was immaterial. The state also raised
constitutional issues concerning the FUTA requirement for
state coverage of services performed for the state and its
political subdivisions. Neither the Administrative Law Judge
nor the Secretary ruled on the constitutionality of the federal
statute.
The Secretary©s 1978 decision was appealed by New
Hampshire to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, which stayed the Secretary©s decision pending
outcome of the appeal.
While the 1978 case was pending before the Court of Ap
peals, newly elected Governor Hugh Gallen who took office
in January 1979 requested later that year that the Court
postpone issuing a decision pending a possible settlement of
the case. The Court agreed. Efforts were made to develop a
compromise under which the state would by statute, regula
tions, and Attorney General opinion, effect conformity with
the federal requirements, both prospectively and retrospec
tively. However, the Commissioner of the State Department
of Employment Security (DES), which had autonomous
status independent of the Governor, and his counsel refused
either to sign a consent decree to which the Departments of
Labor and Justice and the State Attorney General had
agreed or to take the administrative actions DOL believed
necessary to correct the damage done by the failure of the
state to conform. On February 20, 1980, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit decided in favor of DOL on all
issues/20
The state filed a further appeal in May 1980 to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Court, treating the appeal as a petition
for certiorari, denied further review on October 6, 1980. On
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October 28, 1980, Secretary Marshall advised Governor
Gallen that,
I believe at this point that there is no alternative
under the law other than to withhold the certifica
tions which would result in the loss by New Hamp
shire employers of the credits taken tentatively by
them for taxable year 1978 under Section 3302 of
the Code, and to recoup the administrative grants
provided for that year. If you have any information
that may be pertinent to the decision I feel I must
make, please let me know as soon as possible.
A response dated the following day from Governor Gallen
requested that the Secretary meet with the Governor and the
State Attorney General before actually decertifying the state
and sending notification of that action to the Treasury
Department. The Governor pointed out that although his ad
ministration, the Attorney General, the state legislature and
the business community believed the state should have con
formed to the federal law, this was prevented by Governor
Thomson©s 1978 veto and the DBS Commissioner©s steadfast
refusal to settle the lawsuit. The Governor explained that
since the U.S. Supreme Court decision, he had issued an
Executive Order transferring all of the agency©s attorneys to
the Office of the Attorney General and that he believed that
he now had adequate authority to bring the state into confor
mity.
On December 18, 1980, Governor Gallen wrote to the
Secretary advising him of his understanding, from the
Justice Department©s Tax Division and from a Congres
sional Research Service legal memorandum, that the
Secretary has authority under the law to certify New Hamp
shire retroactively for 1978 and to decline to impose any
sanctions. The Governor argued that the disastrous conse
quences to the New Hampshire community of imposing the
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sanctions far outweighed the effect they would have of deter
ring other states from availing themselves of judicial review.
The sanctions themselves are not graded in any way
to take into account the intent or the actions of the
State that suffers them. Beyond that, as you know,
they are imposed on members of the private
business community who are not parties to con
troversies such as this, whose decisions could not
have affected the outcome, and who are innocent
of any wrongdoing. In this case we have lost at
every stage of the administrative and judicial pro
ceedings, we have taken steps to conform our law
in every material respect for 1978, and have stood
willing for weeks now to do anything else which
may be required to meet both in law and in fact
your standard of conformity. I do not see how our
experience could conceivably encourage any other
jurisdiction to take the same course. Under these
circumstances your interest in deterrence has been
more than adequately served.
On January 19, 1981, Secretary Marshall advised Governor
Gallen of his decision to certify the State of New Hampshire
for the 12-month period ending October 31, 1978, condition
ed upon the state©s compliance with an agreement signed the
same day by both parties. First, the state (whose law was cer
tified for 1980 after including necessary rules, regulations
and Attorney General©s opinions) was to apply the conform
ing provisions retroactively to January 1, 1978, to ac
complish substantial compliance with respect to the six issues
in question. The state was required also to make certain
reports concerning its compliance action. In addition, the
state was to repay in six installments to the Department of
Labor $3.3 million representing the grant to the state for ad
ministration of its unemployment insurance program in
1978. If, however, the Secretary determined that the state
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had taken all required action on or before October 31, 1981,
he would reduce the amount due to $500,000 payable on or
before December 31, 1981. It is not clear how this figure was
determined. It may represent one of the six installments.
When the amount due DOL had been paid, the state©s cer
tification would become final. If the state legislature failed
to appropriate the money for the payment due, the certifica
tion for 1979 would be withheld.
There were also conformity issues raised formally with
respect to the state©s 1979 law. New Hampshire amended its
unemployment compensation law in June 1979 to meet the
federal requirements of the 1976 amendments. It did so
reluctantly: "Wherefor, the legislature having no alternative
but to accede to this federal intrusion of its State sovereign
ty, acting under duress and for no other reason enacts this
Chapter." 21 However, DOL advised the state that the
amendments did not resolve all the issues and initiated a new
conformity proceeding to determine certification of the state
for the 12 months ending October 31, 1979. A hearing was
held on September 6 and 7, 1979. On October 15, 1979, the
Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended decision
finding the state law not in conformity or substantial com
pliance with respect to seven issues. These were not
significantly different from the 1978 issues. This decision
was adopted by Secretary Marshall October 31, 1979.
This 1979 decision, which the state had appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit but which was
held in abeyance pending possible settlement by the parties,
was settled in early January 1981, by a consent judgment,
subject to approval by the Court. That settlement included
retroactive application of the conforming provisions to
January 1, 1978, as described above. The state was directed
to redetermine the claims of all individuals denied benefits
under nonconforming law, including not only claimants
determined ineligible under prior law but also all individuals
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who would have been eligible except for such law. The Court
entered the consent judgment January 26, 1981. On April 6,
1981, Secretary of Labor Donovan certified the State of New
Hampshire for the 12-month period ending October 31,
1979.
The importance of the New Hampshire case lies more in its
implications for the conformity and judicial review processes
than in the nature of the specific issues. These conformity
and judicial review issues are discussed below in connection
with the County of Los Angeles case. The questions the New
Hampshire case raise include whether a stay of a Secretary©s
decision pending judicial review is equitable to those affected
adversely by the state provision in question; whether fear of
the consequences of a negative decision by the Courts (and
consequent imposition of sanctions) will deter states from
seeking judicial review; whether the sanction imposed on
New Hampsire ($500,000 instead of the possible $35445
million loss the state would have incurred if the tax credit
and administrative grants for 1978 had been denied) will en
courage more states to try the conformity route rather than
attempt settlement through negotiation; whether the
availability of a "lesser sanction" will incline DOL to move
toward hearings more quickly and on more issues than
before instead of pressing for settlement through negotia
tion. It does not seem appropriate to speculate here on these
issues, but it is pertinent to point out that the New Hamp
shire case could change significantly the way conformity
issues are handled and, consequently, the climate of future
federal-state relations.

Constitutionality Challenge: The County
of Los Angeles Case (1980)
After the 1976 federal employment security amendments
were enacted, but before state implementation was required,
the Executive Committee of the National Institute of
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Municipal Law Officers (NIMLO) sent a memorandum
(March 22, 1977) to its member attorneys, in which it pro
posed a lawsuit attacking the constitutionality of the new
coverage requirements that applied to employment by state
and local governments. The Executive Committee of
NIMLO described the impact of the resulting unemployment
insurance costs that the new required coverage would have
on state and local governments, contending that the ensuing
financial drain would necessitate the reduction of public ser
vices, additional taxes and, most ironically, the separation of
workers. The Executive Committee explained that the pro
posed action would not be brought in NIMLO©s name but
rather would be a multiparty suit, naming as plaintiffs
"those state and local governments which decide to par
ticipate in and finance the costs of this litigation." The suit
would seek relief only for plaintiffs named in the complaint
and "only those state and local governments willing to help
bear the costs of this litigation will be named as Plaintiffs."
Hope for success was based largely on the June 24, 1976
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in National League of
Cities, et al. v. Usery, Secretary of Labor. 22 This case involv
ed a 1974 amendment extending application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act©s minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions to almost all employees of states and their
political subdivisions. According to Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a 5-4 majority, both the minimum wage and the
maximum hour provisions "will impermissibly interfere with
the integral governmental functions of these bodies." The
basis for this opinion was the anticipated massive impact of
the requirements on the states, in terms of increased costs
and reduced control over the conditions of employment of
their workers. Estimates by a number of states and cities
convinced the Court that "Judged solely in terms of increas
ed costs in dollars, these allegations show a significant im
pact on the functioning of the governmental bodies
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involved." The same legal firm that successfully represented
local governments in National League of Cities was hired for
the County of Los Angeles suit.
Optimism also rested on a legal opinion obtained from a
Wisconsin law firm, as requested by the National Associa
tion of Counties. The opinion concluded that the state and
local government UI coverage requirement constituted an
"unconstitutional condition imposed upon the several States
by Congress." The states have no realistic choice in enacting
required legislation; no federal funds are provided so state
and local taxes must be raised; the interest of the states with
respect to the necessary funding needed to comply, together
with the resulting disruption of traditional state and local
employment practices, transcends the national interest
presented. According to the opinion, any court battle over
constitutionality would be won or lost on the basis of suffi
cient statistics showing (1) the impact of the cost of coverage
(allegedly $500 million annually) to the states and local units
of government, and (2) the measures necessary to meet the
costs, which would result in "a marked disruption" in the
employment practices of local government.
The time appears to be appropriate to test to what
degree Congress may wield its spending power to
impinge upon the operation of State and local
government. Based upon the balancing test applied
by the Court in the National League of Cities case,
we are inclined to believe that the scales would be
tipped by the present Supreme Court in the direc
tion of protecting the employment interests of State
and local government. 23
In August 1977, members of the International Personnel
Management Association received a letter from the law firm
retained by NIMLO requesting data showing the impact of
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the coverage requirements. According to the law firm, the
case could be won
. . . only upon a compelling presentation of the
facts demonstrating the grossly burdensome and
disruptive impact of the 1976 FUTA Amendments
upon each Plaintiff Government. 24
During 1977 most states enacted legislation designed to con
form with the 1976 Amendments. Almost half the states in
cluded "self-destruct5 © provisions nullifying the extensions
of coverage to states and local government workers if, in
some states, the requirement was stayed by a U.S. Court or,
in others, was declared constitutionally invalid in a final ad
judication.
By the time the suit was heard (December 1977), the plain
tiffs included the States of Alaska, South Carolina,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and
Utah, and 1,750 localities in 44 states. The plaintiffs, iden
tified as the County of Los Angeles, et al., first moved for a
preliminary injunction in 1977 before the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The purpose
alleged by the plaintiffs was to delay implementation of the
coverage requirements so as to prevent the need for some
states and localities (with constitutional or statutory limits
on new debts and taxes) to curtail government services or fire
employees in order to raise money for unemployment in
surance costs.
District Judge Charles R. Richey denied the motion for in
junction in an opinion issued December 29, 1977. He advised
first that the Anti-Injunction Act appeared to bar the suit:
No suit for the purpose of restraining the assess
ment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in
any court by any person, whether or not such per-
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son is the person against whom such tax was assess
ed. 25
According to Judge Richey, since the refusal of a state to
enact the conforming legislation would result in denial of a
credit to private employers against their federal tax, the
plaintiffs© suit to prevent this denial "is in essence a suit to
restrain the assessment of a tax." Although having found it
unlikely that the Court even has jurisdiction, Judge Richey
went on to discuss the four factors a Court must consider in
deciding whether to issue any injunction:
. . . has the plaintiff made a strong showing that it
is likely to prevail on the merits; would the denial
of the injunction cause irreparable injury to the
plaintiff; would the granting of the injunction
cause irreparable injury to the other parties; and
where does the public interest lie. 26
With regard to the first factor, the Court found it unlikely
that the plaintiffs would prevail on the merits. Noting that
the plaintiffs placed chief reliance on the 1977 National
League of Cities case decision, Judge Richey pointed out
that the regulations there concerning wage and hour stan
dards were mandatory. The only discretion left to the states
in that instance was how to raise the additional revenue.
Citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 27 the Court stated that
the imposition of an unemployment insurance scheme is at
the option of the state. By allowing the states a choice, it is
actually supportive of the Tenth Amendment. Referring to
the plaintiffs© contention that Steward was distinguishable
because the Supreme Court there stated that the states did
not complain of coercion, the Judge pointed out that the fact
that a state chooses to voice objection rather than remain
silent while a private employer voices objection, as in
Steward, should not be determinative of the outcome. The
same signs of coercion that were alleged in Steward exist
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here. At the time that case was decided, 35 of the 43 states
that had enacted conforming legislation included the same
kind of self-destruct clauses that several states had recently
enacted. "This was not enough to prove coercion in Steward
and it is not enough now."
Concerning the second factor cited by Richey, the Court
found also that the plaintiffs could avoid any alleged ir
reparable injury by not enacting the conforming legislation.
Even if the sanctions were imposed, the state would not have
to fire anyone or curtail any services. The states face no im
minent injury. Judicial review of a Secretary©s decision is
available.
As for the last two factors cited, the Court held that the is
suance of an injunction would, however, deny benefits to
public employees and would thereby "cause a substantial ir
reparable injury to the defendants© interest and the public in
terest."
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit was issued March 19, 1980, almost a
year after the appeal had been argued before the Court. The
Court ruled that it had awaited the February 20, 1980 deci
sion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the
New Hampshire case, since the same constitutional challenge
had been made by that state©s Department of Employment
Security: "in the interest of inter-circuit comity and the con
comitant husbanding of scarce judicial resources. ..."
In addition to sustaining the Secretary©s decertifica
tion of New Hampshire as not conforming in cer
tain respects with FUTA, the First Circuit address
ed the Tenth Amendment contention and conclud
ed that it was unavailing. We agree with the con
stitutional determination so made by the First Cir
cuit, and adopt its reasoning as fully applicable to
the consolidated appeals before us. 28
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The Court briefly reiterated the mandatory versus voluntary
distinctions drawn between the National League of Cities
and the Steward Machine Co. cases. The District Court©s
dismissal of the case was affirmed. On October 6, 1980, the
U.S. Supreme Court let stand the lower Court©s decision.
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in the New Hampshire case was thus controlling also
in the County of Los Angeles case. For this reason it is useful
to review the New Hampshire case. The First Circuit Court
ruled on both conformity and constitutional issues. In each
of the six issues, the Court found the state law contrary to
the federal law requirements and the Secretary©s determina
tion of nonconformity correct. 29 The constitutional issue
boiled down to:
... do the 1976 amendments to FUTA violate the
sovereign integrity of the states and impair their
ability to function effectively under the federal
system as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.
The Court first distinguished the case from the National
League of Cities case in which the issue was whether man
dated application of the minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act constituted coer
cion of the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment.
The Act required all states to pay the majority of their
workers the minimum wage rates determined by Congress. It
provided for both civil and criminal penalties in the event of
a violation.
The unemployment insurance amendments, based on the
taxing power rather than the commerce clause, offered the
states a choice of conforming or not. The petitioners argued
that the option not to conform is illusory, since the severe
financial consequences that would follow negate any real
choice. According to the Court, however,
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We do not agree that the carrot has become a club
because rewards for conforming have increased. It
is not the size of the stakes that controls, but the
rules of the game.
In a footnote the Court noted that New Hampshire was the
only state that had opted not to conform, and that it
repeatedly stressed in its brief the burden on the state©s
employers if the Act is held constitutional. According to the
Court, "We observe that it is easy to gamble for high stakes
when the money on the table comes from someone else©s
pocket."
The Court noted that the basic design and mechanism of
the federal unemployment insurance laws have not changed
since 1935; coverage has been extended but the percentage of
tax credit remains essentially the same. Moreover, the con
cept that unemployment is a national program that must be
dealt with on a national basis has been woven into the fabric
of our society since 1935. Accordingly, the Court ruled that
the arguments of coercion that had prevailed in the National
League of Cities case were not applicable to the 1976 amend
ments.
The next issue concerned the degree, if any, to which the
amendments impaired New Hampshire©s sovereignty, due to
the cost of extending coverage to public employees. The
Court noted substantial differences between the estimates of
costs of the state©s expert ($1.1 million) and by DOL©s expert
($227,585 for fiscal 1978, $288,935 for fiscal 1979). In the
National League of Cities case the Supreme Court found
that application to states and their political subdivisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act would significantly alter or
displace the ability of those governments to structure
employer-employee relationships. The First Circuit Court
concluded that extending UI coverage to the employees of
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New Hampshire and its political subdivisions would not pro
duce the same result:
FUTA does not set the wage rates or affect hours
worked. All it does is insure unemployment
benefits for State employees. Its administration is
entirely within the control of the State.
The Court held that the 1976 amendments do not impair
New Hampshire©s sovereignty and have not been rendered
unconstitutional by reason of National League of Cities.

Alabama, Nevada (1981)
One of the most contentious issues arising from the 1976
amendments concerning coverage involved a question of
congressional intent. Nothing in the legislative history of
those amendments indicated whether, in extending coverage
to employees of nonprofit primary and secondary schools,
Congress intended also to cover church-related schools. The
intent was ambiguous because of the manner in which
coverage was affected. Prior to 1976, the FUTA included the
following services performed for nonprofit organizations
among those that states were permitted to exclude without
jeopardizing tax credit:
(1) in the employ of (A) a church or convention or
association of churches, or (B) an organization
which is operated primarily for religious purposes
and which is operated, supervised, controlled or
principally supported by a church or convention or
association of churches;
(2) by a duly ordained, commissioned or licensed
minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry
or by a member of a religious order in the exercise
of duties required by such order;
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(3) in the employ of a school which is not an in
stitution of higher education. 30
The 1976 amendments deleted paragraph (3). DOL took the
position that by deleting the school exclusion, Congress in
tended to extend coverage to all such schools, including
church-related primary and secondary schools. In following
DOL©s ruling, Alabama attempted to provide coverage of
such schools, but was enjoined by suits filed by Baptist and
Methodist churches and later enjoined permanently on
January 29, 1979, by a state circuit court in a suit filed by
Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church. 31 The state voluntarily
ceased its efforts to cover church-related schools.
The issue arose in Nevada because the state determined
that Roman Catholic elementary and secondary schools were
exempt under the state law in that services in those schools
were performed in the employ of a church or a churchcontrolled organization operated primarily for religious pur
poses. Alabama and Nevada were not alone. Conformity
proceedings were started by DOL against four additional
states Michigan, Tennessee, Texas and Washington.
Following contentions by the four states that they had not
had sufficient time to prepare for a hearing, the Secretary of
Labor offered all six states certification of their laws for tax
credit for 1979 and renewal of proceedings before certifica
tion was due for 1980. Alabama and Nevada alone decided
to pursue the issue without further delay.
Following a conformity hearing on the Alabama and
Nevada positions, held on September 26, 1979, the Ad
ministrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued his findings on October
11, 1979, recommending that the Secretary hold Alabama
and Nevada in compliance with the FUTA. The ALJ agreed
with the states that
. . . church schools, being an integral part of the
governing church and fundamentally religious in
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character, are exempt from coverage under the
plain language of Section 3309(b)(l)(A) and/or (B).
The ALJ found persuasive three lower court decisions32
which rejected the DOL position as "contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute, unsupported by the legislative history
and constitutionally impermissible." He disagreed with the
DOL interpretation of the language "in the employ of a
church" as meaning in the employ of a house of worship,
performing religious duties, and with the Department©s re
jection of the contention that church-schools were "operated
primarily for religious purposes," rather than educational
purposes.
In a decision issued October 31, 1979, Secretary of Labor
Marshall rejected the ALJ©s recommendation and found that
the Alabama and Nevada laws failed to conform with the
FUTA. The Secretary©s decision referred to the fact that
since the original enactment of the program, "Congress has
followed an unbroken path towards expansions of
unemployment insurance coverage." In extending coverage
to nonprofit organizations in 1970, Congress excluded
employees of primary and secondary schools, but clearly re
quired coverage of employees of nonprofit colleges and
universities, including church-related institutions of higher
education, except seminaries and novitiates. In enacting the
Special Unemployment Assistance Program (SUA) in 197433
Congress provided emergency benefit protection to
unemployed workers not otherwise covered under state UI
laws, including employees of church-related schools. The
1976 amendments were designed to "eliminate the tem
porary Special Unemployment Assistance Program" and ex
tend "permanent" coverage to "substantially all the
workers . . . covered by SUA. 34 According to the Secretary,
congressional intent was indicated in a Senate Report
estimating the number of employees who would be covered
by eliminating the primary and secondary school exclusion
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as 242,000. 35 The figure, supplied to Congress by DOL,
represented the total number of employees in all nonprofit
primary and secondary schools of which church-related
school employees represent more than half. Finally, the
Secretary©s decision argued that coverage of these schools
did not create excessive governmental entanglement with
religion and was within the limits of government regulation
provided by the Constitution.
Alabama and Nevada appealed the Secretary©s decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In
September 1980, the Court reversed the Secretary©s deter
mination that the two states© laws conflicted with the FUTA.
The Court supported the states© argument that churchrelated schools are within the statute©s meaning of
"church":
. . . many of the church schools have no separate
legal existence from their church; the school
employees are hired, controlled, disciplined, and
fired by church representatives and officials; school
buildings are owned by the church; and school
employees are paid with funds drawn from the
church accounts. 36
According to the Court, the exemption is contingent upon
whether the workers are employed by a "church," not the
kind of work they perform. The plain meaning of "church"
includes something greater than the physical building of wor
ship and encompasses the legal entity commonly referred to
as a church. The Secretary©s definition is too narrow. If Con
gress wishes to amend the law clearly to change the exemp
tion of church-related school employees, it can do so.
But, it is not the responsibility or function of the
court to perform linguistic gymnastics in order to
upset the plain language of Congress as it exists to
day. 37
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This decision represented the end of the road for the
Alabama and Nevada cases since appeal by DOL to the U.S.
Supreme Court was held in abeyance (and ultimately never
pursued) because of a case pending before that Court involv
ing the same issue: South Dakota©s coverage of churchrelated schools. This case had reached the U.S. Supreme
Court on the constitutional grounds that such coverage
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. When South
Dakota, following DOL lead, prepared to tax church-related
schools, two of them appealed. The two schools were not
separate legal entities. They were part of the churches that
ran them. An appeals referee found them subject to tax. The
decision was reversed by a County Circuit Court. The South
Dakota Supreme Court, by a divided vote, in turn reversed
the judgment of the Circuit Court. The case then went to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
On May 26, 1981, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled,
From our reading of the legislation and of its
history, we conclude that the only reasonable con
struction of 26 U.S.C. section 3309(b)(l) is one that
exempts petitioners© church-run schools, and
others similarly operated, from mandatory state
coverage. 38
The Court argued that Congress drew a distinction be
tween employees "of a church or convention or association
of churches" on the one hand and employees of "separately
incorporated" organizations on the other. The former would
be excluded from coverage under the explicit exclusion of
employment for a church, while the latter would be eligible
for exclusion under the exclusion relating to employment for
an organization operated primarily for religious purposes,
but only when the organization is "operated, supervised,
controlled, or principally supported by a church or conven
tion or association of churches." The Court found that the
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individuals performing services for the schools in question
were employees of the church and, therefore, exempt. It ex
pressly rejected the DOL interpretation of the term
"church" as meaning only the actual house of worship used
by a congregation. The Court held instead that "church"
refers to the church authorities who conduct the hiring,
discharging and directing of church employees.
In a footnote, the Court observed:
Our holding today concerns only schools that have
no legal identity separate from a church. To
establish exemption from FUTA, a separately in
corporated church school (or other organization)
must satisfy the requirements of section
3309(b)(l)(B): (1) that the organization "is
operated primarily for religious purposes" and
(2) that it is "operated, supervised, controlled, or
principally supported by a church or convention or
association of churches."
Because we hold petitioners exempt under section
3309(b)(l)(A), we leave the issue of coverage under
section 3309(b)(l)(B) for the future. 39
Although the Court left open the question of coverage of
schools with a legal identity separate from a church, no
issues have been presented. This is because unofficial DOL
policy has permitted exemption of schools that are "af
filiated" with a church, regardless of their separate legal
identity. It is not clear what is meant by "affiliated," but in
any event, DOL has followed the practice of not objecting to
coverage exemptions if the school can demonstrate any af
filiation at all with a church, however tenuous or vague the
connection.
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Experience Rating and Benefit Charging Issues
Before the 1970 Amendments, experience rating issues,
often involving questions of how benefits are charged or not
charged to employers, constituted the main source of confor
mity conflicts. The requirement in FUTA for additional tax
credit40 is so broad and ambiguous as to require many inter
pretations, and these were regularly challenged:
(1) No reduced rate of contributions . . . is permit
ted to a person . . . except on the basis of
his ... experience with respect to unemployment
or other factors bearing a direct relation to
unemployment risk. 41
The following conformity cases illustrate the various kinds
of questions raised under this provision.

Minnesota (1947)
In 1947 Minnesota amended its law to permit employers to
make voluntary contributions, in excess of what their tax
rates required, for the purpose of building up their reserve
accounts and thereby qualifying for tax rate brackets lower
than the rates warranted by their actual experience. The con
tributions could be made subsequent to the close of a rate
year, but still affect the rates for that year. The amendment
was challenged as running counter to the federal standard on
experience rating.
After a conformity hearing on June 10, 1947, the Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Board held that under
the federal requirement, any voluntary contributions must
be paid no later than the due date for the first quarter con
tributions in the rate year. This is usually April 30, approx
imately the 120th day of the new year. Accordingly, the Min
nesota provision was ruled out of conformity with the
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FUTA. A month later an amendment to the federal law was
enacted providing that,
A State law may, without being deemed to violate
the standards set forth in subsection (a), permit
voluntary contributions to be used in the computa
tion of reduced rates if such contributions are paid
prior to the expiration of 120 days after the begin
ning of the year for which such rates are effective. 42

Alabama (1953)
A bill passed by the Alabama legislature in 1953 provided
relief from charges for benefits paid their workers who
became unemployed because a natural disaster destroyed the
employer©s business. The Department of Labor took the
position that under the bill employers© reduced rates would
be determined by a factor a natural disaster other than
their unemployment experience (as measured by benefit
charges) and would thus be inconsistent with the federal re
quirement.
The Administrator of the state agency secured an amend
ment to the bill providing that the noncharging would not
become effective if the Federal Bureau of Employment
Security or the Secretary of Labor decided that the bill was
not in conformity with federal requirements. The Secretary
so decided and the Administrator declared that the bill was
not part of the state©s unemployment insurance law. The
DOL interpretation was changed in 1972 after Pennsylvania
and a number of other states sought relief for employers
whose businesses were damaged by a severe flood. Under the
new interpretation, noncharging is permitted, but only in
jurisdictions declared disaster areas by the President pur
suant to the Disaster Relief Act. 43
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Michigan (1957)
In 1957 Michigan amended its law covering the cancella
tion of negative balances. Under the reserve ratio system of
experience rating, when all past charges against an
employer©s account exceed all past contributions credited to
the account, his account is considered to have a negative
balance. He is usually assigned the highest rates under the
state law, which continue until the account balance becomes
positive. The accounts of employers who have had only a
single year of very heavy unemployment may take a long
time to recover. For this reason, many states permit
" negative balance employers" the option of having their
record wiped clean. If this is permitted, however, the federal
experience rating standard (for additional tax credit) was in
terpreted to require that the employer whose negative
balance was cancelled be considered in the position of a new
employer. Accordingly, after cancellation, he should serve at
least three years before he could qualify for a "reduced
rate," a rate below the standard rate of 2.7 percent.
Although the federal law was changed in 1954 to permit
states to assign new employers reduced rates on the basis of
as little as one year©s experience, the experience rating re
quirement was interpreted as requiring three years after
cancellation before former negative balance employers could
qualify for a rate below 2.7 percent.
The state©s Attorney General, in Opinion No. 3109, inter
preted the Michigan amendment to mean that employers
whose balances were cancelled in 1955, 1956 and 1957 were
not required after rate year 1958 to pay the standard 2.7 per
cent rate or more. In other words, an employer whose
negative balance had been cancelled would be permitted a
reduced rate before he had three years of experience follow
ing the cancellation. This interpretation conflicted with the
existing federal policy on the matter and the law was
challenged.
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The conformity hearing was held October 22, 1957, and
was adjourned October 26, 1957 at the request of the state
agency. The Michigan law was amended to require a con
tribution rate of at least 2.7 percent for three years after the
last cancellation of negative balances. On October 31, 1957,
the Secretary of Labor signed an order dismissing the pro
ceedings.

Oregon (1976)
In 1973 Oregon amended its law to allow a small group of
food processors (those who ship 75 percent or more of their
annual production in interstate or foreign commerce) to be
relieved of some or all charges for benefits paid their
workers. The proportion noncharged, determined by a
special formula, varied from 10 to 100 percent. All other
Oregon employers continued to be charged in accordance
with the state©s experience rating formula under which
benefits paid a worker were charged to his base-period
employers in the same proportion to total benefits as the
wages paid the worker by the employer were to the worker©s
total base-period wages. The new noncharging provision
took effect on July 1, 1974, and first affected the contribu
tion rates of Oregon employers for the tax year beginning
January 1, 1976.
Following enactment of the provision, the Oregon agency
requested a finding of conformity by the Secretary of Labor.
By letter, dated June 6,1974, the Secretary advised the agen
cy of his finding that the noncharging provision was incon
sistent with the requirements of the experience rating stan
dard in the FUTA. At the agency©s request, a hearing was
held on June 24, 1976 in Washington.
In a decision issued October 26, 1976, Secretary Usery
pointed out that
The test for acceptability of noncharging provi
sions consistently used by the Department to assure
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that all employers are charged by the same rule over
the same period of time, is one of reasonableness in
the measurement of each employer©s experience in
relation to other employers and to the purposes of
experience rating.
He concluded that the Oregon law, in singling out food pro
cessors for special treatment, violated "this aforementioned
principle of reasonableness." Accordingly, the state law was
not in conformity with the federal law.
The main objection to the Oregon provision was basically
that employers in a specified group with unfavorable ex
perience could qualify for lower tax rates than employers
outside the group with better experience, at least as measured
by the factor of benefit charges. That result was the reverse
of what was intended by the requirement.

Delaware, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania (1979)
FUTA requires states to offer nonprofit organizations and
state and local governments the option of financing benefit
costs either by paying contributions, as other employers, or
permit them to
. . . elect, for such minimum period and at such
time as may be provided by State law, to pay (in
lieu of such contributions) into the State unemploy
ment fund amounts equal to the amounts of com
pensation attributable under the State law to such
service.©44
The provision, part of the 1970 amendments, was interpreted
by DOL as prohibiting any noncharging of benefits to
employers electing the reimbursement method. The reason
was that "as self-insurers, they are fully liable for every
dollar of benefits paid their employees and wholly immune
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from any other costs. " 4S DOL pointed out that if a reimburs
ing employer were relieved of benefit charges, liability for
the noncharged benefits would fall to contributing
employers in the form of "pooled costs," from which reim
bursing employers are exempt. In the aftermath of the 1976
amendments, which added substantially more employing
units eligible for the reimbursement option, DOL found it
necessary to reiterate its interpretation. The language of the
federal provision requires reimbursers to pay amounts
"equal" to the benefits based on service with them. Any
noncharging, according to DOL, would result in the
employer paying an amount less than that equal to the
benefits. The Department went so far as to insist on full
reimbursement even when the benefits were paid erroneously
on the basis of an error made by the state agency. Only if
overpaid benefits were recovered may the employer be reliev
ed from liability by refunding to him the recovered funds. In
many instances, of course, such erroneously paid benefits
are not recovered. 46
Delaware, New Jersey and New York maintained that the
language of the statute requiring reimbursing employers to
pay for unemployment compensation "attributable under the
state law to such service" meant that the state has the right to
determine whether or not benefits under particular situations
are attributable to service with the employer, or to other fac
tors. DOL rejected this argument, holding that "attributable
under the state law" merely meant whether or not the
benefits would normally be the employer©s responsibility,
given the system and order of benefit charging set forth in
the state law. A conformity hearing on the issue was held on
August 8, 1979 with these states.
A separate hearing was held August 21, 1979 with Penn
sylvania on the same issue as well as two other unrelated
issues (described earlier in this chapter under Coverage
Issues). In both cases, the Administrative Law Judges re-
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jected the DOL argument concerning noncharging and con
cluded, in their recommended decisions, that the Secretary
of Labor should find the states© practices (of relieving reim
bursing employers of charges under certain circumstances
such as erroneous payments) consistent with the federal pro
vision on reimbursement. The Department had argued that
benefits paid to ineligible claimants were compensation
because all money withdrawn from a state©s unemployment
fund must be used only for compensation (and certain
refunds), pursuant to federal provisions governing the
withdrawal of funds. If these are not benefits, then funds are
being withdrawn in violation of the withdrawal standards.
Pennsylvania©s position was that the withdrawal standards
were not controlling or even relevant. The question was
whether the employer should be charged, not whether money
was properly withdrawn from the unemployment fund. The
state argued that the FUTA requires that reimbursing
employers pay only "amounts of compensation attributable
under state law to ... service" in their employ. The terms
"attributable" and "service" are not defined. Benefits paid
to ineligible claimants are not attributable to service in the
employ of any employer, but are attributable to ad
ministrative errors by the state agency.
The Administrative Law Judge found that since the FUTA
relates compensation to service attributable "under state
law" to an employer, state law should be controlling:
Absent some indication of Congressional intent
that the reimbursing employer should be liable for
costs incurred through errors, which it does not
cause, over which it has no control, and no oppor
tunity to prevent, I cannot accept the Department
of Labor©s argument. 47
The only legislative history produced by DOL to support its
position was a 1966 Senate Report referring to the reim
bursement method as "a form of self-insurance." 48 As
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Pennsylvania pointed out, however, the reimbursing
employer is far different from that of a true self-insurer.
Benefits are not paid directly to the employer but are dispers
ed from public funds for a public purpose, not to discharge
an obligation or liability of a particular employer. Moreover,
although Congress intended for employers to weigh the risks
in deciding whether to elect the reimbursement option, it did
not intend to include risks such as erroneous payments which
no employer could prevent, indirectly recover, or estimate.
The Secretary of Labor found on October 31, 1979 that
whether compensation paid out is attributable to service with
a reimbursing employer is determined by state law. As long
as determinations that certain benefits are not attributable
under the state law to service with a reimbursing employer
are reasonable, such benefits may be noncharged consistent
ly with federal law. 49

Labor Standards Issues
The labor standards, part of the original Social Security
Act, set limits on the states© freedom to establish penalties
for refusing a job. 30 They were aimed as much at protecting
existing work standards as they were intended to keep
claimants from having to accept substandard jobs. They pro
hibit a state from denying benefits for refusal of new work if
the work is vacant due to a labor dispute, if the job interferes
with the claimant©s freedom to join a union of his choice, or
if the wages, hours or working conditions are less favorable
than those prevailing for similar work in the locality.
Although most labor standards issues in recent years had
concerned the prevailing wage requirement, the conformity
confrontations in the early years were over the requirement
prohibiting benefit denial for refusing a job vacant due to a
labor dispute. Also involved was (and is) the concept of
"new work" within the meaning of the labor standards.
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Oregon (1938)
The first conformity hearing of the unemployment in
surance program involved an issue arising from the labor
standards provisions of the Social Security Act. The stan
dards prohibit, as a condition for tax credit, denial of
benefits to an otherwise eligible individual for refusing to ac
cept new work "if the position offered is vacant due directly
to a strike, lockout or other labor dispute." 51
In 1938 Oregon voters approved a statutory initiative
"regulating picketing and boycotting by labor groups and
organizations." Effective December 1, 1938, the approved
law defined the term "labor dispute" as follows:
Whenever in any statute or other law of this state
the term ©labor dispute© is used, such term is hereby
defined for all purposes to mean and include an ac
tual bona fide controversy in which the disputants
stand in proximate relation of employer and the
majority of his or its employees and which directly
concerns matters directly pertaining to wages,
hours, or working conditions of the employees of
the particular employer directly involved in such
controversy. Disputes between organizations or
groups of employees as to which shall act for the
employees in dealing with the employer shall not be
classed as labor disputes, and the refusal of an
employer to deal with either party to any such
jurisdictional controversy shall not operate to make
the dispute a labor dispute within the meaning of
this Act. 52
By eliminating jurisdictional disputes, the bill resulted in a
definition of "labor dispute" that was narrower than the
federal law definition. In other words, under the amended
state law an individual could be disqualified for refusing a
job vacant because of a jurisdictional dispute. A jurisdic-
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tional dispute constituted a labor dispute under the federal
law. The state law, so amended, was challenged.
After a hearing held December 19, 1938, the Social Securi
ty Board found the Oregon law out of conformity. On
January 26, 1939, the Oregon legislature rescinded the provi
sion in question, effective back to the date of its enactment.
In its decision of January 28, 1939, the Social Security Board
found that as of December 31, 1938 the state law included
the appropriate federal law labor standards and that the state
law was eligible for certification to the Secretary of the
Treasury for the taxable year 1938.

California and Washington (1949)
In 1948 West Coast maritime unions were engaged in a
labor dispute. In the State of Washington there was also a
dispute involving members of a carpenters© union. Some of
the workers who were members of the unions engaged in the
labor disputes had become unemployed before the disputes
for reasons not connected with the disputes, and some were
receiving benefits prior to the disputes. All union members,
including these workers, were disqualified in California and
Washington after the disputes began.
The Federal Bureau of Employment Security advised the
two states that the disqualification of those union members
unemployed prior to the labor disputes was inconsistent with
one of the labor standards provisions of FUTA. That provi
sion prohibits denial of benefits solely on the ground that the
worker has refused new work vacant because of the strike,
lockout or other labor dispute. The Bureau argued that the
struck work was "new work" for those workers unemployed
prior to the dispute.
Following a conformity hearing held for both states in
December 1949, Secretary of Labor Tobin found that the
State of Washington©s action violated the federal standard.
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Washington brought itself into conformity before the end of
the year by changing the interpretation of the law. California
agreed to reconsider its decision during the hearing, and the
case was dropped. This case provoked the Knowland
Amendment (discussed under Labor Standards in chapter 2)
enacted in 1950, which provides, in part, that no hearing can
be called by the Secretary as long as further administrative or
judicial review of the matter is available to the parties under
the state law.

California (1955)
This case involved California©s reconsideration of the
same issue that precipitated the 1949 hearing. The California
Supreme Court in 1955 affirmed the reimposed disqualifica
tion of the claimants under the labor dispute disqualification
provision on the grounds that all of the work for seamen on
the waterfront was "their work," not "new work," because
of their union©s agreements with the employer association.
Following a formal hearing, the federal hearing officer ap
pointed by the Secretary of Labor observed that all members
of the unions registered at the hiring halls had a group at
tachment to and shared equally in all available work for
seamen on the waterfront and that when a work stoppage oc
curred, all registered workers had left "their work" because
of the labor dispute. However, claimants were free to
negotiate individually for continued employment with the
same employer. It could be argued, therefore, that their
prior contract had terminated and their old jobs were now
"new work." In any event, upon the advice of an informal
panel of legal authorities, appointed by the Secretary to
review the findings of the hearing officer, the Secretary
found that the state had not violated the federal standard. 53
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Fair Hearing and Promptness Issues

On April 26, 1971, a unanimous Supreme Court decided
one of the most important UI cases to reach the courts. It in
volved interpretation of the phrase "when due" in the Social
Security Act provision requiring states to provide such
methods of administration as are found by the Secretary of
Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of
benefits "when due." 54 The Court concluded that the word
"due" means "the time when payments are first ad
ministratively allowed as a result of a hearing of which both
parties have notice and are permitted to present their respec
tive positions. . . ," 55 This decision resulted in amendments
to every state UI law and dramatic changes in the prompt
ness and quality of UI appeals proceedings and in the
promptness of benefit payments to eligible claimants.

The Java Case (1971)
Unlike all other issues discussed in this chapter, the Java
case was not a federal-state confrontation, although it was
later the cause of considerable intergovernmental conflict
and cooperation. It has not been uncommon for UI issues to
be raised by individuals or groups of claimants or employers,
with the states and DOL being the common adversary.
Usually these are state court cases and a federal-state conflict
arises when a state court interprets a state UI law provision
in such a way as to violate federal requirements. In recent
years more UI cases (e.g., County of Los Angeles) have ap
peared in federal courts. The Java case has been one of the
most important.
The case involved two California claimants, Carroll H.
Hudson and Judith Java, who were awarded benefits follow
ing an eligibility interview at which the employer did not ap
pear. Payments began immediately. The employer, who is
given ten days to appeal, challenged eligibility in each case.
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Pursuant to the California law, payments were automatically
stopped pending decision on the employer©s appeal. The me
dian delay in resuming payments after an employer filed an
appeal, assuming that the claimant©s eligibility is upheld, was
about seven weeks. The claimants appealed the state©s stop
page of payments to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California. 56 The claimants argued first that the
intent of the state UI program, to stave off extreme personal
hardship as well as society-wide depression in terms of in
creasing unemployment, is clearly thwarted when a claimant
must wait some 50 days for payments to resume. Second,
they argued that the state law violates the provision of the
Social Security Act which requires state laws to provide
methods of administration "reasonably calculated to insure
full payment of unemployment compensation when due."
Third, they argued that the denial of benefits, without a
prior hearing, to persons already found eligible violates their
rights to due process of law under the Constitution. They
cited a March 23, 1970 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), that a welfare
claimant©s benefits not be terminated without first affording
him an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing. Consistent
with that case, they argued that once UI benefits are allowed,
they should continue until there is a hearing on the
employer©s appeal and a decision favorable to the employer.
California argued that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs
would adversely affect the UI program in California and 46
other states. "A substantial alteration in processing claims
of such magnitude would have a serious financial impact on
the State of California and impose on it a crushing ad
ministrative burden." More important, the state argued that
the agency©s administrative determination that a claimant is
entitled to benefits is not sufficient, standing alone, to justify
payment until a determination is made on the employer©s ap
peal. Prior to hearing on the employer©s appeal, no
testimony is taken under oath: there is no right to confronta-
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tion or to call witnesses. Moreover, since employers were
successful in 47 percent of their appeals, benefits paid out
which were subsequently held to be valid would have
amounted to $800,000 if the state had been required to pay
benefits during the pendency of any employer appeal. These
benefits would have been unrecoverable because of the state
law provision requiring waiver of recoupment if benefits had
been received without fault on the part of the recipient. Fur
thermore, recovery would be against equity and good con
science.
The state argued that its procedure balances ad
ministrative prudence and claimants© rights, whereas if
benefits were payable pending an employer©s appeal, the
balance would be altered because claimants would then have
incentive to delay hearings and decisions, thereby adding to
the administrative burden and financial loss to the state. The
state rejected the applicability of Goldberg v. Kelley. In that
case, it was important that termination of welfare payments
be undertaken only after a full evidentiary hearing, since
withholding of these payments rendered those receiving
welfare literally destitute. The state argued that UI claimants
were in a different position from welfare recipients:
Plaintiffs (UI claimants) here have admittedly suf
fered considerable inconvenience but they are,
however, receiving welfare benefits. True these
benefits are modest, but plaintiffs are only asked to
maintain themselves on such a modest scale for ap
proximately 30 to 45 days, during which a decision
on the appeal is being made. 57
In other words, the UI claimants were not as destitute as the
plaintiffs in Goldberg since they would receive welfare, as in
fact they did at the time.
In its brief, 58 DOL argued in support of the California
practice in that it was more reasonable than the alternative,
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urged by the plaintiffs, of paying benefits pursuant to an ini
tial determination and until reversed by an appeals body. Ac
cording to the brief, that procedure would create substantial
overpayments, as seen retroactively, cause delay in hearings,
and result in more close issues being decided initially against
claimants to avoid overpayments. DOL argued that if the
decision in Goldberg v. Kelley applied to UI (no termination
except after a full hearing) the practical effect would be for
states to deny benefits to every claimant until after a hearing
and a decision by a referee that the claimant was eligible.
DOL also pointed out that unlike welfare recipients, UI
claimants are not usually destitute. Finally, the DOL brief
argued that the California procedure (as well as that in 46
other states) was consistent with the federal requirement of
"payment of unemployment compensation when due." The
original draft bills prepared by the Social Security Board to
help states design their first UI laws so as to meet conformity
requirements, contained suggested legislative language pro
viding for withholding benefits pending an appeal. These
provisions were in the Alabama law when the Supreme Court
upheld its constitutionality in 1936. They also provided the
model for the California provision.
In a short, eight page decision, the U.S. District Court rul
ed the California provision defective on both constitutional
and statutory grounds: 59
By not providing a pre-termination hearing, it runs
counter to the principles enunciated in Goldberg v.
Kelley, cit. supra. And by being applied so as to
result in a median seven week delay in payments to
claimants who have been found eligible for such
payments, the California statute violates the direc
tive of 42 U.S.C. 503(a)(l).
The Court found the present case "indistinguishable©© from
Goldberg.
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As here, the defendants in Goldberg argued the
State©s interest in protecting public funds. The
Supreme Court, balancing this interest against the
welfare recipient in having the necessities of life
while the bureaucracy mulls over his continued
eligibility, found the fiscal argument somewhat
weak, and rejected it. Defendants herein suggest
that the unemployed person is perhaps not in such
dire straits as the recipient of public assistance, in
that he can always go on welfare, and thus save
himself from absolute destitution. It is scant com
fort to the disaster stricken that there is someone,
somewhere, worse off than he, and this Court finds
that the situation of the unemployed person herein
is every bit as lamentable as that of the welfare
client. . . .
The most fundamental purpose of both the federal
and the state unemployment compensation laws is
©to prevent the burden of injured employees
becoming charges upon society.© 60
On April 26, 1971, Chief Justice Burger delivered, for a
unanimous Supreme Court, an opinion holding that the
California provision violated Section 303(a)(l) of the Social
Security Act. 61 That made it unnecessary to rule on the con
stitutional issue involved in Goldberg on which the District
Court relied. Specifically, it violated the requirement of that
section that the state law provide such methods of ad
ministration "as are found by the Secretary of Labor to be
reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemploy
ment compensation when due."
Reviewing the history of the Social Security Act led the
Court to:
. . . the conclusion that ©when due© was intended to
mean at the earliest stage of unemployment that
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such payments were administratively feasible after
giving both the worker and the employer an oppor
tunity to be heard.
According to the Court,
Probably no program could be devised to make in
surance payments available precisely on the nearest
payday following the termination, but to the extent
that this was administratively feasible this must be
regarded as what Congress was trying to ac
complish.
We conclude that the word ©due© in section
303(a)(l), when construed in light of the purposes
of the Act, means the time when payments are first
administratively allowed as a result of a hearing of
which both parties have notice and are permitted to
present their respective positions; any other con
struction would fail to meet the objective of early
substitute compensation during unemployment.
Our reading of the statute imposes no hardship on
either the State or the employer and gives effect to
the congressional objective of getting money into
the pocket of the unemployed worker at the earliest
point that is administratively feasible. That is what
the Unemployment Insurance Program was all
about.
The Court found the California local office©s initial inter
view an adequate pre-determination fact-finding proceeding
in which the claims of both the employer and the employee
can be heard.
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Although the eligibility interview is informal and
does not contemplate taking evidence in the tradi
tional judicial sense, it has adversary characteristics
and the minimum obligation of an employer is to
inform the interviewer and the claimant of any dis
qualifying factors. So informed, the interviewer
can direct the initial inquiry to identifying a
frivolous or dilatory contention by either party.

Aftermath of Java
On June 14, 1971, DOL advised all state agencies of the
implications of Java. " First, if benefits have been awarded a
claimant pursuant to an initial determination, they may not
be suspended pending an appeal period or pending, as in
California, disposition of an employer©s appeal. That meant
changes in 47 states© laws or interpretations. Second, states
must provide reasonable notice to both the claimant and
employer of the time and place of the pre-determination
fact-finding hearing. This new step required changes, not in
state laws, but in virtually every state©s procedures, since no
state at that time provided such notices. Finally,
To keep to a minimum the impact of overpayments
that may result from modifications or reversals of
benefit determinations on appeals, attention needs
to be given not only to quality at the determination
level but also to expediting the processing of all ap
peals.
The reduction of overpayments was one reason to focus
on appeals promptness. The estimated magnitude of over
payments, nationally, had the Java requirements been
operative in fiscal year 1971, would have been about $7.5
million. There were other reasons. During 1971, the states
decided fewer than one-fourth of their benefit appeals within
30 days and less than half within 45 days. In some states,
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practically no appeals were processed within 30 days and
relatively few within 45 days. Over one-fourth of all ap
pellants waited more than 75 days for a decision.
In 1971, over a dozen suits were filed in federal courts
which either directly or collaterally sought relief from the
delays of the benefit appeals process. In December 1971, a
Federal District Court concluded that even Vermont©s
average five to six week delay (then among the shortest in the
nation) was unreasonable. On April 14, 1972, a complaint
was filed in a Federal District Court charging that Georgia©s
failure to conduct hearings promptly (it averaged 3 percent
of decisions issues within 30 days) was violative of the Four
teenth Amendment and Section 303(a)(l) of the Social
Security Act.
In 1973 Connecticut©s informal determination procedure
was challenged. A U.S. District Court had enjoined the Con
necticut agency from denying claimants benefits under its ex
isting eligibility determination procedure without first pro
viding a constitutionally sufficient hearing. The District
Court was persuaded of the need for a full hearing at the ini
tial determination level because Connecticut©s record in
hearing appeals was the slowest in the nation. The state ap
pealed this ruling. In a decision issued January 14, 1975, 63
the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that unless appeals
decisions are issued promptly, states would face the costly
prospect of making the initial determination process more
like a full "due process" hearing. The Supreme Court held,
In this context, the possible length of wrongful
deprivation of unemployment benefits is an impor
tant factor in assessing the impact of official action
on the private interests. . . . Prompt and adequate
administrative review provides an opportunity for
correction of errors made in initial eligibility deter
minations. Thus the rapidity of administrative

Conformity and Court Cases

223

review is a significant factor in assessing the suffi
ciency of the entire process.
The Supreme Court vacated the District Court©s judgment
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the fact
that while the case was pending, Connecticut completely
revised its appeals structure in order to accelerate the pro
cess.
DOL advised the states:
The Court©s decision makes crucial the need for all
States to meet and maintain at least the levels of ap
peals performance prescribed in the Secretary©s Ap
peals Promptness Standard. 64
The Appeals Performance Standard, described in the section
on Administration in chapter 2, was the product of Java and
specifically a commitment by DOL in its brief to the Court:
The Secretary of Labor is cognizant of the need for
increased promptness and, insofar as it is possible
to shorten the delay without denying a fair hearing
to the participants, he intends to effectuate im
provements. (Footnote: The Secretary is presently
considering the wisdom and feasibility of pro
mulgating a specific federal standard of the time
within which each State must complete its pro
cedures for determining whether benefits are
due.)65
An Appeals Promptness Project, generated by the penden
cy of Java and organized to implement the Secretary©s com
mitment, issued a comprehensive report July 1972. It iden
tified a number of contributing factors to the states© poor
promptness record, including inadequate staffing, ineffec
tive management, outmoded processing systems and inflexi
ble budgeting. The root cause was simply stated:
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The basic problem is the failure at State and na
tional levels to insist on promptness and on doing
those things which would produce promptness. 66
The Report included a number of recommendations, in
cluding a performance standard.
Java©s influence was not limited to the appeals area.
DOL©s failure to insist on promptness was not confined to
states© appeals performance. It had similarly failed to require
a reasonable degree of promptness in paying benefits. First
payment time lapse (the speed with which a state agency
makes its first payment of benefits) performance was was
abysmal as appeals time lapse. DOL had established sug
gested criteria for reasonable time lapse calling for 86 per
cent of intrastate claims to be paid within 14 days beginning
with the week ending date of the first compensable week,
and 67 percent of interstate claims. From 1971 through 1975
there were never more than 22 states that met the intrastate
criterion in any given calendar quarter, and never more than
15 states met the interstate criterion.
As happened in the appeals area, by 1975, poor perfor
mance of promptness of first payments resulted in court
cases in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland and
Virginia. A Federal District Court in Illinois, appalled by the
long time lapse of that state, concluded that the state agency
did not adhere to the requirements of Section 303(a)(l) of the
Social Security Act. Although it did not determine that DOL
had improperly certified the state for granted funds, it did
determine that the state was not making payments "when
due." The Court concluded that the "when due" require
ment meant that the state agency must mail checks out
within 14 days from the end of the first compensable week of
unemployment in all cases in which the claimant has provid
ed all necessary information, and external factors beyond the
agency©s control do not intervene. The agency must mail
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checks for all subsequent valid claims within 14 days from
the end of the last compensable week of each bi-weekly claim
period. 67
It became obvious that unless DOL developed a prompt
ness standard (rather than merely guidelines) the courts
would do so. And different courts may well develop dif
ferent standards. On March 5, 1976, a proposed Standard
for Benefit Payment Promptness was published in the
Federal Register:
. . . responsive to the overriding concern of the
United States Supreme Court in ... Java . . .and
that of other courts with delays in the payment of
unemployment compensation to eligibile in
dividuals. 68
The proposed Standard was adopted July 23, 1976. It was
later revised to be less stringent, effective August 28, 1978.
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Chapter 6
Summary, Trends, Conclusions

The Conceptual and Legislative Framework
As envisioned by President Roosevelt©s Committee on
Economic Security, unemployment insurance, like the
American system of federalism, was to operate as a hybrid,
with federal and state governments each having principal
jurisdiction over particular aspects of the program and both
sharing responsibility for others. As described in chapter 1,
the immediate federal role to inspire states to enact UI pro
grams was to be accomplished through a federal payroll
tax and a provision allowing employers credit against most
of that tax for the taxes they paid under a state UI program
that met federal requirements.
A second federal responsibility involved management of
the funds collected under the program. All taxes collected,
state and federal, were required to be deposited in the Na
tional Treasury. State deposits remained state property, but
any money withdrawn could be used only for the purpose of
paying unemployment compensation.
The third major federal responsibility was to establish na
tional standards in areas where uniformity was absolutely
essential. The two devices or sanctions available for insuring
state conformity were denial of employers© credit against the
federal tax and withholding of federal grants for administra
tion.
231
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The states were to be responsible for enacting complete,
self-contained unemployment insurance laws that conform
ed to federal standards. The states would have almost com
plete freedom to establish qualifying conditions for benefits,
weekly amount and duration of benefits, eligibility and dis
qualification conditions, and employer tax systems. Ad
ministrative responsibilities were to be shared by both levels
of government. Primary responsibility for administering
their laws fell to the states, but the federal partner would
have control over allocation of all funds for administrative
expenses, authority to insure that administrative grants were
used by the states only for proper purposes, and an obliga
tion to provide technical assistance to the states.
As described in chapter 2, with a few exceptions, the 1935
Social Security Act embodied the recommendations of the
Committee on Economic Security. Through the federal
unemployment tax and tax credit device, the unemployment
insurance titles of the Act provided the impetus for quick
enactment of UI laws in every state. They established the
basic division of responsibilities between federal and state
governments. Federal powers were spelled out explicitly, and
as with the U.S. Constitution, those powers not expressly
delegated to the federal partner or those that could not
reasonably be implied as federal, were reserved to the states.
Unlike the Constitution, the Social Security Act could be
amended or abolished by Congress alone. Unemployment in
surance would be a federal-state system only as long as that
arrangement appeared to Congress to provide advantages.
Experience

Checks and Balances
A legislative framework under which authority and
responsibilities for a program are divided between two part
ners will soon collapse unless there are means to restrain
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either partner from encroaching on the authority of the
other. The U.S. Constitution provides for an elaborate
system of checks and balances among the three branches of
the federal government as well as between the federal and
state governments. The Social Security Act provides some
checks and balances. The American political system provides
others. Among them are the following:
State authority to enact provisions contrary to federal
requirements is checked by the consequences of denial
of tax credit and loss of administrative grants;
Federal authority to substitute a federal system for the
federal-state system is checked by a state-oriented Con
gress;
State authority to enact conforming but extreme provi
sions is checked by federal power to enact uniform stan
dards;
Federal authority to radically alter the system is offset
by public acceptance of the basic provisions of
unemployment insurance;
State authority over the administration of its program is
checked by federal control of administrative grants;
Federal authority to impose sanctions on nonconforming states is checked by Congressional aversion to
penalizing a state.
There are more. Until recent years, the result of these checks
has been to restrain the actions of each partner so as to
achieve something of a balance of power, with neither
dominating in the control of the unemployment insurance
system.

Conflicts
Since the beginning, the program has been characterized
by two types of conflicts those caused by particular provi
sions of law and others generated by friction between two
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levels of government having responsibilities for a single pro
gram. Conflict over specific provisions is carried on almost
every year within the 53 jurisdictions with UI laws between
individuals and organizations with different views of the
purposes of unemployment insurance. When debate between
business and labor has been relatively even, the result has
usually been beneficial to the program. Open fights over
substantive program provisions are the source of the pro
gram©s vitality. More than any other single factor, this con
troversy has kept state programs flexible and responsive to
local needs and attitudes.
The second type of conflict, intergovernmental, is in
evitable in a program where responsibilities are divided, and
federal and state governments have different perspectives.
For example, state authorities with day-to-day responsibility
for administration of their programs are bound to collide
with federal officials who control the amount of money
available for administration, set the priorities for the money,
and may even dictate the "methods" the state must apply in
carrying out administrative functions. These kinds of con
flicts have not had a particularly beneficial impact on the
program, but neither have they been harmful.
State and federal differences over the meaning of the
federal law are more significant intergovernmental conflicts.
As described in chapter 4, most have been settled through a
variety of approaches. When negotiation has failed, the
system provides a mechanism, the conformity process,
whereby the issue may be resolved. It insures a state a fair
hearing, a full opportunity to present its views and the op
tion to seek judicial review of an adverse decision. As
discussed in chapter 5, the most difficult and significant UI
issues have been settled in this fashion. Interpretations are
one means by which federal authority has been expanded to
meet particular issues, and the conformity and judicial pro
cesses have been testing grounds for the soundness of federal
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interpretations. The process has been used sparingly, basical
ly because it involves much effort on the part of all parties to
present and prepare support for positions. The availability
of a fair hearing, if negotiation fails and one is needed, has
had the same beneficial effect on the system as the fair hear
ing opportunity available to claimants and employers.

Cooperation
Conflicts notwithstanding, the dominant pattern of in
tergovernmental relations has been cooperative effort. This
too has been the result of the division of responsibilities and
the development of checks on authority. With each level of
government restrained by statutory or practical obstacles, it
quickly became clear that the program could operate only
through cooperation. The interdependence of the two part
ners was demonstrated at the outset.
As issues arose after the program was inaugurated in most
states, interpretations were made of federal law, many with
administrative implications. To be realistic and workable, it
was necessary that interpretations and decisions affecting ad
ministration be developed on the basis of state experience
and capability. This required participation of state officials
or, at the minimum, opportunity for state review and reac
tion to proposed decisions and standards. This is an example
of state participation in a predominantly federal function.
Federal participation in essentially state matters has been
discussed in the context of federal recommendations for
amendments to state programs. These recommendations
were particularly influential at the beginning of the program,
as discussed in chapter 1. Over the years the recommenda
tions diminished for the variety of reasons discussed in
chapter 4.
Intergovernmental cooperation occurs at all ad
ministrative levels and in all aspects of the program. It is the
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key, for example, to successful negotiation of conformity
issues, as described in chapter 4.
Conflicts over the desirability of particular program provi
sions, discord over the operation of the program,
disagreements over the meaning of federal law, and over
riding cooperative effort are the ingredients of federal-state
relationships that have contributed to the success of
unemployment insurance. The two sources of these
characteristics are the federal-state division of respon
sibilities originally spelled out in the Social Security Act, and
the legislative, practical, and voluntary checks against ar
bitrary expansion of authority by either partner. These are
the elements that make possible debate in a state capitol over
the level of the maximum weekly benefit amount; a U.S.
Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of a
requirement that states cover state and local government
workers as a condition for tax credit; a conformity hearing
rejecting a state-imposed income test as a condition for
benefits; resolution on an informal basis of a conflict with
federal law caused by a state court decision; consideration by
a state advisory council of recommendations prepared by the
federal government for changes in the state©s qualifying re
quirement.

Attitudes
The unemployment insurance program is significantly af
fected by the attitudes of those who operate it and, indirect
ly* by public attitudes about unemployed workers,
claimants, employers, and unemployment insurance.
The system is a product of the 1930s depression when few
Americans were without direct or close experience with
unemployment. That experience showed that anyone could
lose a job through no fault of his own and could remain
unemployed despite all reasonable efforts to find work.
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Enactment of the UI provisions of the Social Security Act
reflected general recognition of government©s obligation to
provide some degree of protection against a hazard faced by
everyone who works for another. These concepts represented
radical departures from prevailing attitudes of preceding
periods, that equated unemployment with shiftlessness,
laziness or other weaknesses of character, and which rejected
government support as gratuitous handouts likely only to en
courage more idleness.
In the 1930s a number of idealistic individuals were at
tracted to the new social insurance program at both the
federal and state levels. Many developed strong personal
commitments to relieving the hardship of unemployment.
The system was thus built on the premise that most
unemployed workers would rather work than draw benefits
and was staffed in significant part by individuals dedicated
to making unemployment insurance an effective means of
meeting unemployed workers© needs.
The federal leadership established two overall objectives:
adequacy and fairness. Recommendations of the Depart
ment of Labor and its predecessors constantly stressed the
need for adequate benefit amounts and duration, as describ
ed in chapter 3. Three Democratic and one Republican ad
ministrations supported federal benefit standards to ensure
adequacy. States were regularly encouraged to assure that
the great majority would be compensated for at least half
their weekly wage loss if unemployed, and to establish the
maximum weekly benefit amount as a percentage (preferably
66-2/3 percent) of the statewide average weekly wage so that
benefit levels would automatically keep pace with increases
in wage levels. It was also recommended that the benefit
duration allowed either be the same for all claimants
(preferably 26 weeks), or be expressed as a maximum
amount equal to a substantial fraction (preferably at least
3/5 or 2/3 instead of the common 1/3 fraction) of the claim-
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ant©s base-period wages, up to no less than 26 times the
claimant©s weekly benefit amount.
Fairness was stressed as much as adequacy. For example,
although the amount of prior employment was the intended
measure of labor force attachment, qualifying requirements
in some states were expressed in terms of flat dollar amounts
of base-period earnings. These tests were discouraged by
federal policy recommendations because higher paid workers
could meet them with less employment than others. Similar
ly, states with disqualifications requiring that the claimant
must be reemployed and earn a specified flat minimum
amount before he can again become eligible for benefits were
urged by the Department of Labor to require instead that the
minimum amount of new earnings be stated as some specific
multiple of the claimant©s weekly benefit amount. Low wage
workers would thus not be disadvantaged in meeting the dis
qualification. States with dependents© allowance provisions
were urged not to require more of female claimants in quali
fying for such allowances. Special disqualifications for par
ticular categories of workers students, retirees, pregnant
women were discouraged.
Beginning with the first Draft Bill developed by the Social
Security Board in 1936, federal efforts to influence state
legislation represented for a time the only leadership with
regard to program policy issues. They provided focal points
for discussion even in states with perspectives wholly dif
ferent from the federal view. Federally organized legislative
planning conferences, where recommendations were
debated, brought federal and state officials together. The
recommendations, somewhat predictable over time in their
emphasis, also provided a certain stability to the program.
In time, as the states gained experience and confidence,
many moved more independently concerning policy matters.
Moreover, certain interest groups chiefly employers and
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labor acquired greater knowledge about UI and more skills
in advancing their positions. The state side of the in
tergovernmental relationship grew generally stronger as a
result; a more equal federal-state balance evolved. While
some on each side saw the other partner as too overbearing
or too stubbornly independent, for the most part a
reasonable climate developed that was favorable to a
cooperative and creative relationship.

Recent Trends
Recent years have been marked by increasing federal
dominance of the unemployment insurance system. The
balance of power has been undermined by new federal stan
dards, program objectives have shifted, and federal-state
relations have undergone substantial change. Chapter 3
described federal program standards enacted in these years.
The 1980 and 1981 amendments which limit the conditions
under which extended benefits may be paid remove from
state jurisdiction almost all control over this aspect of
unemployment insurance.
These and other recent restrictive program standards have
been pressed primarily on the grounds of cost savings. This
objective has become compelling rationale, given recent
Congressional preoccupation with reducing the federal
budget. In addition, cost-saving motivated standards have
not been unwelcome in some states which are interested in
avoiding tax increases otherwise necessary to keep benefits in
step with inflation, to replenish their funds from the drains
of recent recessions and to pay back moneys borrowed from
the federal loan fund. 1
These trends toward increasing federal dominance and
departure from long-standing program goals are products of
dramatic economic and political developments in recent
years.
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A major indirect contributor to the cost cutting trend was
the inclusion of both federal and state UI tax receipts and UI
expenditures in the federal unified budget. From 1936
through 1967, state UI tax moneys were not included in the
federal administrative budget, which was the basis for deter
mining the size of the federal surplus or deficit. They were
not included because they were reserved in trust funds ear
marked for employment security purposes and not available
for other activities. However, by 1967, total receipts of all
U.S. Treasury trust funds (including Social Security©s) equal
ed almost 40 percent of the total administrative budget from
which they were excluded. Because of their size and impact
on the economy, the UI and other trust funds, both their
receipts and expenditures, were incorporated in a unified
federal budget beginning in 1968. 2
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa
tion unanimously recommended removal of UI trust fund
moneys from the federal budget. The Commission argued
that the major portion of employer UI taxes is state moneys,
not federal. State decisions affecting program matters are
more important than federal decisions in their influence on
UI revenues and expenditures. The basic reason for the
Commission©s recommendation, however, was that, as part
of the unified federal budget, trust funds have increasingly
become the target of intensive efforts by both the executive
and legislative branches to cut the expenditure side of the
federal budget, frequently without much or any regard to the
damage caused by the cuts in the programs involved. 3
A second source of current cost consciousness is the sud
den and deep plunge of several states from solvency into
debtor status. Until the 1970s, with few exceptions, states©
reserves were generally adequate to cope with the regular
fluctuations of the economy. During the severe recession of
the mid-1970s, 25 states found it necessary to borrow from
the federal loan fund. By 1977 and 1978, unemployment had
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declined, but the recovery was neither robust nor long
enough to enable many states to reestablish adequate
reserves. Thirteen states were still in debt at the end of 1979,
by which time unemployment was again on the rise. It reach
ed record post-Depression levels in 1982. By the end of that
year, 23 states owed the loan fund $10.6 billion. The federal
UI trust fund account for extended benefits was also in debt
to the Treasury for about $7 billion, most of it for outstand
ing costs of the Federal Supplemental Benefits program of
the mid-1970s. 4
These economic shocks had enormous impact not only on
state reserves, but on the direction the entire unemployment
insurance system would take in the foreseeable future. With
state as well as federal UI deficits reflected in the federal
budget, state programs became subject to budget cutting ef
forts by Congress and the Administration. The 1980 and
1981 EB amendments described in chapter 3 are examples.
The insolvency and potential insolvency of so many states in
fluence the direction of the program also in another way. For
these states, the primary consideration has become, first,
how to keep the debt from growing, and later, how to repay
the debt and rebuild the fund. The federal loan repayment
requirements and the recently added requirement of interest
to be paid on loans made after March 1982 have had signifi
cant influence on state decisions. In addition to the interest,
employers in a state that has not repaid its loan within about
two years face an annual reduction in their federal tax offset
credit until the debt is repaid. This translates into a uniform,
progressive 0.3 percent increase in the federal unemployment
tax rate each year the debt is outstanding. States have the op
tion of paying an amount equivalent to the FUTA "repay
ment tax" instead of the amount being collected through the
uniform tax rate increases. Thus, states may choose to raise
the amount needed through experience-rated taxes, or from
any other source.
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In some states, regaining a sound financial footing may be
accomplished by appropriate increases in the state UI tax
rate, tax base, or both. In others it will require, in addition,
changes in benefit provisions aimed at reducing expen
ditures. 5 In any event, being preoccupied with regaining
solvency means, in most cases, a moratorium on any
liberalization of the benefit formula (even in states where
benefit levels are inadequate), and a favorable reception to a
wide range of cost cutting measures, from frozen maximum
benefit amounts to stiffer disqualifications.
A third source of trends in the early 1980s is, of course, the
election in 1980 of a President and Congress committed to
reducing the cost of domestic programs generally, and the
cost of so-called entitlement programs particularly. The im
petus has been both a serious federal deficit as well as a
predisposition by many Administration leaders to distrust
the motives of those drawing unemployment insurance and
other *© entitlements.©©
Testimony on behalf of new restrictive standards reveals
an Administration attitude toward the program and
unemployed workers quite different from that previously ex
pressed concerning adequacy and fairness. In 1981, for ex
ample, U.S. Secretary of Labor Raymond J. Donovan
testified on behalf of one of a number of UI amendments
proposed by the Reagan Administration. The proposal
would require all states to disqualify claimants who, after
three months of unemployment, refuse any job within their
capabilities paying gross wages equal to the higher of the
minimum wage or their weekly benefit amount. The pro
posal, which was rejected, was similar to that enacted in 1980
to apply to extended benefit claimants. 6 According to the
Secretary, the proposal was needed because,
By allowing unemployed workers to draw up to six
months of compensation unless jobs in their oc-
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cupations are available, the present unemployment
compensation system discourages workers from
seeking employment in new industries. . . . 7
A second Administration proposal (enacted) for elimina
tion of the national trigger for extended benefits was describ
ed by a DOL spokesman as necessary to remove
a disincentive for the unemployed to become quick
ly reemployed in those States with low unemploy
ment when the national trigger is on. 8
Another Administration proposal (enacted) was for amend
ing the unemployment compensation program for ex-service
persons (UCX) by requiring states to disqualify from
benefits any individual who voluntarily leaves the armed
forces after serving an enlistment period. In effect, the
amendment provides that if the individual could have
reenlisted, but chose instead to leave the service and reenter
the civilian work force, he will be considered a voluntary quit
and denied benefits if he is unemployed and files for UI. 9
These and other Reagan Administration proposals were
recommended as a means of responding to what the DOL
spokesman saw as a growing public image of beneficiaries,
. . . who are prepared to ride the system until all
benefits are exhausted, and who only then look for
work. 10
Implicit in the DOL testimony on behalf of reducing
disincentives so as to encourage claimants to seek work was
agreement with the image of claimants as preferring to draw
benefits than accept jobs; a conviction that tests applied by
state agencies of claimants© availability for work are inade
quate; and a commitment to stricter eligibility and work
search requirements rather than to making administration of
existing requirements more effective and positive.
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A change in attitudes toward claimants from sympathy to
impatience was also demonstrated abundantly by Congress
in the 1980 debates on new extended benefit standards, par
ticularly on the requirement that a state have a waiting week
for regular claimants as a condition for payment of the
federal share of the cost for the first week of extended
benefits. It was asserted that the waiting week would
somehow encourage workers to seek jobs instead of filing
for benefits immediately. 11 A skeptical view of claimants©
job search determination was evident also in the debate con
cerning the deduction of retirement income from benefits.
Such deduction, it was argued, was necessary to prevent
retirees from draining the system. 12
Allegations of excessive benefit costs and the prevailing
suspicion of claimant motivations also seem to draw support
from new revelations by behaviorists and economists show
ing that the average period of unemployment lengthens as
benefit amounts or duration increase. 13 The implication is
that as benefits become more "attractive" they lure more
and more workers away from jobs. Many of these studies are
solely statistical, without serious analysis of the implications
of the figures or the validity of the samples used. If benefits
are adequate, most unemployed workers are likely to spend a
longer time trying to find the best job possible. Also, if
benefits are adequate, more unemployed workers will file
who ordinarily would delay because of embarrassment or
unwillingness to become involved in the filing, registering,
and reporting procedures. It is questionable, however,
whether many individuals would deliberately forfeit a steady
or even an uncertain job for benefits, amounting generally to
half or less their regular weekly pay, for a period usually of
half a year or less. The fact that most claimants do not ex
haust their benefit entitlement even in hard times suggests
the validity of the program©s premise that most people
would rather work than draw benefits.
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Finally, cost considerations and a predisposition to
distrust benefit recipients seem also to encourage a certain
inventiveness in developing justifications for proposed
changes. The entire package of restrictive, cost-cutting 1981
Administration UI proposals, for example, was justified by
Secretary of Labor Donovan in part on the grounds that
their enactment "will strengthen this multi-billion dollar
safety net for unemployed workers. . . . u

Conclusions
This paper has been supportive of the balanced federalstate system and negative about the drift toward greater
federal control over the program in recent years. Reasons for
this view are explained later, but in the interest of balance,
some mention should be made of the advantages and disad
vantages of a single nationwide program of increased federal
dominance.

Arguments for Federal Control
Perhaps the greatest advantage of a single national pro
gram is the opportunity it affords for equal treatment of
claimants and employers throughout the country. In con
trast, while state autonomy over program matters has per
mitted experimentation and innovation, it has also produced
some serious inequalities. Some states provide the same
treatment for all claimants except for those categories
singled out by federal law for special treatment. Other states
discriminate against interstate claimants, women, students,
seasonal workers and part-time workers. In some states, dis
qualification provisions are so severe as to remove the of
fender completely from any protection under the program
for the foreseeable future. Some states have enacted benefit
formulas that fall far short of meeting any reasonable test of
adequacy, and taxing provisions that are wholly unrealistic
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as means of ensuring solvency. State law differences, in
many instances, result in claimants qualifying for wholly dif
ferent UI benefits with identical base-period experience sim
ply because they are in different states. Conversely,
claimants with quite different work histories may qualify for
identical benefit amounts and duration in different states.
Divergent eligibility provisions produce situations in which a
claimant in one state may be denied benefits for a certain act
for six months or more, while in another state the same act
may not be disqualifying at all. Employers with similar ex
perience and payroll are regularly assigned wholly different
tax rates in different states, depending on a great number of
variables, and which may apply to different taxable wage
bases as well.
Another advantage of a national system is financial. Na
tionwide pooling of all unemployment insurance taxes would
require the maintenance of smaller reserves than the ag
gregate of 53 separate reserve funds. Such a system also has
the potential to be a much more effective tool in controlling
the economy. Federal domination should also lead to greater
efficiency: The more uniformity throughout the country, the
easier is the administrative burden. A national system also
has the potential of unambiguous, united and effective
leadership and direction, instead of 54 separate jurisdictions
(53 "states" and one federal entity), each with authority
over its own domain.
Nor is there any lack of support for a national or more
federally dominated system. Both labor and, recently,
business groups have supported greater federal control of the
program. Organized labor has consistently favored benefit
amount standards, as well as outright total federalization. It
has also regularly looked to federal amendments to correct
inadequacies and inequities of many states© programs. Labor
representatives on the National Commission on Unemploy
ment Compensation, for example, recommended that Con-
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gress consider adding federal benefit standards in the follow
ing areas: the level of wage replacement represented by the
weekly benefit amount, qualifying requirements, waiting
periods, disqualifications, eligibility conditions for UI, ap
peals requirements, benefits for partial unemployment,
dependents© allowances, job search requirements and
assistance, rules for availability for work and active search
for work. 15
Business groups have only recently acquired a fondness
for some federal standards. These former advocates of state
autonomy supported the Reagan Administration©s 1981 pro
posals for several new federal standards in the extended
benefit area, and for a standard on a new suitable work
definition for regular benefit claimants. The Chamber of
Commerce, for example, recommended "swift enactment of
the President©s Program for Economic Recovery, in its en
tirety."
As federal budget restrictions, the proposed
changes in the UC program (see Appendix A) will
contribute to national economic recovery. Most im
portantly, however, they are good for the UC pro
gram and constitute a modest step toward long
overdue reform of the federal unemployment com
pensation laws. 16
Similarly, the National Association of Manufacturers,
although it:
. . . philosophically opposes any imposition of
federal standards on individual State UC pro
grams, . . . urges you, the Congress, to respond to
the Administration©s proposed unemployment
compensation savings in a courageous manner by
expeditiously enacting the legislative proposals be
ing debated today. 17
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Both of these statements of support were for Administration
proposals that included the "imposition ... on individual
State UC programs" of several new and sweeping federal
standards. Traditional opposition by these organizations to
enlarged federal control over the program apparently gives
way in the face of opportunity for cost reduction and for a
narrower definition of worker behavior acceptable as
"deserving" of benefit support.

Disadvantages of Federal Dominance
A single national system that successfully provided
uniformly fair and adequate UI provisions would be superior
to the present federal-state system in the author©s opinion.
Unfortunately, a national system with the potential for
eliminating inequalities and inequities also has the capability
of doing the opposite. The capability for producing ine
qualities has been amply demonstrated. For example, state
discriminatory provisions aimed at retirees, school
employees, athletes, aliens, are federally mandated. That the
federal government is as capable of inequities as any state is
illustrated by the DOL-sponsored 1981 amendment and 1982
amendments to the federal program of unemployment com
pensation of ex-service persons (UCX) which required dis
qualification, as a voluntary quit without good cause, of
anyone who left the service when he could have reenlisted.
This questionable provision was dropped in 1982, but in
stead of reinstating the practice of treating veterans on an
equal basis as other claimants, as was the case for over 20
years, Congress imposed a four week waiting period as a
condition for benefits (not required of other claimants by
any state) and established a ceiling of 13 weeks of benefits,
half the usual 26 week maximums for regular benefits
available in all but one state and one-third the usual max
imum duration in states with extended benefits triggered
on. 18
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The federal government is also no less capable than any
state of absurdities, as illustrated by the 1982 requirement
denying payment to any state of the federal share of the cost
of extended benefits to the extent of "extra" benefit cost
resulting from the state not rounding all the regular benefit
amounts ending in other than full dollars, down to the next
lower full dollar amount. There exists no viable means of ef
fectively enforcing the provision. Finally, it should be noted
that the federal government is as fully capable as any state of
questionable judgment of the type illustrated by the severe
1981 restrictions (elimination of the national trigger, increase
of insured unemployment rate levels required to activate
state triggers, elimination of EB claimants from the com
putation of the trigger rates) imposed on the availability of
extended benefits, at a time when record numbers of workers
were losing their jobs only to turn around within months
and enact a special emergency program to help the long term
unemployed, including those dropped from unemployment
insurance protection solely because of the earlier amend
ments.
A 1978 General Accounting Office report of the UI system
illustrates the dilemma, posed on the one hand by a hybrid
federal-state system that produces inequalities but usually no
nationwide blunders, and on the other hand by a national
system (or a federally dominated partnership) that has the
promise of equal treatment nationwide but also the potential
for imposing provisions that are universally unfair or inade
quate. In its report, the GAO recommended abolition of the
extreme diversity of provisions it had discovered among the
states:
We recommend that the Congress establish
uniform eligibility standards and methods for
determining benefit amounts so that all UI
claimants are treated equally. 19
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We believe that the benefit to be derived from our
recommendation would outweigh what might be
perceived by some as an intrusion on the partner
ship. 20
Differences in eligibility and benefit provisions
among the jurisdictions have a significant impact
on program costs. 21
The recommendation for greater uniformity "so that all UI
claimants are treated equally" was not, however, accom
panied by recommendations that would assure both unifor
mity and equity. Instead, GAO was disturbed that some
states had no waiting week requirement, some did not deduct
retirement income from benefits, some paid dependents©
allowances, some permitted disqualified claimants to
become eligible after a specified number of weeks rather
than requiring them to requalify by getting another job. Ac
cording to GAO estimates, these provisions increase UI costs
over $1.0 billion. 22
There was no discussion in the report of the merits of the
provisions from the standpoint of program objectives or
from any other standpoint than cost. The GAO completely
ignored DOL©s rebuttal that the very provisions the report
singled out and implied were too expensive were provisions
(except for dependents© allowances) the Department had urg
ed the states to adopt for over 40 years, on the grounds that
they provided fair treatment of claimants and made UI a
more effective buffer against the hardships of unemploy
ment. The GAO recommendations would thus have ac
complished greater uniformity and saved money, but the
cost of such "reforms" would be borne entirely by claimants
and would be substantial.
Perhaps more important than other disadvantages of a na
tional system is its potential for manipulating people. The re
cent amendments to the EB program, for example, seemed
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more aimed at forcing unemployed workers to seek any
available job regardless of their skills, experience, former
wage level or standard of living, than at providing mean
ingful help to people suffering from loss of jobs, income,
and self-confidence. The concerted attacks in recent years by
Administration spokesmen and Congressmen on the motiva
tions and character of those receiving UI and other public
entitlement program benefits seem deliberately intended to
instill a sense of shame, or at least embarrassment, in reci
pients, and thereby to manipulate unemployed workers to
forego or delay filing claims for benefits. Given the increas
ingly common attitude toward claimants as parasites rather
than involuntarily unemployed workers, a wholly centraliz
ed, national program could become even more manipulative
and oppressive.

Restoring a More Even Balance
The federal-state system has the disadvantages described
earlier. But it does not have the same potential as a national
system (or a federally dominated partnership) for manipula
tion. It still permits experimentation on an individual state
basis; and with a constantly changing economy, the chance
to test new ideas in individual state laboratories is needed as
much now as 50 years ago. Unlike the mistakes of a national
administration and Congress, which have nationwide im
plications and can be repealed only by another act of Con
gress, state disasters are usually confined to individual state
borders, while successes can be quickly picked up by other
states.
The current federal-state division of responsibilities is a
source of the debate, discussion, conflict and confrontations
discussed throughout this paper. These are the factors that
have produced a unique vitality in a 45-year old program and
that provide the key to its flexibility and responsiveness to
new problems.
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The means of retaining the advantages and preserving
what is left of the federal-state balance lie in buttressing
deterrents to federal takeover. The main reason for federal
restraint in the past was widespread public acceptance and
support of a system that seemed to work well and provided
meaningful help to involuntarily unemployed workers. The
general assumption was that the states maintained
reasonably efficient, adequate programs at relatively low
cost, and that benefits generally were paid only to workers
unemployed through no fault of their own, most of whom
were ready, willing and able to work. Given these assump
tions (disturbed occasionally by a newspaper article or televi
sion program focusing on UI fraud or implying fraud), there
was a natural reluctance to change a successful organiza
tional structure.
The heavy unemployment of the mid-1970s, enactments
during that period extending benefit duration to as much as
65 weeks, and the sudden and complete depletion of many
states© reserves caused public reassessment not only of the
capabilities of the states but also of the character of the UI
claimant. The 1980 and 1981 federal invasions of state
authority through a succession of program standards,
motivated mostly by budget considerations, were made
possible because of the erosion of public confidence in the
system encouraged and articulated by congressional and
administration advocates of restrictive federal standards.
Restoration of past positive attitudes requires shoring up
the current system©s abilities to meet its basic responsibilities.
First is the federal-state responsibility to ensure adequate
financing of benefits.
The states must work their way back to solvency if public
skepticism of their ability to manage their own UI programs
is to be replaced by public confidence. States© heavy borrow
ing in recent years from a federal loan fund that itself has
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had to borrow from general revenues, has been interpreted
as a sign of irresponsibility and a signal for federal takeover
of state responsibilities. Federally imposed cost-saving
measures have been substituted for state decisionmaking.
The trend toward increased federal influence will certainly
continue as long as substantial numbers of states must bor
row "federal" money. The paths individual states must take
to regain solvency and independence are many and varied
and not the appropriate subject for this paper.
Clearly, states must take appropriate steps, but given the
uneven impact among the states of recent recessions and the
severe economic shocks suffered by some, it is no longer
reasonable to expect individual states to carry the entire
burden of extraordinary benefit costs. In some states, the
most prudent financing measures conceivable would not
have prevented complete depletion of state reserves. Some
form of catastrophic reinsurance is clearly needed so that no
state©s reserves are so exhausted by a recession as to prevent
it from recovering, through reasonable tax increases, within
a relatively short period.
A second basic responsibility of the system is to ensure
that benefits are paid only to those for whom the program is
intended to help. If the public continues to believe that too
many claimants would rather draw benefits than work, and
that most states are either unable or unwilling to take
necessary steps to limit benefits only to those genuinely eligi
ble, more federal eligibility standards are likely to be forth
coming. The emphasis will continue to be on "stimulating
work incentives" by tightening eligibility requirements,
lowering benefits, and making disqualifications more severe,
and it is possible that efforts will also be made to amend the
law so as to permit (or require) states to limit benefits only to
those who meet needs or income tests.
The UI program has always been vulnerable to charges
that it is easy for claimants to cheat by not reporting all earn-
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ings for a week, by false statements about their availability
for work, by insincere and half-hearted searches for a job.
Everyone seems to know someone who has collected benefits
apparently without being ready, willing and able to work.
There is no question that some of the alleged abuse is real.
Application of the availability and work search tests is the
weakest aspect of UI administration.
Recent national administrations have tended to view abuse
and fraud as common if not prevailing practices rather than
aberrations. Instead of concentrating on making UI a more
effective protection for individuals and their families, and a
more effective counter-recessionary tool, they have focused
on reducing abuse and providing new incentives to return to
work, such as increasing the penalties for turning down a
suitable job; considering as suitable any job the claimant is
physically able to perform if it pays more than either the
minimum wage or the claimant©s weekly benefit amount; re
quiring that claimants produce tangible evidence of their
work search efforts.
The disregard of such factors as the claimant©s prior work
experience, his skills and training and his past earnings levels
only adds to employers© problems, since few individuals are
likely to remain long in a job that is not compatible with
their training and experience and out of line with their prior
wage levels. It adds also to the problems of other
unemployed individuals for whom the job, taken temporari
ly by the "over qualified" claimant, is suitable. The tangible
evidence of work search requirement results in the claimant
making employer contacts solely for the purpose of meeting
the requirement a futile effort by the claimant and a
nuisance to employers.
A better approach, tried on an experimental basis from
time to time, is a positive, thorough application of each
state©s existing availability for work and work search re-
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quirements. Such an approach requires individualized treat
ment of each claimant to the greatest feasible extent. It in
volves joint employment service and UI evaluation of the
claimant©s prospects for local reemployment in his usual oc
cupation and his need and aptitude for acquiring new skills
that are in demand. Most important, for claimants not ex
pecting recall to their jobs, it requires the early cooperative
development by the employment service and UI staff with
the claimant of a plan representing the most realistic path to
the claimant©s reemployment in suitable work; actual im
plementation of the plan and adjustment of the plan when
necessary; and a periodic evaluation of the claimant©s own
pursuit of the plan and of his availability for work. 23 This
approach is expensive, but it may be cost effective if all
social as well as program costs are taken into account. It
represents the most productive and realistic approach possi
ble, from the standpoint of the claimant, the state agency,
and employers.
The effective application of a thorough reemployment ser
vice would also permit the early indentification of those in
dividuals not really committed to working. Accordingly, this
approach would seem to be the most effective means of
reducing abuse of the program by claimants. It should also
help in restoring public confidence in state ability to limit
benefit payments only to those who genuinely meet the state
eligibility conditions.
A third basic responsibility of the system is to provide ade
quate benefits. A sure invitation to increased federal control
of the program is for the states to continue to fall short of
this goal. Federal benefit standards have received con
siderable support in the past primarily because states
neglected to prescribe reasonable benefit levels. Clearly such
standards are not likely in the immediate future. However,
the current federal emphasis on cutting costs will in time be
replaced by a genuine concern for the plight of unemployed
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workers. It will be accompanied by a growing conviction that
a state UI program should be expected to meet some
reasonable benchmark of minimum benefit adequacy to
qualify the state©s employers for credit against the federal
tax. Unless the states do this voluntarily, it will be done for
them.
A fourth basic responsibility is for the system to
reestablish reasonable program objectives and goals. This
means resumption by the federal partner of its responsibility
for developing and recommending provisions for state con
sideration based on criteria of fairness and adequacy, as well
as cost. Resumption of its traditional advocacy role (by a
DOL genuinely committed to strengthening UI) would pro
vide a needed focus on program improvement, abandoned to
cost considerations in recent years. It would represent a
return by the federal partner to a role of leadership in
establishing broad as well as specific program goals and in
persuading states of the merits of its recommendations on
the basis of reason, research and experience, rather than
coercion.
If adopted, these four general recommendations should
help renew public confidence in unemployment insurance.
Their adoption should lead to greater support for the pro
gram©s original objectives and a change in the current public
image of the claimant as lazy, devious and undeserving.
These changes in the public perceptions would seem to be
prerequisite to restoring the traditional federal-state balance
of power. In addition, if the old partnership is to be revived,
it seems necessary that there also be greater public awareness
of the hazards of centralized control and the values of a
pluralistic system. Perhaps this monograph will contribute to
that end.
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